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New Proposals Offered to CFE Talks in Vienna

LD1904192191 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Commentary by Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] You'll remember that when the Paris agreement was signed last November to reduce conventional armed forces, the United States and later its NATO partners raised the issue of trust. The Soviet General Staff was accused of attaching some of the forces to other armed services, in particular three divisions guarding the sea coast. Another question raised was the redeployment of many tanks to the Asian region of the Soviet Union. The American side accepted explanations concerning the tanks as in keeping with the treaty. The three divisions proved a more delicate matter. The Soviet side explained that all three divisions had been formed before the talks. The American side knew it. This was a natural response to the American flat refusal to negotiate a naval forces reduction. But the United States has left this country so far behind in this armed service that the three marine divisions cannot possibly upset the correlation.

The talks have come to a standstill. The Soviet Union, in trying to find a solution, has suggested to its detriment to include the armament of these three marine divisions into the general quota to conform this agreement to the Paris agreement. As a result the two sides have seemed to become closer together. As for trust, this country is actively trying to stimulate it. Take its latest proposal for stability building measures. Under this proposal no European nation must carry out any military activity with an overall total of more than 40,000 men. Other ceilings suggested are not more than 800 tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, and 400 war planes. The proposal also suggests that not more than six military exercises or other measures must be held within a year and not more than 13,000 servicemen involved. In short, the Soviet Union has suggested far-reaching moves to scale-down the armed confrontation in Europe. It hopes for reciprocity at the talks. This alone can keep disarmament dynamic.

Bogachev Views U.S. ABM Treaty 'Violations'

LD2104124691 Moscow TASS in English 1236 GMT 21 Apr 91

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—Even after the U.S. Administration has reconsidered the objectives of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) programme, reorienting it to ensuring defence against limited missile strikes, the Star Wars programme still envisages the development of anti-missile defence weapons banned by the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

The leaders of the U.S. SDI organisation maintain that the renewed SDI programme still presupposes the use of space-based interceptors banned by the 1972 treaty. The development of air- and sea-launched ABM systems is under study, although they are also outlawed by the treaty.

Under the 1974 Soviet-U.S. protocol, each party has the right to deploy not more than 100 anti-ballistic missiles in one area with a radius of 150 kilometres. Under the "smaller-scale and not so costly" SDI project, as it is referred to in Washington, there will be about 1,000 space-based ABM systems alone.

The Soviet Union and the United States undertook not to deploy missiles outside their national territories. However, the U.S. Administration now plans to deploy a system for the anti-missile defence of U.S. troops as well as of "friends and allies of the United States" abroad.

Some three years ago U.S. Administration spokesmen tried to somehow justify planned violations of the ABM treaty. Even a commission was set up at one time. It came up with the concept of a "broad and narrow interpretation of the treaty", making it possible to deploy ABM systems based on new physical principles worked out after 1972.

It appears that Washington has now abandoned attempts at legal justification of the violations of its obligations under the ABM treaty. Even SDI programme director Mr Cooper acknowledges that the "implementation of some elements" of the planned ABM system would be a breach of the treaty. He now argues about the need to go ahead with the Star Wars programme by pleading "instability in the Soviet union".

The 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate and retains its legal force up to now. However, Washington is apparently steering matters towards violating the treaty, this time in an overt manner already.

At one time U.S. adepts of the philosophy of political realism referred to arms control treaties as "mere pieces of paper", maintaining that the gun muzzle was the only reliable arbiter in international relations.

Such evaluations of international accords, it seems, have re-gained currency in Washington.

United States & Canada

Visiting U.S. Senate Delegation Criticized

LD1904170391 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS international observer Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—A delegation from the U.S. Senate headed by Senator David Boren, Democrat from Oklahoma, visited the Soviet Union in late March and early April. It was a representative and respectable delegation comprising five senators and five Senate staffers, all politicians well versed in international affairs and representing a variety of orientations.

In Moscow, delegation members met member of the USSR Security Council Yevgeniy Primakov, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov and other influential politicians. Reports about the visit published by the IZVESTIYA newspaper created an impression that Moscow encounters with the Senate delegation helped deepen mutual understanding and constructive dialogue concerning a wide range of problems.

Unfortunately, nothing much came out of this impression. In closing their visit to Moscow, senators unexpectedly asked for help in arranging a trip to Riga, saying they wanted to "look deeper into the situation" in Latvia. Moscow showed goodwill and the opportunity to visit the Latvian capital was provided. However, they used the trip not so much in order to "look deeper" into the situation as in order to make several public statements. Some of which were tantamount to direct intervention into the domestic affairs of this country.

Judge for yourself. According to the Latvian DIENA news agency, the delegation leader, David Boren, spoke at the news conference in Riga on April 3 about the "illegal" incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union. Senator Howell Heflin said in an interview with the daily review programme of Radio Latvia that "we have arrived to pressure the leaders of the USSR".

None of these aims, made public by delegation members in Riga, was mentioned when visas were issued to them. Moscow's attitude to the trip would have been different if delegation members had candidly stated before they entered the country that their purpose was to bring pressure to bear on the leaders of the USSR concerning an acute problem of domestic politics.

In this connection, it would not be amiss to recall the scandalous mission to the Baltic last February by a group of U.S. Congressmen headed by Steny Hoyer. During that trip, group members sought to openly support nationalistic forces in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by throwing their weight and influence to bolster the position of a side in the domestic conflict within the Soviet Union.

In both cases, U.S. legislators failed to show elementary political tact and respect for hospitality norms. Worst of all, they never said a word to their colleagues in the Baltic about the need and importance of observing the Soviet Constitution and laws based on it. A legitimate question arises: Does the behavior of the U.S. congressmen really aim at strengthening Soviet-American relations?

New U.S. Envoy's Armenian Background Queried

PM1904212591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 1

[A. Vasilyev report: "Matlock Packing His Cases"]

[Text] According to reports from well-informed sources, Jack Matlock's term as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union ends this fall. A replacement has been found. The present U.S. ambassador to Syria, Edward Djerejian—an experienced diplomat, like Matlock with a knowledge of the Russian language—will be the next resident of the house on Spasopeskovskiy Street (Spaso House—as Americans call their ambassador's residence in Moscow).

It is interesting that E. Djerejian is Armenian by nationality. I would like to know whether, when selecting this candidate, people in Washington took into consideration the effect this will have on the nature of relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. After all, literally two or three years ago the question of which of the two nationalities had more influence over the country's supreme leadership came under vigorous discussion in Moscow. "Independent experts" gave clear preference to the Armenians, especially after one of M.S. Gorbachev's visits to the United States, during which Raisa Maksimovna had close contacts with leaders of the U.S. Armenian community...

China

Spokesman on Troop Reduction Talks With PRC

LD1804170291 Moscow TASS in English 1604 GMT 18 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Postanogov, Sergey Ryabikin, and Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The third round of Soviet- Chinese talks on a mutual reduction of troops and military confidence-building in the border area were held in Moscow between April 4 and 18, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said at a briefing here today.

The exchange of views, held, as usual, in an atmosphere of constructive cooperation, made it possible to consolidate mutual understanding between the two states and promoted the expansion of the spheres of agreement.

The sides agreed that they would start soon the development, on the basis of an intergovernmental guidelines agreement, of a common document on a whole package of problems dealing with the reduction of the armed forces.

According to Gremitskikh, the Chinese delegation was received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev. It also visited the Belorussian military district.

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev-Kaifu Talks Result in Communique

TASS on Fourth, Fifth Rounds

LD1804154391 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo April 18 TASS—The fourth and fifth rounds of talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Toshiki Kaifu took place today. They discussed in a comprehensive and detailed way the issues included in the future peace treaty. In this context they analysed the proposals of the sides concerning a joint communique on the results of the visit. A thorough analysis of the approaches of the two sides to any problem, as well as attention to each other's arguments, shows an enormous significance attached to the improvement of bilateral relations.

One can state even now that important work has been fulfilled on the summit level, which is introducing a new element to Soviet-Japanese mutual understanding and expanding the content of a political dialogue. The talks between the Soviet president and the Japanese prime minister are strengthening conditions for reaching a higher level of working out the peace treaty. They are invariably held in a benevolent atmosphere.

The Soviet leader expressed a number of ideas, which put on a practical footing a political formula of the settlement of the existing problems, thus expressing his goodwill and taking into consideration real interdependence of processes, leading to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Both rounds were held in a narrow circle, with the participation of foreign ministers.

No Compromise on Territories

LD1804141191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1115 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov in Tokyo—live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Hello.

[Tsvetov] Hello.

[Announcer] You have already said in your reports that in the Japanese capital you are almost the only one representing the independent media.

[Tsvetov] I am the only one, to be more accurate. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] As far as I know, the president's itinerary has been changed, which evidently has been caused by some kind of extraordinary circumstances, which I ask you to comment on:

[Tsvetov] Yes, the circumstances are indeed extraordinary. It appears that what many expected and feared is taking place. The positions of the Soviet Union and Japan on the question of territorial demarcation have turned out to be too distant from each other. [passage omitted] The minimums and maximums of what is possible for the Soviet and Japanese sides have so far not coincided. The fifth unforeseen round of talks between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu has now ended without results. A sixth round will start in an hour. Both leaders are looking for a way out of the impasse, but their hands are tied: They are tied by public opinion in their own countries, and this public opinion is not ready for compromise. Long years of reciprocal ideologization of relations has made Gorbachev and Kaifu their own hostages.

Last night there was a meeting of the leaders of the Liberal Democrat Party, at which the hawks from among the party elite resolutely demanded of Kaifu that he should not sign a joint statement with Gorbachev on the results of talks if in the text there was not an admission by the Soviet Union of Japanese sovereignty over the islands. In order not to repeat myself in citing the utterances of the hawks to Kaifu, I refer listeners to speeches made by critics of Gorbachev at the last CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The accusations coincide almost word for word.

So the fifth round of talks is continuing. That is, they continued up to the point when I began talking to you. They have just ended.

The farewell ceremony given by the emperor and empress for the Gorbachevs has been postponed until tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev: Talks 'Difficult'

PM1904140591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Report by special correspondents T. Kolesnichenko and I. Latyshev: "Japan: Day Three; USSR President Tells PRAVDA Correspondents Talks Were Very Difficult"]

[Text] Tokyo, 18 Apr—The hardest day of talks between M.S. Gorbachev and Prime Minister T. Kaifu has arrived. The day also can be said to conclude the official part of the Soviet president's visit to Japan.

Jumping ahead slightly, we should say that in the interval between the talks we managed to meet and speak with the USSR president. Here is what he told us: "The talks have been very difficult, of course. But we have managed to create a businesslike and, I would say, sincere atmosphere. I think that this atmosphere will help us to work out a formula that will satisfy both sides. The route of pressure and ultimatums is unacceptable. That is clear to everyone. We are striving to reach agreement on a healthy, principled basis."

The difficulties both leaders have encountered are shown by the fact that the program for the visit has been entirely changed. At the time of writing it is almost 1900 hours here, and the talks are still going on behind closed doors.

The English word "blackout"—meaning a complete refusal to issue information—is again on the lips of the many thousands of journalists here. This was not the case during recent Soviet-U.S. summits. But it has been the case on previous occasions—at Geneva and Reykjavik, for example, when the talks between the leaders were very tough and their participants sought a way out of the deadlock virtually on their own.

This has now been repeated in Tokyo. Moreover, at the Japanese side's request, the third round of talks was held in the presence of a restricted number of participants, and it was decided by mutual consent not to reveal beforehand the details of the exchange of opinions. This is being observed all the more today.

A "blackout" is one thing, but journalists' commentaries—without which no newspaper would appear—are another. There have been many of them. Some remain in the air, so to speak, exchanged by the journalists themselves who have not gotten any sleep for the past few nights. Others are put down on paper and aired on television. The general opinion is that the talks are trying to find an acceptable formula on just one dispute. But this issue is the stumbling block that prevents the two sides getting moving. The Japanese call it the "Northern Territories problem," referring to the transfer to them of the four islands of the Kuril group, which belong to the USSR. But for us, as was clear from the USSR president's speech in the Japanese legislature, this is a "problem of territorial demarcation." This formula generated various commentaries in the Japanese press. Nobody is prohibited from arguing (rather than conjecturing). But we would particularly like to emphasize that the formula used by our president does not go beyond the framework, for example, of statements that are well known to the Japanese side—for example, these expressions were used by Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh at the talks this March.

In general it should be said that the Japanese side, in our opinion, has now fallen victim to the fuss that the local press—with the blessing of certain Japanese officials—whipped up here on the eve of the Soviet-Japanese summit. The press directly linked the visit to the "territorial problem." They demanded that Kaifu should "not budge one iota." But that way lies deadlock. It is well known that diplomacy is the art of the possible. You cannot demand the impossible. Therefore, we should nevertheless hope that common sense will prevail and that a reasonable compromise will have been reached today.

But it is already clear that the Soviet president's visit has gone far beyond this persistently aired problem. It has covered the broadest spheres of Soviet-Japanese cooperation.

The talks are over. A joint statement has been adopted that opens a new chapter in Soviet-Japanese relations. This was stressed by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev at a late-night press conference. Answering PRAVDA's questions, the president said that there had been a breakthrough [proryv] in Soviet-Japanese relations. It is a question of the interaction of economic and political factors and the creation of a new atmosphere in Soviet-Japanese relations. And this presupposes Japan's active participation in promoting our country's transition to a market economy. Given these facts, we can conclude that the summit talks were successful.

'First Signs of Trust' Seen

PM1904141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondents S. Agafonov and S. Kondrashov from Tokyo: "Dramatic Subject of Talks"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The third meeting with Kaifu was one-on-one, and the fourth was followed in the afternoon by a completely unexpected fifth, which put off the signing of the final documents and M.S. Gorbachev's news conference at the National Press Club and, furthermore, jeopardized the trip to Kyoto and Nagasaki planned for the end of the visit.

As a rule, the Soviet president's news conferences with Bush, Mitterrand, and Kohl have now become joint events. But after the initial contacts, that did not happen with Kaifu. In just three days you cannot melt the glaciers that have grown more than they have thawed in the long years since the war, not to mention the long years before the war. But a fundamental start has been made—the start of a breakthrough for the better. As far as one can judge, the first signs of trust, the fabric of trust, appeared in the first large-scale top-level dialogue.

Movement toward a peace treaty will be the most important factor in the process of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. In 1945 the USSR and Japan fought for less than one month, if you can call the immediate capitulation of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria a war at all. But after more than 40 years we are still unable to conclude a peace treaty. Addressing parliament, Gorbachev said that this is "absolutely abnormal" and called for movement toward a peace treaty "without excluding anything positive that has been produced in bilateral talks in various years."

The milestones of subsequent movement have been roughly outlined: A visit by Kaifu to Moscow, possibly in August this year; a return visit by the Soviet president to Japan next year; and another visit by the Japanese premier during which, it is presently thought, the conclusion of the peace treaty is planned.

But the greatest difficulty remains. That is the territorial question, which the Japanese still prefer to call the question of the return of the "Northern Territories" but which we recently—since Bessmertnykh's preparatory visit to Tokyo in March—have been calling "territorial demarcation." This question inevitably cropped up at the first round of Gorbachev-Kaifu talks, where the sides set out their positions and the Japanese side proposed not giving reports to the press, presumably so as not to further fuel passions. The territorial question and the difficult search for points of contact, it is reported, dominated the one-on-one meeting, too. It also predetermined the intensity and dramatic nature of the talks, the need for a fourth round which, incidentally, had not been ruled out from the very beginning, and finally the fifth round, which was not planned at all.

The gradual nature of the movement toward a peace treaty demonstrates that the main obstacle in Soviet-Japanese relations cannot be removed at once. It will take time and increasing trust on a broad range of bilateral and international problems. It will take the utmost art of diplomatic maneuvering—given the diametrically opposed positions of Soviet and Japanese public opinion on the ownership of the four disputed islands.

One of the writers of this piece has covered several of Gorbachev's visits to the United States and other countries. He has seen much, but now feels for the first time that there are two invisible participants peering over the shoulders of the Soviet president and the Japanese prime minister even when they are meeting one-on-one. One of those spirits has been summoned by Kaifu, and it is not too difficult to discern President Bush here. In their relations with us, the Japanese want nothing that would hamper their close strategic alliance with the United States or their military dependence on and economic benefit from the main Western power. This spirit of suspicion can in principle be dispelled—which is what Gorbachev sought in his talks with Kaifu when emphasizing factors that are well known and not far-fetched: Cooperation between the USSR and the United States not to the detriment of other countries, and the durability and confidentiality of the two presidents' personal relations which have stood the test of international practice.

The second spirit is one of our own—an importunate and unpredictable one. At the moment, he is resisting requests and attempts to persuade him to "leave the premises." He hovers over the official negotiating table and is there in virtually every conversation with all politically knowledgeable Japanese. What can we expect from you and how should we treat you—you read in everyone's looks and hear in their words—if you cannot put your own house in order. This is a spirit of our own, a domestic spirit of disorder, discord, and dissension. [passage omitted]

Kaifu Offers 'Major Concession'

LD1804104191 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] A senior Japanese official said Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made a major concession in talks on Thursday with President Mikhail Gorbachev to reach a compromise on the territorial dispute, which has soured relations for decades. Another official indicated that the Soviet president's acceptance of the revised proposal would lead to a long-sought Japanese aid for his country's economy. The two leaders were locked in negotiations throughout Thursday, forcing President Gorbachev to delay or cancel most of his scheduled activities. A Japanese Foreign Ministry official acknowledged that the Soviet president was unwilling to meet Tokyo's demands that he at least recognize a never fulfilled Soviet promise of 1956 to return two of the four disputed islands. The senior official said Tokyo therefore dropped that demand and instead was asking Gorbachev to acknowledge that all four islands are a part of the dispute to be negotiated. The official referred to the concession as the one and final offer, adding that if the Soviet side declined it it would kill the talks. Another Foreign Ministry official said that if President Gorbachev agrees to Tokyo's scaled-down demands, Japan would certainly consider economic assistance. The two nations have already agreed on 15 documents to be signed on Thursday under which Japan will offer technical assistance for economic reforms.

TASS Reports Agreements

LD1804153591 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo April 18 TASS—Talks between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu lasted until late on Thursday. They ended with the adoption of the Soviet-Japanese joint statement and the signing of a number of agreements on cooperation.

The central agreement is the joint Soviet-Japanese statement signed by President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu.

Gorbachev Addresses Ceremony

LD1804230191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today was fairly busy for those participating in the Soviet-Japanese talks in Tokyo. Two unplanned rounds of talks were added to the planned

one, and REUTER, commenting upon what has been taking place in Tokyo, called these talks an unprecedented political marathon.

[Correspondent] Today's main event was the signing of intergovernmental Soviet-Japanese agreements in the Akasaka Palace. All in all, 14 agreements and intergovernmental documents were prepared. Their signing takes Soviet-Japanese relations onto a new level and lays the foundation for real good-neighborliness and cooperation between our countries. President Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu are signing the main document: the joint Soviet-Japanese statement on the results of the visit. It lays down the agreements reached during the talks between the USSR and Japan.

A large number of documents concern the further development of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic links. Among these, the agreement on technical cooperation by Japan in the economic restructuring of the Soviet Union is of primary significance. According to this, Japan will provide assistance by means of its know-how and experience in such areas as direction of the economy, financial and currency policy, the organization of medium-sized and small enterprises, and relations between management and labor. The Japanese Government intends to actively cooperate with our country in strengthening the reconstruction of our industry and will create a center for training cadres in the business of trade.

An agreement on trade and payments is also being signed, one on coastal trade and cooperation in protecting the environment. Among the agreements in the humanitarian sphere, the inter-governmental agreement on guaranteeing visiting rights for the relatives of Russian citizens buried on Japanese territory, and for relatives of Japanese buried on USSR territory, are of great significance. The agreement on Japanese cooperation in overcoming the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station is also an important humanitarian document.

Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Union's minister of foreign affairs, handed Taro Nakayama, the head of the Japanese foreign policy department, a list of Japanese prisoners of war who died on Soviet territory. After signing the agreements, President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu exchanged brief speeches. [passage omitted] [video shows Gorbachev addressing the assembled dignitaries]

[Begin Gorbachev recording] Respected Prime Minister, respected gentlemen. Today we are present at an outstanding event in the history of Soviet-Japanese relations. This evening representatives of the Soviet Union and Japan have signed a joint statement of fundamental importance and a package of agreements and documents unprecendented in their scope.

We can speak of a major step on the way to new relations between our great neighboring peoples, between two world powers. We can speak about accelerating work on a peace agreement, the development of economic cooperation, and development in other areas.

I would like to single out the concluding document, the agreement on technical assistance in restructuring, and the one on cooperation in overcoming the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the people and Government of Japan for their noble, humane, and commendably human stance on these issues.

I would particularly like to note the agreement on the problems bequeathed to us by the war, connected with the burial of servicemen. Implementation of it is already starting. Today we handed over the list of Japanese prisoners of war who died on the territory of the Soviet Union. Let the memory of past tragedies provoke us into conducting affairs with each other so that it will never again be necessary to experience anything of the kind.

Allow me to express the hope that the new agreements and documents, in reinforcing and broadening the treaty-based, legal foundation of Soviet-Japanese relations, will impart a new impulse to bilateral cooperation and will support the development of good- neighborliness, and in increasing mutual links between our countries.

Our common task is to translate what is laid down in the documents into the language of practical matters. Let it be according to Eastern wisdom: From these let the great road to a thousand rin [old name for a unit of Japanese currency, i.e. the road to prosperity] commence. [end recording]

'Full Text' of Joint Communique

CM2204102991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 91

[Text]

Japan-USSR Joint Communique

1. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics paid an official visit to Japan from April 16 through April 19, 1991, at the invitation of the Government of Japan. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was accompanied by Minister for Foreign Affairs A.A. Bessmertnykh of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other officials.

2. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mrs. Gorbachev had an audience with their imperial highnesses the emperor and the empress of Japan in the Imperial Palace on April 16.

3. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had frank and constructive discussions with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan on questions of Soviet-Japanese relations, including the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty, and on the main international issues of mutual interest. President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics invited Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan to pay an official visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which invitation was gratefully accepted. The details of the visit are to be arranged through diplomatic channels.

4. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan and President M.S. Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held an in- depth and thorough discussion of the total range of issues relating to the drafting and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the issue of territorial demarcation, with consideration to the two sides' positions on the ownership of the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.

The joint work done previously—particularly the talks at summit level—have made it possible to state a number of conceptual provisions: The peace treaty should be the document marking the final resolution of war-related issues, including the territorial issue, that it should open the way for long-term Japan- U.S.S.R. relations on the basis of friendship, and that it should not infringe upon either side's security.

The Soviet side proposed that measures be taken in the near future to expand exchanges between residents of Japan and residents of the aforementioned islands, to establish a simplified visa-free framework for visits by Japanese to these islands, to initiate joint mutually beneficial economic activities in that region, and to reduce the Soviet military forces stationed on the islands. The Japanese side stated its intention to consult on these questions in the future.

As well as emphasizing the primary importance of accelerating work to conclude the preparations on the peace treaty, the prime minister and the president expressed their firm resolve to make constructive and vigorous efforts to this end taking advantage of all positive elements that have been built up in the bilateral negotiations in the years since Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly proclaimed an end to the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956.

At the same time, they recognized that the development of constructive cooperation between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the adjacent Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, in the trade and economic, scientific and technological, and political as well as in the social activity, cultural, educational, tourism, and sports fields through free and wide-ranging exchanges between the peoples of the two countries in mutual relations in an atmosphere of good-neighborliness, mutual benefit, and trust is advisable.

5. Affirming that expanded political dialogue is a useful and effective means of enhancing Japan-U.S.S.R. relations, the two sides announced their determination to work to continue, deepen, and advance this political dialogue through regular exchanges of visits at the highest level.

6. Noting the importance of holding regular foreign ministerial consulations, as agreed in 1966, the two sides affirmed that such consultations should be held at least once a year, and more frequently if necessary.

7. The two sides affirmed that they guide their bilateral relations in accordance with the principles elucidated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principles of:

I. Settling their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

II. Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

8. The two sides are in agreement that this summit meeting was extremely useful for both sides. Noting the importance of expanding, and making more active, cooperation in practical fields, the two sides have produced the following.

- Memorandum on consultations between the Governments of Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on cooperation in regard to technical support for the reforms now under way in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to shift to a market economy
- Agreement on trade and payments between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period 1991 through 1995
- Exchange of notes on trade in consumer and other goods with the Far East region of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Japan-U.S.S.R. joint communique on encouraging the mutual holding of exhibitions and trade fairs
- Japan-U.S.S.R. joint communique on progress in cooperation in the field of fisheries
- Exchange of notes concerning amendment of Appendix I of the Japan-USSR aviation agreement
- Exchange of notes between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on expanding air services on the Siberian route
- Agreement on cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the field of environmental conservation
- Agreement beween the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear power
- Memorandum on cooperation between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to reduce the impact of the Chernobyl atomic power station accident on the health of residents of the area

- Exchange of notes approving the plans proposed for implementing the agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on cultural exchanges during the period April 1, 1991 through March 31, 1993
- Memorandum on links and cooperation between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the field of conserving important cultural properties
- Japan-U.S.S.R. joint communique on cooperation relating to the activities of the Center for Modern Japanese Studies
- Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on persons interned in prisoner of war camps

9. The two sides were in agreement on the need to further deepen and develop practical relations between the two countries on economic consultations in a balanced manner and to the extent feasible on the basis of friendship and mutual benefit so as to contribute to the improvement of living standards for the people of Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and further progress in the international community.

10. Expressing their high regard for the activities of the Japan-USSR governmental trade and economic consultations, Japan-USSR and USSR-Japan committees on economic cooperation, the two sides announced their readiness to promote further expansion of trade and economic relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit. The two sides share the understanding that the continued promotion of perestroyka in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of significance not only for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but for the entire world.

11. The two sides evaluated highly the cooperation between the two countries under the existing governmental agreements in the fisheries field and were agreed on the desirability of continuing constructive exchanges of views so as to further develop such cooperation on a long-term and mutually beneficial basis.

In this regard, the two sides expressed the desire to see extensive development of relations between enterprises and organizations in Japan and the Far Eastern region of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics based on market economy principles. The two sides recognized the necessity of maintaining and developing close cooperation in international deliberations for the conservation, management, reproduction, and optimal utilization of the world's biomarine resources (also in such activities of the international organizations to which both governments are parties).

12. The two sides announced their satisfaction with the activities of the committee on science and technology cooperation and the steady progress being made in cooperation in the field of science and technology between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit and were in agreement on working to further develop such cooperation and to expand cooperation in such other fields as might be deemed necessary by the two sides.

13. The two sides announced their satisfaction that cultural exchange between the two countries has recently been becoming increasingly active and that mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries is being deepened. The two sides also expressed their satisfaction with the steady progress being made in developing cultural exchanges between the two countries under the existing agreement and were in agreement on the importance of exchanges to further promote mutual understanding of the two countries' traditional and contemporary cultures and societies.

14. The two sides recognized that cooperation between the two countries in the humanitarian field contributes considerably to enhancing mutual trust between the two peoples and expressed their satisfaction that such cooperation is becoming increasingly active as regards visits to gravesites, the issue of persons interned in prisoner of war camps, and the issue of Japanese permanently living in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

15. The two sides agreed that the process of improvement in the international situation is of an irreversible nature on a global scale and regional scale and should be further promoted. The two sides stressed the need to continue efforts to maintain international peace and security and the importance of attaining, in a balanced manner, the lowest levels of military forces and arms possible. In this connection, the two sides welcomed the results attained in arms control and disarmament and recognized the importance of faithful implementation and supported the attainment of early agreement in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations now under way in this field.

16. In light of the harsh lessons of the crisis in the Gulf and from the perspective of maintaining international peace and security, the two sides have a shared recognition of the need for the international community to strengthen its efforts for the nonproliferation of nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles, for the enhancement of transparency and openness on conventional arms transfers, and for the strengthening of self-restraint on conventional arms transfers by all countries.

17. Given their place and responsibility in international politics and economics in conditions of the modern world order, when rapid changes are occurring in the situation of the ending of the "cold war," the sides were agreed that it is important to achieve a complete normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations and to pave the way for a rapid development of these relations and that achieving this will not only be in the two countries' own interests but will also contribute to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and worldwide.

18. The two sides have a high regard for the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations and for the important contribution that they have made to the resolution of regional conflicts, to the strengthening of mutual understanding, trust, and stability worldwide, and to the expansion of constructive cooperation and collaboration within the framework of the present international community. The two sides were in agreement that the United Nations has an important role to play in the resolution of international issues, including the fight against illegal trafficking in drugs. The two sides were in agreement in recognizing the need for the two countries to further promote their cooperation and consultations for supporting the full flowering of the United Nations' potential for peace and enhancing the role of the United Nations on global issues.

The two sides recognized that "the former enemy clauses" in the United Nations Charter have lost their meaning and, mindful of the need to strengthen the United Nations Charter and the united Nations, agreed that appropriate ways should be sought to resolve this issue.

19. The two sides had shared awareness that the solidarity and cooperation of the international community centering on the United Nations in dealing with the crisis in the Gulf made the liberation of Kuwait possible and were in agreement that peace and security must be restored to the region through Iraq's prompt compliance with the series of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Recognizing that the Middle East region is extremely important to international peace, the two sides had a shared awareness that it is important that the international community as a whole, respecting the intentions and activities of the countries in the region, work in concert and cooperate actively for postwar economic reconstruction in that region to ensure peace and prosperity not only in the Middle East but worldwide.

The two sides believe that it is extremely important that, together with efforts to work for post-crisis reconstruction in the Gulf region, the international community should support efforts for the early resolution of other hotbeds of conflict in the Middle East, primarily for a Middle East settlement and the initiation of a meaningful peace process to that end.

20. The two sides evaluated the efforts being made for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. In this connection, the two sides supported efforts for just and reasonable resolution of conflicts in this region through peaceful means and shared an awareness of the importance of providing constructive cooperation for the self-reliant efforts of the states of the region and of always respecting those states' own initiatives and decisions.

21. The two sides announced their profound interest in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and, and on the basis of a common understanding of the importance of progress in North-South dialogue for their attainment, supported the continuation of the North-South prime ministerial talks. In this connection, the Japanese side welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet side welcomed the start of discussions between Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the normalization of their relations, both as contributing to the relaxation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. The two sides expressed their hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will promptly conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

22. The two sides touched upon the great importance of the draft agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict drawn up by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. In this connection, Japan expressed its appreciation for the contribution made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and the Soviet Union welcomed the recent efforts by Japan to encourage the Cambodian parties to accept the draft agreements on a comprehensive political settlement. The two sides were in agreement on the need to continue to endeavor for the early attainment of a comprehensive Cambodian settlement.

23. The two sides were in agreement on the need to further strengthen the international trend toward relaxation of tensions and the importance of expanding the dialogue and contacts between the two countries on a broad range of issues, including security aspects, from the perspective of promoting peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The two sides expressed their high regard for the consultations held between the two countries' foreign ministry foreign policy planning subdivisions in December 1990 as a means to that end and gave their approval for further continuing these consultations.

24. The two sides had a positive regard for the cooperation taking place among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and in the appropriate economic organizations for regional prosperity in keeping with the principles of freedom and openness. In this connection, Japan welcomed the desire of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shares the said principles, to be a member of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had a positive regard for Japanese contributions to the promotion of economic development in the region.

The President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Prime Minister of Japan

Tokyo, 18 Apr 1991

Gorbachev's Activities in Tokyo Detailed

LD1804181591 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Report from Tokyo by correspondent V. Lyubovtsev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The third day of President Gorbachev's stay on Japanese soil began with a tree-planting ceremony at the Akasaka Palace. This honor is conferred on particularly honored guests of the Japanese government. Trees have been planted in this part by President Ford of the United States and Queen Elizabeth II of Britain. A symbolic thing is that the two leaders of our countries are taking part in this traditional Japanese ceremony. This Japanese sapling, which is of a modest appearance and a symbol of life, will remain as a fine memory of the stay of the Soviet guests on Japanese soil.

This day of the visit was almost wholly devoted to the talks between the USSR president and the Japanese prime minister. In the morning the fourth round took place. Then Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Toshiki Kaifu agreed to hold new, additional meetings. They only finished late in the evening. The duration of these talks is understandable. Complex and difficult issues are being discussed. For this reason the talks have also been difficult and complex. But, as has been noted in Tokyo, they are being held in an atmosphere of frankness and there has been a desire to find mutually acceptable solutions to all the difficult problems inherited from the past, including the problems of territorial demarcation. It is hoped here that as a result solutions will be found and significant steps taken toward the establishment of genuinely goodneighborly and friendly relations between our country.

Approaches to resolving problems relating to inter-state relations are being worked out not only at the negotiating table. In this sense the luncheon given on behalf of the leaders of Japan's parliament and the leaders of the political parties was yet a further opportunity to compare positions and to find points of contact on yet unresolved issues. On the Japanese side the luncheon was attended by the most influential politicians including former prime ministers Takeshita and Nakasone; Shintaro Abe, a prominent figure in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party; and Takako Doi, chairman of the Socialist Party. On the Soviet side it was attended by officials accompanying the president, advisers and USSR people's deputies.

This meeting with parliamentary leaders and leaders of political parties is the more noteworthy in that precisely yesterday, in his speech to the Japanese parliament, the president put forward a number of new proposals, in particular on holding a conference on security issues relating to the Asian-Pacific region with the involvement of five states. The majority of local observers, incidentally, are noting the warmth, unusual for parliament, with which the president's speech was received. The words of greetings exchanged at the luncheon by Sakurauchi, president of the House of Representatives of the Japanese parliament, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev were also friendly and amicable.

Gorbachev Holds Tokyo News Conference

LD1804185791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1535 GMT 18 Apr 91

[News conference with President Mikhail Gorbachev by domestic and foreign journalists at the Japan International Press Club in Tokyo—live]

[Text] Good evening. As I am from Moscow and it is still evening over there, I can greet you in this way; otherwise, one could already say good morning!

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, comrades! Our visit to Japan is drawing to a close. This visit has been awaited in the Soviet Union and Japan for a long time. Even before it started, the world press of our two countries [as heard] evaluated it in different ways, even described it as an historic one and made forecasts. Indeed, this is the first Japanese-Soviet meeting at the highest level on Japanese soil in more than a century and a half of diplomatic relations. At the same time, an end has been put to the abnormal situation in which leaders of the Soviet Union and Japan failed to meet each other even during the years of perestroyka, a time of the most intensive international contacts and the assertion of new principles in international policy, worldwide policy.

Three days of work are behind us, days of intensive, frank—and, I would like to stress—well-disposed dialogue, on the whole. A large-scale and thorough conversation was held on key issues in Soviet-Japanese relations and on important international problems. Still problems of bilateral relations and problems of the peace treaty probably took up about 80 percent of the entire negotiating time. In our discussion we did not try to avoid any sensitive aspects or to hide behind evasive expressions. This also concerns a complex and delicate issue for both sides: the peace treaty, including territorial demarcation.

The Soviet leadership approaches this issue, just like others, in a broad context of bilateral relations, taking into account their whole importance for both countries, for the given region of the world and for the world as a whole. From all angles a genuine breakthrough is needed in Soviet-Japanese relations toward which, I think—and after three days I can perhaps say that I am convinced of this—both sides are striving. One should bear in mind that, in recent years, changes have been sweeping the European continent and a decisive area of world politics like Soviet-U.S. relations, without which it would have been difficult for us to count on these changes with which we are both dealing now. Furthermore, these processes of dynamization in international relations have now embraced the huge Asian-Pacific region.

I can say here that we acknowledge with great satisfaction that dialogue and cooperation have been increasing in all forms with the PRC. Relations have reached a new level with India, both in terms of cooperation, dialogue, and degree of trust. Active ties, and above all a political dialogue, have been created with Indonesia, with the ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand. Generally speaking, there are many things taking place in this region that one can also talk about. We have established diplomatic relations with South Korea. So, the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan which you have observed up to now somehow did not fit into this. Somehow it seemed to be a kind of anachronism.

I think that this is not normal either from the point of view of bilateral interests or from the point of view of world policy. Over 40 years we—the Japanese for their part, and we for our part—have been able to demonstrate we can on the whole live without each other, maintaining normal relations, but not particularly advancing them, or broadening or deepening them. We demonstrated this. But now when the whole world is occupied in rethinking what is going on in it, and we are all thinking, while saying goodbye to the cold war, about a new long period of peaceful development, it is of course not normal for our relations to be in such a condition.

All of this prompted me to leave all our domestic affairs—you are familiar with them, in particular I can see a lot of Muscovites here, and foreign correspondents. And despite the fact that to some degree I have had to cut down on the amount of work linked to foreign policy recently, nevertheless I consider it necessary—and the entire Soviet leadership is of the same opinion—that a state visit to Japan must be undertaken, despite the complexity of the situation.

And so here we are in Japan, six meetings, and if you consider that two had intervals, then eight meetings over, I think, 12 or 14 hours—I have not yet had time to count them—on the whole probably a kind of Guinness record. This is one further confirmation, from another aspect, that business cannot be conducted in such a way, so that later when you meet and begin the conversation, you do not know when or how to end it and you do not have time to discuss all the issues. On the whole, once again we felt that it was necessary to seek a joint compromise and to look for keys to new relations.

The Soviet Union is geared to a decisive improvement of relations with Japan: We say this directly. We are neighbors and will remain neighbors: Two great peoples, two major world powers. In this changing world there cannot be such mutual relations. I think that everything here—politics, and geography, and the fact that we are neighbors—everything is in favor of our cooperating. And on the threshold of the 21st century we must think that the burden which is weighing down those relations must be relinquished. If you...

[Unidentified voice in English interrupts] A little bit more slowly, slowly.

[Translator] You are being asked to go a bit slower.

[Gorbachev] A bit slower? I think I am already going quite slowly. [laughter] All right.

In any event, I am satisfied with the work that has been done here. At the end of the day, we have managed at last to reach a joint statement of agreed positions and have signed a whole package of agreements concerning various fields of cooperation. I regard the result as a major achievement. After that we can think and put a breakthrough in our bilateral relations on to the plane of real policy. We can speak of this now with greater confidence. But everything still lies ahead. I am certain that, in any event, the peoples of our two countries...[changes thought] Politicians will continue to clarify and journalists to argue about what happened here, what one can speak of in general, whether there is exaggeration or euphoria here or not, whether there is a breakthrough or something completely different, whether the entries in the documents match the political possibilities, and so on. There will probably be a lot of talk here. We also have something to think about, both the Japanese side and us.

I think nevertheless that both our peoples will welcome the positive results of this visit. In our country 83 percent in all polls come out—within such a range: 75, 80, 83 percent—in favor of improving relations with Japan. Feelings, benevolent feelings toward the Japanese people are shown; their hard-working nature and modesty are respected. And what is important, noticeable changes are taking place in Japanese society, too. Representatives of the KYODO TSUSHIN are here and they have conveyed to me the data they obtained from studying with our relevant organizations the mood in the Soviet Union and Japan. Only recently in Japan 14 or 16 percent were in favor of expanding cooperation with the Soviet Union—people from the agency can say or confirm—but now, it seems, more than 43 percent favor cooperation. That is, the attitude has changed and the percentage has grown over a short period. Well, I think that it is a task for politicians to express these feeling of two peoples and to find methods for making policy more dynamic.

Profiting by the occasion, I would like to say that ...[pauses] to single out...[pauses] although there have been few of them; perhaps, in the days to come when we visit Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagasaki there may be more live contacts there, since I, to a considerable degree, have been staying at the palace under political arrest. But the things that members of the delegation observed with me, representatives of science and culture who have come here with me, and what Raisa Maksimovna experienced herself in direct contacts with citizens and Tokyo residents shows that, indeed, people have displayed great friendliness and great interest in the visit and they have opened their souls, they have shown cordiality. This is wonderful and I express cordial gratitude to the Japanese

people for hospitality and warm-heartedness and appreciate the constructive approach of the government and political...[corrects himself] leaders of political parties, for everything they did on the eve of the visit and within the framework of the visit. Thank you. I have finished. I was warned that I had to be brief, but I have failed.

[News conference chairman in Japanese with superimposed Russian translation] I shall indicate who is now to ask a question. Go over to the nearest microphone, give your surname and what information body you represent, and ask your question. Ask the question in Japanese, Russian, or English—one of the three languages.

[Correspondent] MAINICHI. I would like to ask you a question on the territorial issue. The four northern islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup. The territorial issue concerns these islands. Tell us what accord was reached on this issue. Why were there seven or eight working summit meetings? Was the reason not precisely that problems arose over the territorial issue? On what items were there the most acute divergences in this matter with the Japanese side?

[Gorbachev] I am not going to talk about our discussions. It would take too long. But I have probably not had such a discussion for a long time. I shall talk about the result of this discussion.

We held detailed and in-depth talks—as will be stated in the document—on the whole complex of questions concerning the elaboration and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR including the problems of territorial demarcation, taking account of the positions of the sides on the ownership of Habomai island, Shikotan island, Kunashir island, and Iturup island.

During the meeting we stressed the primary importance of speeding up work on concluding the preparations for a peace treaty, and we expressed the firm intention to act with this aim constructively and dynamically, making use of everything positive that has been accumulated in bilateral talks in various years beginning from 1956 when Japan and the USSR jointly declared the state of war was ended and diplomatic relations between them restored.

That is the result of the discussions on this question.

As you can see, the policy here is based on realism; there is recognition of past and current realities; there is the position and the mutual striving to speed up work to complete the elaboration and conclusion of a peace treaty; there is a mention of 1956, when the cessation of the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic relations were declared.

Let me say right away, so that you do not ask the question and I do not wait for it: Why is there no mention of the declaration? We took from this document those things which have not only gone down in history but have acquired juridical force and international consequences, legal international consequences. But as for those things that did not take place, the chance disappeared.

History started working differently so that, over 30 years on, we were unable to reanimate the second part of this document. That is why we duly evaluated the year 1956 and what was done then, and we believe that what happened then is also a positive achievement of this lengthy period, of this difficult period of a quest for ways toward a peace treaty.

The advance that has been made is immense. As recently as 1986 the contacts and conversations we had on this matter took place very simply—they took up not eight many-hour conversations but approximately eight minutes. The Japanese side demanded that their lands be returned to them. We said that a territorial question does not exist. Everything was clear.

Now this document testifies first to the fact that we have traveled a long distance. On the other hand we will act, proceeding from all the experience within the framework of real politics, and look for a solution of the problem on the basis of a balance of interests.

I am convinced from the experience of the past few years that history must sort matters out for itself, and you know that history is like that: Now it suddenly slows down, now it suddenly speeds up.

But for the Moscow Treaty with the FRG and the subsequent entire package of treaties by other countries with the FRG, but for the GDR and FRG not having become members of the United Nations, but for the Helsinki process having begun and ended successfully, and having continued...[hesitates] yes, if very large-scale relations with both German states and the Soviet Union had not built up, firstly, new thinking would have hardly emerged. We would today have hardly reached the processes connected already...[changes thought] which have made it possible to reach the Paris Charter and the processes that have unfolded in eastern Europe. It is always a very complicated process. And history always somehow or other shows itself in some face or other, depending on the concurrence of circumstances; it opens up its possibilities in the conditions, in the new conditions of cooperation, trust, the greater degress of trust.

I think that our own experience of the bilateral relations with Japan and in the other directions of the world policy has helped us to arrive at a stage in our endeavors where we try to meet each other halfway. I think that the subsequent articles of this document envision the building up of cooperation in all spheres, including economic cooperation. This will change our relations, bring them on to a different level: not only the dialogue but also the exchange of the people, knowledge, learning about each other. In the end, all the structure and content of these relations will fundamentally change. And then it will be easier to look for the answers to all questions, and history can be brought into action, can

change gear. How will it be? Let us not do the guessing, let us work. And I am convinced that such mutual understanding and cooperation and simply, trust—not only at the political [level] but at the human level—will give us a lot.

[Unidentified correspondent] Soviet television. Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have just mentioned the Paris peace charter for Europe. Speaking there six months ago, you spoke about the need to establish new relations between the USSR and Japan, without which it is inconceivable to create a band of cooperation in the northern hemisphere. How do you appraise the results of your visit in this regard?

[Gorbachev] I think that from this point of view as well the results will work toward improving the international situation in this region. Moreover, my recent contacts, my contacts over recent years with very many countries from this region, show great interest in changes here. This does not mean that everything will be repeated, copied, that the European model will be totally implemented here. I think that if we went along such a path this would simply be an error, it would be an artificial imposition of forms and means. Here it will proceed in its own way.

On the one hand the roots of our civilization are here, there is much wisdom here, the history and the peoples of these countries has amassed a huge potential. So, I think that the experience which we have been accumulating in recent years here must be used taking into account the realities and particular features of this region, its traditions. I think that this presupposes collective efforts. We do not want to act as if we want to play a card here, or play any particular role. No, we invite everyone to cooperation and a joint quest.

I think that if the United States does not participate in this process—and once someone tossed up the opinion after my speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, that there is an attempt here to force a wedge between the United States and the countries of this region—then I think that nothing will take place here, just as it does not happen in other areas of world policy without the participation of that huge state and the American people.

In just such a way I thought about the fact that here Japan's economic role is very...[hesitates] immense. New states are emerging and are gathering pace in their development. And in connection with this, what we have been doing here during these days and the fact that two such states which are connected with this region like the Soviet Union and Japan will both consult and will improve not only their bilateral relations but cooperate with other countries—we discussed this—and Comrade Kaifu shared his immediate plans and spoke of his immediate visits, including those to major countries of this region.

All of this, I think, will work to improve the general situation, and the build-up here, albeit a slow one, of cooperation potential.

I advocated that the Five—the United States, China, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan—think about their role, what they can do. I once again spoke out in support of trying to get the foreign ministers of this region to meet as early as 1993 and to reach some balance, to draw some preliminary conclusions as to what is happening—to exchange views.

And the point is not in creating the structure at once for the whole of this vast region, or institutions—that is not the point, I think. The point is to search for these ways. I think that a large area here is the quest for trust. And as regards...[changes thought] a huge military potential has been accumulated here. Here, as perhaps nowhere else there is the problem of naval forces. On the whole there are many questions here.

[Correspondent Komodo] Komodo, YOMIURI. The northern territories in the Soviet Union are part of the Russian Federative Republic. There were also representatives of the Russian Federation among the members of your delegation. Tell us: I hear that there is complete unity between the representatives of the Russian Federation who are in your delegation and the all-Union delegation on this issue. Speaking in Paris on the 19th [as heard], Yeltsin backed a five-stage process of return as a solution to the territorial problem, somewhere in the region of over 20 years. He mentioned a fairly lengthy period. This plan for Japan...he had already mentioned this plan when he was in Japan a few years ago... but he iterated it... but this plan is very difficult for Japan to accept. On this plane, how do you assess Yeltsin's position on the territorial issue, and also, what connection is there between what you signed today in that joint statement with Japan and the position that Yeltsin is expressing? What relationship is there? And a further question I'd like to ask is this: During your visit and the discussions you held, matters to do with the territorial demarcation were discussed and evidently certain headway was made on this. In your view, won't it be an obstacle if, for instance, Russia and Yeltsin are going to protest such headway?

[Moderator of news conference] Excuse me, I'd like to interrupt for a moment. I'd like to request both the questioners and the president to keep questions and replies as brief as possible so that as many people as possible can get in their question.

[Unidentified voices] All right!

[Gorbachev] I'll brace myself! Regarding the position of the comrades who represent Russia officially and are among the persons officially accompanying me, their position coincides completely with the position on the basis of which the tenets with which I have acquainted you were formulated. There are no differences between us. As far as Comrade Boris Nikolayevich Yeltin's position is concerned, I think that if you wait a few days more, he might say something completely different on this issue. So, don't be in a hurry. [Laughter] I already

have much experience on this, and I advise you to take advantage of my experience.

I think that what we have discussed and decided here corresponds fully to the interests of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, which is the leading republic of this union, and which naturally has a special interest in Japanese-Soviet relations.

I think we can look with great hope—well, we shall have to do a lot of work on the prospects for our relations.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mikhail Sergeyevich, the joint statement and a large package of documents were signed today, and as you have said already we could expect a big breakthrough. One would like to hear how you see the scheme of the further development of relations between the USSR and Japan.

[Gorbachev] Well, I think that in order to do this I should have to begin unfolding it all from Adam and Eve. You know, I think that since we now have the documents, the legal foundations have been created, and we have agreed that now the appropriate organizations from the Soviet and Japanese sides will begin to put these agreed and formulated provisions into concrete form and work toward their realization. Moreover, in these documents themselves, especially in the main joint statement, the necessity, desirability, and urgency of the actions are being specifically emphasized.

Moreover, many provisions often begin with this—with the acceleration, the foremost importance, the urgency. Therefore, the departments will have to put in a lot of work from now on. I think that now we already need to bring these provisions on to the practical level through the work of the departments. I intend to issue a special decree based on the results of this visit with instructions on the subject of all of these questions.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, in parliament you spoke of the danger of a dictatorship in the USSR. When you return to Moscow what specific steps will you be taking in order to bring about national concord and with what leaders and with what forces are you prepared to meet? Thank you.

[Gorbachev] [words indistinct] the Japanese parliament, whereas you are returning me to the Soviet Union! Yes, the situation in our country, the Soviet Union, today is such that there are real dangers, threats for the state, for the economy, for the common market, for political stability. These are real threats. And on this score I have spoken out a lot in the past few days and since you are familar with that, I will not go into details. I only want to confirm that political differences between the parties and movements need to be removed: everything that is connected with the activity of some party or other, or some group, some social group of persons. And common interests must be put above everything. I think that today in our country there is a real task of saving the state.

The keys to this I see in completing as soon as possible the work on the union treaty. I have already fixed an appointment with the leaders of the republics that have conducted the referendum. They asked me to do this without delay, and such a meeting has been fixed for 23 April. As one of the leaders said: What we need to do is not to disperse until there is smoke coming from the chimney, as happens during the election of the pope, not until we come to an agreement on all fundamental isues. That is one way. That is a very important way, the most important. For much has been happening because there exists some suspicion between the center, the republics, and the ministries inasmuch as a process of redistribution of powers, of decentralization is taking place. And this is connected also with a disruption of the normal functioning of the system of power, with the struggle of laws, and is disrupting the whole of social and economic life as well as affecting law and order in the country. That is why this is a key question. This is the first thing. And in the next month or two we are to complete this work; it is to be signed by those who have gone as far as this. That is the first thing.

Second, the Cabinet's program, the anticrisis action program—something designed for the next few months and for this year to get out of the crisis—has already been distributed and sent out to the Supreme Soviet, to all republics, to all leaders of various parties, scientists, scientific institutions, Supreme Soviet deputies.

It is a very serious program. It is the next, it is the second directive on overcoming the crisis, on stabilization, so as to relieve social tension. And, you know, the point is not even the danger of the actual possibilities of clashes within the framework of political struggle. That is normal, after all. The danger lies elsewhere: that someone aspiring to some position in society, in the state, is striving for power. He may play some card or other, above all the social tension card. That is where the danger lies. With the current state of the market, and given that there is a breakdown of economic links and disorganization in production, people are now tense. They have many critical arguments about the processes taking place, according to how the authorities act, and one can, you know, throw a match into that kerosene shop, as it were. But only irresponsible people can do that now. Unfortunately, they do exist. That must be avoided. One must put a stop to any possibility of frenzied people both on the right and on the left taking advantage of the tension in society and involving the people in holding mass meetings and especially strikes and just see how they are managing to do that. That must be done. A base for uniting the healthy forces. [sentence as heard] They are huge.

In my meetings in Khabarovsk, I decided to go to enterprises, to tour them live, as it were, to get the feeling of all that for myself: all the information, the mood of people, how are they worrying, how are they thinking. People are ready to unite around the continuation of perestroyka and for the fastest solution of questions connected with overcoming the slump in production and

making sure that the market starts more quickly. They are ready today to be patient and to stand firm, but they want changes and demand order and decisive action. Here one must not confuse decisive action and dictatorship. Strong authorities and decisive action by those authorities within the framework of the constitution and of the law are normal. That is precisely a sign of democracy. If it is absent, if law does not prevail, if the authorities cannot act, what sort of democracy is that? It is ochlocracy. It is chaos, anarchy. Democracy presupposes strong authority buttressed by the law and by people's support. So there is no contradiction. And, when you write about the Soviet Union, always try not only to get a hot story, something new. I think there is enough news in the Soviet Union now. You probably won't complain about us now, saying that we are not giving you enough news.

For that reason, but, nevertheless, I ask you to think this over. And I hope that all of you—just like us—want perestroyka. Because it is not only our perestroyka. And it is not just us who need the success of perestroyka—it is also your perstroyka, and you, too, need this success. For much is tied up here—the fate of all of us together. We perhaps now as never before feel ourselves to be members of this civilization, to be parts of this civilization. Yes, we are different. Yes, we think somewhat differently but we are all united and we feel that we are also needed by each other. And it is on this that we want to unite the constructive forces in society: on major values, on values common to all mankind, on the state, on patriotism, on the preservation of what is the most important, the main thing for each people and for the state. I was rather long-winded. But that was because of the question.

[Correspondent, in Japanese followed by Russian translation] The Moscow correspondent of the KYODO TSUSHIN agency. I am very glad that you have provided some advertising for our agency, the KYODO TSUSHIN agency, here. Now I come to the questions.

Regarding the formulation which you quoted regarding the territorial issue: The Japanese people, in their expectations concerning this visit, hoped that at least two islands would return in the course of preparations for the peace treaty. Is it possible to hope for that? That is my first question.

My second question concerns those new relations of trust which you said it is necessary to create in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region. Tell us, please, within the framework of this process, what can you say in connection with the Soviet Armed Forces in the far east, in particular with regard to these armed forces which are stationed on these four northern islands?

[Gorbachev] As far as the first part of your question is concerned, I have tried to give a fundamental answer to it. Everything else will be clarified in the course of the process of negotiation which will be continued in the very near future, already on the basis of the approaches coordinated.

As far as the second issue is concerned, the issue of trust and in this connection the question of the USSR Armed Forces stationed in that part of the USSR, firstly, I think all of you have noticed that we have been honoring all the pledges we have recently taken upon ourselves. We have done a great deal with China, as you know. We have withdrawn troops from Mongolia; we cut them and withdrew them. Short-range nuclear missiles have been scrapped. Medium-range missiles will have been scrapped by the middle of this year. Sixteen warships, including submarines and surface ships, will be destroyed. We have not tried to build up any nuclear arms here. Nor have we tried to build up the strength of troops; we are not doing any of it.

And I must say that the Soviet side has advanced a proposal to show its good will and to demonstrate that we do not want to make the process of negotiating a peace treaty into some sort of screen but that we are indeed inclined to engage in real politics, we have stated that in the nearest future we will carry out measures to broaden contacts between the population of Japan and the population of the aforementioned islands, to establish a simpler travel regime with no visa requirements for Japanese citizens to visit the islands, and to set up a joint mutual beneficial economic activity in this region and to cut the Soviet military contingent stationed on these islands.

[Unidentified correspondent, in Japanese followed by Russian translation] The newspaper ASAHI, concerning the Korean peninsula. After visiting our country you, Mr. President, will visit Cheju island for a meeting with No Tae-u, the president of South Korea. Over the past year you have had meetings with them on three occasions. What importance will the forthcoming summit meeting with No Tae-u have for relaxation of tension in the peninsula? And a further question in respect of the DPRK. Do you have plans in the near future to visit North Korea?

[Gorbachev] In answer to the first question I would like briefly to say the following. We are satisfied by the fact that we have diplomatic relations going with the Republic of Korea. In my opinion, they have to our mutual satisfaction begun to develop very dynamically, both as far as dialogue is concerned and as far as specific forms of cooperation, including economic cooperation, are concerned. We have discovered that we have great opportunities to build up this cooperation.

I feel too that the fact that we are preserving, supporting, and developing relations with the DPRK is in all respects positive—positive for making a positive contribution to getting a constructive dialogue going in the quest for ways to resolve the problems in this peninsula that will accord with the aspirations of the Korean people. Another aspect is that it will be of importance too for our

cooperation in this region. We have had many new links appearing and many new documents have been signed with the states of this region, and we consider that this is our contribution to normalizing and improving the atmosphere in this region. I have plans to pay an official visit to North Korea. I have an invitation and I will use it without fail.

[News conference chairman] I would like here to give an opportunity to journalists from countries other than Japan and the Soviet Union to ask a question.

I am saying: journalists who are not from Japan or the Soviet Union.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, I am glad that you [word indistinct] the situation. I would like to ask you [word indistinct] the problem of the Near East. What immediate steps will you take in the matter of the settlement of this problem? Will Mr. Bessmertnykh go on a tour to the Near East in the near future and, if possible, did the Japanese side take any obligation in the matter of supporting perestroyka on the economic plane? Thank you.

[Gorbachev] First question: We think that our role will be as active, at least, I imagine so, and our contacts with leaders of other countries, in the first place, with the President of the United States of America and the U.S. secretary of state and with leaders of Arab countries show it. We have the understanding and desire and aspiration and responsibility to assist in solving problems connected with the conflict in the Near East. The first phase of this interaction and cooperation will involve, of course, all problems connected with coming out of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. And in future, it seems, questions will arise touching, on the whole, upon problems of this long-standing conflict in the Near East, tackling those problems which require solution, I mean the Palestinian question, I mean the question of returning the Arab lands, I mean the fate of Lebanon, and I mean security and confidence in the future of the state of Israel and its citizens.

Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh will visit that region in the immediate future.

[Unidentified speaker] The second question, Mr. President.

[Gorbachev] What second question do you...?

[Unidentified speaker] Forgive me; was an obligation undertaken?

[Gorbachev] Oh, yes. Firstly, during these days, in the framework of this dialogue, we have heard very sound, well-argued and, I feel, sincere support for the cause of perestroyka from the government, official circles, the leaders of virtually all Japan's political parties, parliament and public circles; and we see in this a manifestation of the solidarity of the Japanese people and Japan's leadership with our enormously important, but difficult cause.

On the other hand, many specific matters were discussed in the search for new forms of cooperation in various fields. Firstly, the 12 documents which we have signed deal with these matters. Within the framework of the joint statement Mr. Kaifu and I deemed it necessary to write down the following, alongside the issues connected with accelerating work on a peace treaty: At the same time, it was recognized as expedient to expand constructive cooperation, carried out in an atmosphere of good-neighborliness, mutual benefit, and trust, in Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, including the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], which borders directly on Japan, in the trade, economic, scientific-technical, and political fields, through public, culture, education, tourism, sport, and free and wide contacts among citizens.

Thus, there are very important political provisions, which give various public groups and business circles in Japan a point of reference, and there are steps in specific areas of cooperation. In particular, in the package of agreements which has been signed, there is an agreement such as the agreement on technical assistance for perestroyka, the implementation of perestroyka by moving toward the market.

[Unidentified correspondent, in Japanese, fading to Russian translation] I used to work for the ASAHI newspaper. I am now a member of the press club as an individual. After the war I experienced being a prisoner of war in Siberia for three years. In putting my question to you, I would also like to express my opinion through it in some way.

Before you arrived in Japan, you visited a cemetery and laid a wreath at the grave of former Japanese prisoners of war. I thank you for this. After that, you made a statement in which you said that you felt what was rendered in our official translation as sympathy. In Japanese it sounded like sympathy. You expressed your condolences to the families of the prisoners of war who died. To put it in other words, we would have liked you to have used a stronger expression for your sympathy, an expression which would imply some sort of regret about what had happened.

Today, after dinner, when you met representatives of the prisoners of war, you did in fact offer your apologies. But could you not repeat them now here at this forum. That is one thing. The second thing is that among those prisoners of war, in addition to former Japanese servicemen, there were many peaceful citizens from among the nonmilitary population. And you have not mentioned anywhere even once that the peaceful population was also among those interned. Why have you failed to mention this? Can you say anything about this?

[Gorbachev] I think that this is, of course, a difficult question from our complex history. And I think that had I begun to speak about what happened in the course of that history, I think that would have provoked certain arguments and disagreements, and above all anxiety.

One generally cannot rewrite history and one cannot throw it away. How can one discard it? It did take place, and there is no escape from this fact. But, as I have said, if we try to grow a tree that is alive today and want it to yield good fruit, it cannot be fed on the water of the dead past. I would rather invite you all, both in our country—in the USSR—and in Japan, to think of the fact that we are neighbors and to remember that these two peoples have always been greatly interested in one another. After all, is it not astonishing how well we know each other's culture, literature, and art?

I remember that 15 years ago we were all fascinated by contemporary Japanese literature. I asked our professor who was with me all the time at that time—I hope that he is here, or maybe he isn't; and he helped me in my work—he told me that even now this interest is not declining. This is all genuinely suprising.

Yesterday I even, you know, discovered for the first time, when I heard a tune without words, I thought that it was a Russian tune, and it turned out that it was an ancient Japanese song, which Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh heard a long time ago, and he secretly ordered that it be played yesterday. There is an awful lot that united these peoples, brought them closer together. And I think that here, preserving all this in our memory and extracting lessons from bitter experience, we can find the right answers as to how we are to build our relations today, and in particular tomorrow, how we are to give our experience to the young generations, what to tell them.

And as regards the topic of prisoners of war, this is a difficult topic for everyone. And I will have to say that Japan and the Soviet Union belonged to different coalitions, opposing military coalitions, which were in a state of war. And every coalition cooperated, took decisions, including everything that took place on the Soviet Union-Japan line, this all also took place in this real context. You cannot get away from this.

But we nevertheless have begun, and consider that in the framework of a general improvement of relations with Japan we have started on this topic as well. And we are making progress.

This is a very sensitive subject. We are very grateful to the Japanese people for the way they care for the graves of the fallen Russians and other representatives of other peoples of our country whose remains lie here. We intend to do much more than we have done up to now to show respect for the memory of those who are buried in our country. In general, a process of reconciliation, of rapprochement, is taking place. I sympathize with this, and not only sympathize, but will, within the framework of my state duties, do all I can to promote it. Several messages have been passed on to me from your veterans' organization; I will read and study them, and involve those competent to judge these matters in discussing them. We shall take new steps to heal the wounds.

[Unidentified correspondent] PRAVDA. Mikhail Sergeyevich, you have just spoken of a breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations. Can one regard that breakthrough as one that will now happen specifically in economic relations, in the sense that Japan will now be willing to help us set up a market, an infrastructure, banks, and so on—not just an agreement, but specifically an economic breakthrough? Or is the Japanese side continuing to make this condition political—on the development of political questions?

[Gorbachev] This theme was central to the discussions. But I would like to be precise. We still have to make a breakthrough. I only said that what has taken place over the past few days allows me to consider it possible to reach a breakthrough in our relations in all areas. And I think that past experience has convinced us that if any side puts forward preliminary conditions in the form of an ultimatum then nothing comes of this this.

Therefore, I said: You know, I acknowledge the formula: politics and economics, but in conditions that politics influences economics and economics influences politics. Therefore, no breakthrough will take place in any single area. It should absolutely be... [changes thought] In our relations this will by insured if added dynamism is given to relations in all areas and primarily in the area of politics and the area of economic cooperation.

[Correspondent, in English] [Name indistinct], Germany. Mr President, you indicated that to solve the problems between Japan and the Soviet Union there would have to be a balance of interests. I would like to come back to the territorial question and ask you what direction you would see for a compromise.

[Gorbachev] Somehow I ... I can't hear any translation.

[Unidentified voice in Russian] It's not working. Ah! Everything's all right.

[Translator] I am a representative of the German newspaper [name indistinct]. You said here there was mention of a balance of interests, of compromise. This compromise clearly includes the territorial aspect of the problem too. That is how I understood you. But in order to somehow convince public opinion that compromise is necessary, one must at least outline some road toward that compromise. If one looks at the policy that the Japanese side has followed so far, it stated that Shikotan and Habomai... at least, as regards those two islands, a decision at the International Court would probably be in favor of Japan, but as regards the other two islands, Kunashir and Iturup, the International Court's decision would not be so predictable. After all, the question is also how to find a compromise over these remaining two islands. What sort of compromise can there be here? Let us say, can one return the island of Kunashir to Japan while leaving Iturup to the Soviet Union? What opinion for a compromise is there here? Can there, in theory, be one or is it completely excluded altogether? What areas of compromise do you have in mind?

[Gorbachev] Well, I do not intend to find myself now in the position of the negotiator on these issues. But I will try to answer you in principle. Because on the whole I adhere to such an approach, that it is necessary to seek a balance of interests and it is necessary to seek a compromise. It seems to me that we and the Japanese have lost a lot by putting forward prior conditions to each other, or by announcing firm, reinforced concrete positions. If there is a problem you cannot leave it, it must be discussed and examined. Now we have reached the understanding that it is necessary to act in this way. But, you know, I have become convinced by my experience, and also by studying the experience of the past, and have come to the same conclusion, that the most dangerous and on the whole unproductive occupation, especially in high-level politics, is always when people draw up some model of a scheme in an office and then try to artificially impose it. There has been a lot of this in our country in particular, in our history. When I am sometimes told that there is no conception, no model, then I always conduct a fairly thorough discussion on these issues. Yes, there must be a choice, aims must be orientated, defined. And the rest must be a joint quest by the sides taking part in any conflict or interested in the solution of any problem. And this is always better. It is found, it is solved when the situation changes, when an atmosphere of trust appears.

But listen, changes, look, the world has only just started to change, in Europe, Soviet-American relations have changed, disarmament processes have gotten underway, the subject of the priority of universal human values arose, and immediately, the situation has thus changed and we immediately started to find solutions more easily—to Afghanistan, to Cambodia, to Namibia, to South Africa. But the Persian Gulf has spoiled our Middle Eastern quests. That means we have to change the situation, the atmosphere, create another level of trust. And this I have been proposing persistently to our partners in the negotiations here.

So I would not now go on all that much about which island we are going to put where or whatever. The important thing is that we are saying: Indeed it is important that we should deal with a peace treaty, indeed this should also include the problem of territorial demarcation. And that this is perhaps best solved in a different situation, with relations of a different nature, when there is a greater mutual dependence and links. You know, at times I can even surmise an option of these relations becoming such that these questions are not perceived as critically and painfully as they are now. We have Academician Yakovlev here, he is with me here, among the official representatives. He once said in a discussion here, in Japan: Listen, why do you keep on asking me questions about the islands? I have a proposal here for you, and I am convinced that the entire Soviet leadership will support it. Let us think about cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union in opening up the Far East, Siberia. Can you imagine what kind of territories we are offering you? That is how the issue could turn. And if it turns that way, if we cooperate, if we travel, if we do things, if there are joint ventures and perhaps concessions and so on, then listen, then it is a different environment and we would be looking at many questions differently. These are my ideas. We have to go for new relations more boldly.

[Unidentified speaker in Japanese with superimposed Russian translation] It is already 0148 and in six hours time now the president and his wife are due to have another meeting with the emperor and empress. We are very pleased—in general, this is the first experience by our press club of holding a news conference at this hour, and I think that there will never be such an experience again. Therefore I would like to thank you, Mr. President, with all my heart for the fact that despite it being such a late hour you found an opportunity to come here.

If you will allow us—it has indeed become our tradition at the Press Club—we want to present you with a souvenir. It is a very insubstantial thing but indeed a handsome Japanese pen. As you are aware, the pen is of course a symbol of the freedom of the press and of glasnost. We thank you once again with all our hearts and it is with great hope that we want to present you with our gift. As for these hopes that I just mentioned, they include the hope that you will in the near future visit us again and that I shall be able again to present you with a second pen. It is therefore with that wish that I would like to present you with this gift. [applause]

Gorbachev Comments at Children's Festival

LD1804173291 Moscow TASS in English 1531 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo April 18 TASS—"We welcome you, children of this great planet and hope that you will remember this festival in Japan and preserve throughout your life the feeling of friendship engendered here," visiting President Mikhail Gorbachev said in his address to the participants of the Children's Summit, an international children's festival held in Japan.

"We, with Mister Toshiki Kaifu have been conducting very important talks, but what can be more important than meeting children? For the sake of this meeting we put aside our difficult and very serious affairs and are feeling as happy as if a lesson has been cancelled".

Young delegates from the Soviet Union, the United States, Germany, France, Canada, India, Australia, Japan and other countries, which launched the movement last September, specially assembled in Tokyo for one day to meet the visiting Soviet president and convey through him to the leaders of all countries their wish to see this planet peaceful and happy.

The children who greeted the Soviet president with applause, asked him to tell them about his childhood, favourite school subjects and habits.

Asked if Mikhail Gorbachev managed to make friends with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu during his brief stay in Tokyo, the two leaders held up their firmly locked hands.

Gorbachev Letter to Japan Culture Group

LD1804153391 Moscow TASS in English 1517 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Tokyo April 18 TASS—The sponsoring committee of the Japanese-Soviet Cultural Centre held its first meeting in Tokyo today. An address by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was read out to committee members.

The address points to the formation of a new attitude to the Soviet Union in Japanese society and sincere and permanent interest in the USSR in national traditions, culture and present life in Japan.

"Even in difficult periods, there was the yearning of Soviet and Japanese peoples for each other," Gorbachev's letter says.

"Therefore, now that we are turning a new page of cooperation between our countries, your centre, called upon to broaden bilateral exchanges in the inexhaustible humanitarian sphere, will play an indispensible role in bringing the two nations closer together."

Today's meeting was attended by Japanese lawmakers, businessmen, men of culture and arts and politicians.

Gorbachev Delivers Speech to Students

PM1904122591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 Second Edition pp 4, 5

[TASS report: "Meeting With Students"]

[Text] Tokyo, 18 Apr—USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, who is on an official visit to Japan, met Wednesday with students and professors from six Japanese universities.

Addressing those present, he said:

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen!

Dear students—a special class in all countries throughout the world!

I am very glad to be in this room at this meeting. I see it as a happy opportunity to address you who embody the mighty intellectual potential of modern Japan and who are, consequently, one of the sources of the "Japanese miracle." In greeting students I am also greeting the future of this great land, this great people. Thank you for your warm welcome.

The new relations with Japan which we are seeking and which are the reason for my visit to your country do not just embrace, as we see it, politics, economics, and security—on which we have already had a thorough dialogue both at the political level and with business circles and representatives of the public. The new relations embrace the entire sphere of contact between our two unique cultures, which have made such an important contribution to civilization. The overall progress of these relations will depend on how well our peoples can understand each other, how quickly they come closer together, and whether their collaboration in this sphere—and I advocate this—is fruitful. Everything starts with culture.

The building of new relations between the Soviet Union and Japan will require trust. In recent years, thanks largely to perestroyka, our peoples have, as it were, been rediscovering each other and getting to know each other again. And it is the duty of people of science and culture—as it is of politicians—to promote this in every possible way. The conditions required for rapprochement are that both nations and states be open. Japan's experience of the postwar decades and the Soviet Union's experience of recent years graphically confirm this.

We have felt, however, that the clearing away of ideological barriers could also uncover some stumbling blocks which have been present for decades, if not centuries. The history of relations between Russia and Japan and between Japan and the Soviet Union has left us a difficult legacy. We cannot hide from things that remind us of the times of alienation and the tragedies of military clashes. The ashes of our countrymen buried against their will in a foreign land are a mark of our common historical fate. That is history.

At the same time, our common past contains much that is instructive. And it is the duty of those of us alive today to understand and interpret our history, our common history, to ponder the lessons stemming from it, and to draw conclusions for the future.

When I say that there is much that is instructive in our history, I am thinking above all of the definitely synchronized way in which Russia and Japan entered the general stream of world civilization. Almost simultaneously—a century or so ago—both countries began laying the foundations for economic, scientific, and technical progress that was advanced by the standards of the time, and started learning the rudiments of political democracy. Both Russia and Japan began their route into the 20th century later than many Western states. This not only determined the scale and acuteness of their problems but also prompted both countries to seek accelerated solutions. Clearly, this largely explained the high state "weighting" in the process of national development. This also resulted in a major social overload: Both countries had to set up in decades structures which had been formed in Europe over the course of centuries.

Japan became the leading country of the Orient, boldly striding into the modern era. We know how much work this took. Not by you, the present generation, but by previous generations.

Japan's success shows other countries that the effective assimilation of foreign experience is only possible on the basis of national traditions and by retaining your cultural identity. As a result of the creative synthesis and combination of elements of Western and Oriental civilization Japan has managed to create its own original and highly effective social model. The time has now come when there is much that even the most developed countries can learn from you.

In some respects the Japanese experience is close to us. The spirit of collectivity, national commonality, and solidarity between people, which plays such a notable part in the Japanese model, is also inherent in Russian traditions and the traditions of our other peoples. In the modernization process the Japanese have succeeded in resolving an exceptionally complex task—combining the traditions of collectivity and national consensus with the principles of democracy and respect for the individual; combining a desire for social justice and fair distribution of society's wealth with a high level of motivation for people, individual responsibility, and enterprise. That, it seems to me, is the mainspring of the "Japanese miracle."

We are facing a similar task: combining the universal principles of political democracy and the market economy with the socialist tradition, which—despite all its deformations and our bitter historical experience—is deep-rooted among our people. This is a reality and it has to be taken into account, as have the realities in the economy and other spheres of our life.

I do not think it would be wrong to say that the Soviet and Japanese intelligentsia have infinite spiritual scope for cooperating and exchanging knowledge with a view to resolving national and world tasks. The world is entering a new period of civilization. The catalysts for this are the advanced development of science and technology, and an information revolution that knows no bounds.

Incidentally, in the diversity and dissimilarity of the peoples and cultures which make up the mosaic of world civilization, the source of progress has been little recognized as yet. Even the most comprehensive theory or successful social model, or the experience of the most advanced country cannot stake a claim to universality. Any hegemony—be it political, cultural, or spiritual—is anathema to diversity and, consequently, to the current criteria of what constitutes civilization.

Today two dozen states have moved a long way ahead and are essentially entering the 21st century already. However, not one dozen but many dozens of countries constitute a zone of backwardness, and even poverty. The rest are somewhere in the middle. We cannot calmly observe these profound discrepancies. They conceal not just human dramas and problems. They are a source of dangerous conflicts. That is why the development problem does not merely concern certain countries and peoples. It is a problem for all mankind. The pooling of efforts in this area is an imperative of the time and one of the most important aspects of the new thinking.

Clearly, men of science are better placed than others to see that in an interlinked world there is, naturally, no future in certain states' prospering while other states are facing crisis and collapse. The contact between science and politics, which has been rid of its ideological prejudices and dogmas, has already been of enormous benefit to the world of late, particularly in improving international relations. The world community of scientists increasingly recognizes its responsibility for world politics, for the fate of peace, and for producing the correct response to the awesome challenges of the time. Whether mankind will meet these awesome challenges fully armed will depend largely, if not decisively, on scientists.

I have learned that the international foundation "Message to the Future" has put forward the initiative of creating a world video encyclopedia which could be used to pass on to future generations fundamental information about the lives of all the earth's peoples, their cultural legacy, and the moral potential inherent in it. This program has already been approved by UNESCO. We are prepared to participate in it. There is extensive scope in this area for cooperation between different countries' universities, and between Soviet and Japanese academics and cultural figures.

It is well known that a nation's creative potential depends on its level of education and on the amount of resources that a nation can allocate to its educational, enlightenment, and cultural needs. This was realized in good time by your country and has become one of the guarantees of its success. A similar problem is currently facing Soviet society in all its acuteness. Although at another stage, in the beginning and middle of this century, we maybe understood the importance of this better than anyone. But mistakes were then made in policy with regard to the development of science and education.

It is important, however, to ensure that young people grasp not only the supreme achievements of science but also organically assimilate the eternal truth that life is a priceless gift. This truth, as was stated more than a dozen centuries ago in your famous "Manyoshu" ("10,000 Leaves") poetry anthology, is "fleeting and fragile, like foam on the water." One wrong move could destroy it.

Today we are acutely aware not only of the fragility and vulnerability of human life but of the unprotected nature and frailty of the environment and our entire planet as a balanced integrated organism. The physic's ancient maxim "do no harm" should now become the guiding principle behind the activity of scientists and the intelligentsia.

Science is developing rapidly and arming itself with more and more sophisticated means of getting to the heart of the matter and enriching mankind with simply fantastic discoveries. But the responsibility—above all, the moral responsibility—incumbent on scientists is

thereby increased. Scarred by the Hiroshima and Chernobyl tragedies, we are all well aware that if science is to climb the steps of progress it will require commensurate wisdom, farsightedness, and self-control from people. Not for nothing is modern science being clearly drawn toward ethical principles. Not for nothing are the general spiritual standards of people who devote themselves to research work being increasingly valued.

Science is unusually dynamic. It occasionally develops with a spurt, sometimes devaluing previous ideas and knowledge. Culture, conversely, is distinguished by its cautiousness and guardedness. Since it represents, above all, the accumulation of the centuries-old spiritual and moral experience of every people and all mankind. And that is why not even the most sophisticated science will produce a full and correct picture of human life without it. This means that ecological culture and the preservation of a spiritual and moral environment which rejects the use of the achievements of reason to the detriment of mankind is just as urgent as the search for balance in the environment.

One would like to believe that the younger generation of the intelligentsia, enriched not only with scientific experience but with ethical knowledge and experience too, will not repeat the mistakes made by their forefathers, and will be wiser and more magnanimous than we. Those who are students today will have a difficult but inspiring and noble job to do—taking part in the creation of a new world order.

Cooperation between our two countries' academics is likely to make a great and original contribution to the progress of the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world. The scientific potentials of Japan and the USSR are largely complementary: Whereas we have made considerable progress in fundamental research in a number of areas, you have acquired unique experience in turning scientific developments into advanced technology, and in putting them into production. It would be simply criminal not to make use of this opportunity to pool our intellectual and material resources to our mutual advantage and mutual benefit.

Regrettably, scientific exchanges between our countries have been limited, and are lagging behind both our needs and, I hope, yours. Our needs are increased by the country's transition to a regulated market economy—in particular, we have a growing requirement for specialists able to work under market conditions.

Needless to say, economic, scientific, and technical links are primarily a matter for specific people, companies, firms, universities, and academies. Their understanding of the benefit they can derive will determine how, to what extent, and with whom they have dealings. However, turning business ties into lasting mutually advantageous structures will, of necessity, create better conditions for the resolution of any political problems too.

The Soviet Union is a great Eurasian power, an integral and, one may say, civilized power occupying a central position between the European and Asia-Pacific poles of the world process. Now, when the conflicts which lay at the basis of the postwar division of Europe are disappearing into the past, we, together with the Europeans and North Americans, have already taken the first steps toward creating an unprecedented politico-economic and cultural-historical community—a zone of cooperation in the Northern hemisphere. But its progress is inconceivable not only without the Japanese-American and Japanese-European factors but also without the new relations between the USSR and Japan. This requires of us a realization of our responsibility not only to our own peoples but to the world community, too.

In conversations and at meetings previously and in the past few days I have repeatedly said, including in public: In recent decades we have been able to show that we can live without one another. This does not require greater efforts here, this is all clear. Let us try to develop our cooperation and give it a different character, different intentions, and different criteria and see how this will turn out both for us and for you. I am sure that using this approach rather than alienation we can expect a good future, the future of both the Japanese and Soviet peoples.

It is probably appropriate to end my speech to you with words from the document with which official relations between our countries began 135 years ago and which our generation is called upon to finally turn into reality. Here are those solemn words: "Henceforth there will be permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan." It is hard to imagine better words. I agree with them and ask you to do the same.

M.S. Gorbachev answered questions from students. One asked:

Do you think that the further development of economic cooperation with Japan is possible only after the solution of the territorial question, and what, in your opinion, is the most important thing to be done in order to make cooperation effective?

M.S. Gorbachev: These days, yesterday and today, this whole range of questions has been central, whichever auditorium I was in. And it was not for nothing, but with good reason, that I used the phrase: Our history is rich in events, our relations are rooted deep in the past, and in that history our peoples' desire for cooperation was constant. This is beyond doubt and did not disappear even when times were difficult. Nevertheless, we often found ourselves on different sides, members of different and opposing coalitions, which had certain historical consequences and created certain realities—both between us and throughout the world. Such is the unpredictable course of history. We may regret many things but today, as we recall and study our past we must also think about the present and the future.

Then suddenly history accelerated its pace in many areas, and what had seemed absolutely unattainable suddenly began to be achieved. Take the arms race—we

not only stopped it, we also began disarmament. We were divided into two opposing camps and viewed each other as enemies. Now we hear statements from both sides that we do not regard one another as enemies but as partners and see prospects for cooperation, friendly relations, perhaps even friendship.

Just yesterday we were dealing with two Germanys, members of the United Nations; now we are dealing with a united Germany. Take the German question—that was how history ordained. And we said to the Germans: Let history itself decide what is to happen next and in what forms the question is to be resolved. Artificial prompting, peremptory demands, and the imposition of the solution of such major questions achieves nothing apart from a further aggravation of confrontation, suspicions, and new conflicts, including military ones.

When history itself accelerates its pace, problems become resolved, even chronic problems in world politics and relations between states, the political climate changes, relations change, a new degree of trust between people and the peoples arises, and other institutions—not those of military confrontation but of cooperation, common security, and so forth—begin to operate. That is what happened when everyone realized the threat of nuclear conflict. The Chernobyl catastrophe showed that even a country as mighty as ours which has already spent around 15 billion rubles clearing up the aftermath still cannot cope with the explosion of a single reactor. But what would happen if all the nuclear weapons were launched?! The only conclusion, the most categorical conclusion, is that it is necessary to stop and to get down to reducing and destroying nuclear weapons.

We realized that. That is why we had Reykjavik. It was a dramatic moment there. But that drama itself suddenly accelerated the process of accords and nuclear disarmament began. The German question began to be resolved at that time when first the treaty between the FRG and USSR became a possibility and later when the treaties between the FRG and Poland and Czechoslovakia became possibilities, when relations in Europe in general began to change, when the Helsinki process occurred and the results of development after World War II were summed up, and finally when perestroyka occurred and subsequently new relations between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged. Disarmament began when people, the peoples, and states, faced with the threat of nuclear destruction and environmental catastrophe, began to understand that they are all connected and dependent and must act accordingly. Everything began to change.

In the past 6 years I have had very many meetings with representatives of Japan, dozens of meetings. At first they were simply conversations. The Japanese interlocutors said: The Soviet Union has appropriated territories. We replied: The territorial question does not exist. Everything was clear. But 6 years passed and the world is changing before our eyes and we are changing, too. We are already saying: Yes, there is a question which must be discussed and examined, problems to be unraveled. But for that it is necessary to travel a certain path, movements toward one another are needed, there must be a different type of relations, a different degree of trust. Therefore I favor a formula. I would not object to the Japanese formula on the link between politics and the economy, but it must be fleshed out with modern content in the light of recent experience. And I propose: Let us develop our relations, restructure them. Let us work for a breakthrough and achieve a different degree of cooperation, a different degree of recognition and understanding of one another, a different degree of trust. And many questions will be resolved. And I think that in the new environment created as a result of such cooperation all questions connected with the conclusion of the peace treaty, including the territorial demarcation between our states, will be successfully resolved.

I believe that on this path we will launch the kind of cooperation—we both have so much potential for pooling our efforts here, after all—which will set in motion the deepest strengths of our two great peoples. And they will find in this cooperation tremendous potential which will begin to work for the common good. Thus, let history take its course here. That is my answer to the first part of the question.

The second part: Is there any point in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. You know that when we raise this question we do so not as "poor relations." Ours is a vast country with a great wealth of natural resources with perhaps the greatest potential in the intellectual sphere and in the level of the people's education. If that people really set to work they can resolve any task. We are now reforming our society so as to give to it a new "mainspring," a different motivation for actions and behavior—via democracy, economic and political freedom, new forms of life, and changes in property relations.

We must resolve the tasks of perestroyka not by isolating ourselves from other peoples but by cooperating, studying their experience, and collaborating. But finding ourselves now confronted by a difficult situation which must be endured and temporary difficulties which must be mastered, we need real solidarity. What is wrong with that? We take credits on certain terms and we will repay them. Now, when we particularly need financial resources and when the painful transition from certain forms of ownership to others is in progress, we really do need reasonable support and cooperation.

Gorbachev Addresses Japanese Public Figures

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[Speech by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev to Japanese politicians and celebrities in Tokyo on 18 April, including unidentified correspondent's report on Gorbachev's actitvities in Japan; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] This evening Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev met representatives of three organizations of former Japanese prisoners of war who after 1945 were imprisoned in the Soviet Union. The fate of the prisoners of war is one of the bitter pages in the history of the relations between our two countries. We cannot change it. Now we need reconciliation, drawing lessons from the past to build the future. The organization of Japanese prisoners of war has been cooperating with Soviet veterans; organizations for a long time. The Soviet side, including at the very highest level, has done a lot to find out the fate of each Japanese person who was a victim of Stalin. Among the package of agreeemnts which it is intended to sign in Tokyo, one has a direct bearing on the fate of the Japanese prisoners of war.

The USSR president's series of receptions and conversations in Tokyo's Hotel New Otani has been christened by journalists; circles: A meeting with Japan. More than 2,000 of the most respected politicians, cultural figures, and businessmen in the land have assembled here. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev also met representatives of the Japanese public committee for organizing the USSR president's meeting. This committee has united those politicians and public figures which have made the greatest contribution to the development of relations between the two countries. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke to those attending the reception. [video shows Gorbachev chatting to Japanese men; Gorbachev and Raisa listening through earpieces to a Japanese speaker]

[Gorbachev] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen: The meeting with you, organized by the national committee which has done so much to prepare and look after my visit to Japan, worthily crowns the itinerary of my visit. I am pleased to see all of you together and to express my sincere gratitude to you for your tremendous efforts. My particular gratitude to Mr. Abe, committee chairman, with whom I have been acquainted for a long time. The fact that he shouldered this difficult burden of heading such a committee demonstrates what importance Japan's major politicians lend to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Your committee's work has facilitated the creation of a friendly atmosphere surrounding the visit, and that is of tremendous importance. The program of the visit has turned out to be extraordinarily full, bursting with talks. To let you in on a secret, I want to say that after this meeting of ours which will end here I will have my seventh conversation with Mr. Kaifu. [applause and laughter]

Too little time remains to become better acquainted with your marvelous, splendid country and with the people who have made it and continue to make it this way. Perhaps I have only managed to skim the surface of that multifaceted and rapidly changing reality which is called contemporary Japan.

Anyway, you have given me and all my colleagues a remarkable present. You have gathered the cream of the political, public, and business world, science, culture, and the media. Briefly, you have thus organized what is being called a meeting with Japan, with its people, for me. Of course, this is the culmination of our visit to Japan. The business part is, as it were, behind us. It is being completed, it is close to completion.

Therefore, it is already, at this stage, admissable to say a few words about how I evaluate the results of the visit and what they augur for our countries. We came with the firm intention of placing our relations, between the USSR and Japan, on a new level. I think that I and Mr. Kaifu, the prime minister, have managed to facilitate this. Large-scale negotiations at the highest level have been held and are continuing, and this has happened for the first time. We, those who are here with me, representatives of the Soviet state, are satisfied with the progress and the scale and frankness of this political dialogue.

We have discussed all aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations frankly and in an atmosphere of goodwill and have left some things, as I have already said, for one more nocturnal conversation. As they say, we have checked out each other's views and what we tentatively prepared at home, we have gone into each other's arguments and, I think, received much food for further thought and consideration.

A whole series of important agreements will be signed. They concern many areas of practical cooperation. This solid package of accords makes it possible to extend, I would say to modernize, the relations between our countries, and that means also to improve conditions of trust, concord, and good-neighborliness.

I attach special importance to the fact that the prime minister and I are presently working doggedly and searchingly on the main political document and we hope that we will overcome everything which has cropped up and arisen on the path of this dialogue and will arrive at that political document which the Japanese and Soviet peoples expect.

I think that by the same token we can say today that the preconditions for a position, a new position for a breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations, for progress in our mutual interest and in the interests of the interaction of our two great powers on the international arena are being set.

And one more thing which is also significant—the content, nature, and atmosphere of the visit have reflected shifts in our people's perceptions of each other. In its turn, hope has appeared that the rapprochement process of the Soviet people and the Japanese will be accelerated after this visit. I want to assure you as the president of the Soviet Union: Soviet people desire a rapprochement with the Japanese people.

Acquaintance, knowledge of each other, and understanding of the problems and concerns, which we both have enough of, especially in our country at the moment, are broadening. After all, however important relations at the state level are, it is precisely relations between peoples and societies, between people, which constitute the deep foundation of international relations. How they look at each other, whether they perceived their close, yet also their far-off neighbors, as equal and worthy of good relations, or whether they consider them potential enemies—what foreign policy there will be depends to a great extent on this.

In their turn statesmen, parties, and their leaders should constantly feel responsible for forming respect for the peoples of other countries and neighbors above all among their compatriots. Interstate relations are basically determined by balance of interests. In relations between peoples, on the contrary, the major role is played by feelings, mood, sometimes stereotypes which formed a long time ago, and even prejudice. Frequently they mean more than the most thought-through foreign policy plans and rational studies.

A government however does not have the right to abuse this. They are called to remove the obstacles which hinder peoples from getting to know and understanding each other better, and to help them escape from suspicion and prejudice. In this respect I think that the present visit has also yielded something and we talked about this today when I met the leaders of parliamentary factions within the framework of the parliamentary meeting.

Direct contact between peoples is capable of promoting the resolution of the most complex interstate problems. Conquering them may escape politicians and diplomats for a long time. Something else is also true. If decisions at the interstate level do not meet with support and understanding in society, then their consequences will be unstable. The danger of a recoil will always be preserved.

We note with satisfaction that the enemy image, a mournful legacy of the cold war, for a long time not permitting our peoples to see each other as they actually are, is becoming a thing of the past. And we and you are beginning to see the faces of friends on the other side. I observe these changes in the Soviet Union, and in Japan I also see their confirmation in the nationwide composition of your committee, in the actual nature of its activities and in the tasks which you have set yourselves.

Here I would like to name names and express gratitude to Japan's eminent politicians and public figures who have done much to renew mutual understanding between our countries, including Messrs. Nakasone, Takeshita, Abe, Kanemaru, Miyazawa, Aizawa, Doi, Obuchi and Araki, the former mayor of Hiroshima. On behalf of their Soviet colleagues and many Soviet citizens, I would like to tell the whole of Japan how highly we value the activities of the association of parliamentary deputies of Japan for friendship with the Soviet Union and the association of parliamentary deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party for friendship between Japan and the USSR, the Japan-USSR Society, the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society, the Society for Japanese-Soviet relations, the Japanese association for cultural relations headed by Professor Matsumae, and the Soka Gakkai Society.

I consider it necessary separately to note the contribution to Soviet-Japanese relations of twin towns. There are already dozens of them, large and small. They regularly exchange delegations, arrange joint functions and do the great, if not immediately noticeable, work to further the genuine knowledge of our peoples of each other, their rapprochement and to elevate their relations.

I want to give the towns of Kyoto and Sendai their due for effective solidarity with Kiev and Minsk with regard to the Chernobyl tragedy. Our gratitude to Mr. Yokomichi, governor of Hokkaido, who organized treatment at his home town for children caught up in the calamity. Those of you who have visited our country in recent years have probably felt that the attitude to Japan, to everything Japanese, and to Japanese people is no longer simply amicable and respectful. A desire, especially among the youth, to learn a little more about your achievements, about your life, and about your culture and history is growing among our people.

Establishing its policy on Japan, the Soviet Union's leadership is guided by these feelings, by the manifest aspirations of the Soviet people toward friendly, serious, businesslike cooperation with Japan. The dynamics of cultural exchanges are particularly significant. Painting, cinema, literature, and music are a life-giving source not only of mutual acquaintance and enrichment, they nourish the old truth. If ordinary people communicate directly it is difficult to shake the internal respect and trust imprinted in their spirit and then dissimilarity becomes a stimulus for rapprochement and cooperation.

It is possible that it is slightly more difficult for the Japanese than for us. After all, before them is not simply a different world and different culture but a multitude of worlds and cultures constituting the incredible complexity of a society, the Soviet Union. Dozens of nations, with their culture, their characters, their beliefs, populate our country. Now they have all started speaking at the top of their voices and foreigners, accustomed to the image of a monolithic and gloomy country, may be dazzled by the mutli-colored flood, and, let's be honest, totally unharmonious and contradictory chorus of voices.

Indeed, the Soviet Union is an enormous and unique giant in the world, a whole civilization. Thanks to its position both in Europe and Asia many ideas of its scholars, humanists, philosophers, and writers contain a synthesis of the cultures of the East and West. Today, when the Soviet Union is overcoming a legacy of ideological and economic self-imposed isolation, we turn our face above all to our neighbors in all directions and

sincerely aspire to understand and acquire what they have which is valuable and acceptabe for us.

What is now happening in Soviet-Japanese relations is also indicative of general changes in the world. Humanity is tired of confrontation, of ideological struggle and cursing, and of fear for it's future. Dialogue and compromise—this is what is replacing ever more confidently the imperatives of the old political thinking. They must also determine Soviet-Japanese relations. It seems to me that this has also been assisted by my coming to you, dear friends.

Finally, a few words and observations of a totally personal nature. I am in Japan for the first time. I have read about your country. I am not badly informed about your political and public life. When I have the chance I watch your films. I have long dreamed of coming to Japan.

My impressions have not yet jelled, but I will say what I feel. The real, live Japan has eclipsed all my information about it. The beauty of nature, the flowering of the cherry blossom, the organic proximity of the past with contemporaneity and the breakthrough to the future, benevolent people with a sense of their own dignity and respect for others, healthy curiosity, interest in life, an aspiration to realize oneself, to demonstrate one's talents, in a word, an amazing fruit of nature and culture—this is the Japanese people.

All of this grips one and gives rise to a profound liking. I am glad that I have been able to feel the living pulse of your country, to see its achievements, which have legitimately given Japan a place among the leaders in world progress, with my own eyes.

The official part of my visit is already approaching it's end but I am not yet saying goodbye. I still have to visit the local capital of Kyoto and the city of Nagasaki. They will certainly help me to feel the real Japan again.

On the way to you I made a stopover in Khabarovsk where I paid my respects to the Soviet and Japanese soldiers who died during the years of World War II. Our joint history will not let us forget it.

I repeat that there has been much which gives rise to bitterness and regret. But we must not let history divide us. Those who became it's victims do not allow us to do this either. The memory of their sufferings calls out to us and returns us to the idea of the need for reconciliation, reconciliation and concord for the sake of the present and the future.

This is also a mandate to the politicians of both countries. We must learn to look at things broadly, more broadly, and not confine ourselves to the particular and transient. We must be guided by the profound interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples. I can say in all frankness that this was the leitmotiv of my talks with Prime Minister Kaifu. And this present meeting with you has strengthened me in the conviction that the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union are sincerely striving to live in peace and to build bridges of good-neighborliness. Once more I thank everyone for their cooperation, support, and the splendid atmosphere of our intercourse. I wish those present, all of you, the Japanese people, peace, happiness, and prosperity! Thank you. [applause] [video shows Gorbachev talking from a platform, occasional shots of Raisa, looking on from his right, and Japanese audience]

[Correspondent] The USSR president presented orders of the friendship of peoples to Akira Kurosawa, the veteran film director, who is very well-known in the Soviet Union, as well as Toyohiro Akiyama, the country's first space man, and Ryoko Kikuchi, his understudy, and members of the Soviet-Japanese space crew. [video shows Gorbachev presenting awards to two Japanese men and one Japanese woman]

Gorbachev Addresses Japanese Politicians

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[TASS report: "Agreements Signed"]

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 18 Apr—[passage omitted] The Soviet leader visited the residence of the speaker of the House of Representatives of parliament, situated in downtown Tokyo, where he was greeted by Y. Sakurauchi, speaker of the House of Representatives; Y. Tsuchiya, speaker of the House of Councillors; leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and also of the opposition Social Democratic Party, Komeito Party, Communist Party, and Democratic Socialist Party; former prime ministers, and other well-known parliament deputies.

Welcoming the USSR president, Sakurauchi emphasized the importance of this meeting between the Soviet leader and representatives of Japan's political world. He expressed profound gratitude to M.S. Gorbachev for his efforts aimed at establishing friendship between the two countries.

Delivering a brief speech in reply, the USSR president pointed out that his visit to Japan has made it possible better to learn and clarify each other's positions, helped to create a more propitious atmosphere for contacts between the Japanese and Soviet people, and widened the bounds of mutual interest. This means, Gorbachev emphasized, that the visit is "working" in the only main direction via which it is possible to create new relations and raise them to a level consonant with the potential and requirements of the two peoples and states.

By strengthening the atmosphere of trust, both sides will also seek solutions to the problems which for one reason or another do not now lend themselves to a final settlement. Much in common concerning positions both on bilateral relations and on the international plane has come to light during the visit, and this will be recorded in the corresponding documents and agreements. It is important, Gorbachev emphasized, to implement all that has been agreed. [Passage omitted]

Then Gorbachev met with representatives of the Japanese public committee to organize a meeting with the USSR president, which unites prominent representatives of the political world, of public organizations, and of business who have made a big contribution to the development of relations between the two countries.

N. Takeshita, former prime minister and one of the most authoritative leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, delivered a speech of welcome on their behalf.

Welcoming Gorbachev, he emphasized that the first ever visit to Japan by a Soviet head of state is of epoch-making significance for the establishment of relations of friendship and good-neighborliness between the two countries.

The perestroyka which is being carried out under President Gorbachev's leadership has not only brought great changes in the Soviet Union but has also ended the policy of confrontation, put a stop to the "cold war," and opened up the way to the creation of a new world order and to concord and peace.

The establishment of friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Takeshita said, meets the wishes of our countries' peoples. This is also our duty to the peoples of the whole world. We believe that, mindful of our two countries' so historic mission, we can and must resolve all problems, conclude a peace treaty, and build strong relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation.

M.S. Gorbachev delivered a speech in reply.

Esteemed Mr. Chairman!

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen!

My meeting with you, organized by the national committee which has done so much to prepare for my visit to Japan and during it, worthily crowns its program.

I am pleased to see you all together and to express to you my sincere gratitude for your efforts.

My special gratitude goes to Mr. Abe, the committee chairman, with whom I have long been acquainted. The fact that he took on the heavy burden of heading such a committee shows what significance a major Japanese politician attaches to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Your committee's work has helped to create a friendly atmosphere around the visit. And this is of huge significance.

The program of my stay has proved unusually full, filled to overflowing with talks and political meetings. Too little time remains to acquaint myself more closely with your wonderful and beautiful country and with the people who have made and are making it what it is.

I have probably succeeded only in touching the surface of the multifaceted and rapidly changing reality whose name is modern Japan.

Incidentally, you have made me and all my colleagues a splendid gift. You have gathered together the flower of the political, public, and business world, science, culture, and the news media.

In short, in this way you have organized for me a "meeting with Japan," as it were, with its people.

This is, of course, the culmination of our visit to Japan. The business part of it is behind us, as it were, it is close to being completed. Therefore I may be permitted even now to say a few words about how I assess the results of the visit and what they promise our countries.

We came with the firm intention of raising relations between the USSR and Japan to a new level. I believe that Prime Minister Kaifu and I have succeeded in promoting this. Large-scale top-level talks have been held and are continuing. This has happened for the first time. We—the representatives of the Soviet state who are here with me—are satisfied with this course and this scale and with the frankness of this political dialogue.

We have discussed frankly and in a congenial atmosphere all aspects of Soviet-Japanese relations and have left some things, as I have already said, for one more late-night conversation. We have "tried out" our views and "domestic procurements" on each other, as they say, delved into each other's arguments, and probably derived much food for subsequent thought and reflection.

A whole series of significant agreements will be signed. They concern many areas of practical cooperation. This solid package of accords makes it possible to expand and, I would say, modernize ties between our countries and, thus, also improve conditions for trust, concord, and good-neighborliness.

I attach special significance to the fact that the prime minister and I are now working hard on the chief political document. We hope to thereby surmount everything that has arisen and emerged in the path of this dialogue and to attain the political document which the Japanese and Soviet peoples await. I believe that we can, thus, say today that the preconditions of a new position are being laid down for a breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations and for their advancement in our mutual interest and in the interests of our two great powers' cooperation in the international arena.

And another thing, also portentous. The substance, nature, and atmosphere of the visit have reflected the changes in our peoples' perception of each other. The hope that the process of rapprochement between Soviet and Japanese people will be accelerated after this visit has emerged in its turn. As president of the Soviet Union I wish to assure you that Soviet people desire rapprochement with the Japanese people.

Acquaintance, knowledge of each other, and understanding of the problems and concerns—of which there are plenty on both sides, and particularly on our side just now—will be broadened.

For, however important relations at the state level may be, it is precisely ties between nations, societies, and people that constitute the deep-seated basis of international relations.

The way they look on each other, whether they perceive their near and also distant neighbors as equal and worthy of good relations, or whether they consider them "potential enemies"—this means a very great deal for foreign policy.

Statesmen, parties, and their leaders must in turn constantly feel responsible for fostering in their compatriots respect for the peoples of other countries, and for neighbors above all.

Interstate relations are mainly determined by a balance of interests. In relations between peoples, on the contrary, the predominant role is played by feelings, sentiments, and sometimes long-established stereotypes and even prejudices.

They frequently mean more than the most carefully considered foreign policy schemes and rational elaborations.

But governments do not have the right to abuse this. They are called upon to remove the obstacles which prevent peoples from getting to know and understand each other better and to help them to overcome suspicion and preconceptions. I believe that this visit has brought some things in this sphere too, and we spoke of this today when I met with the leaders of parliamentary factions within the framework of a parliamentary meeting.

Direct contact between peoples can promote the resolution of the most complex interstate problems which politicians and diplomats might be unable to surmount for a long time.

Something else is true, too: If certain decisions on an interstate level do not meet with support and understanding in society, their consequences will not last and the danger of a recoil will always persist.

We note with satisfaction that the "image of the enemy," a sad legacy of the "cold war," which long prevented our peoples from seeing each other as they really are, is receding into the past. Both you and we are beginning to see the faces of friends "on the other side."

I observe these changes in the Soviet Union. And in Japan I also see them confirmed in the nationwide composition of your committee, in the very nature of its activity, and in the tasks you have set yourselves.

Here I would like to name names and express gratitude to prominent politicians and public figures in Japan who have done much to restore the mutual understanding between our countries.

They include Messieurs Nakasone, Takeshita, Abe, Kanemaru, Miyazawa, Ozawa, Doi, Obuchi, and Araki, the former mayor of Hiroshima.

On behalf of their Soviet colleagues and many Soviet citizens I would like to say to the whole of Japan how highly we value the activity of the Association of Japanese Parliament Deputies for Friendship with the Soviet Union, the Association of Liberal Democratic Party Parliament Deputies for Friendship Between Japan and the USSR, the Japan-USSR Society, the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society, the Japanese-Soviet Relations Society, the Japanese Association for Cultural Relations headed by Professor Matsumae, and the Soka Gakkai Society.

I consider it necessary to point separately to the contribution of linked cities to Soviet-Japanese relations. There are already dozens of them—large and small. They regularly exchange delegations, hold joint measures, and perform the great—albeit not immediately apparent—deed of helping our peoples to really get to know each other, drawing them closer, and ennobling relations.

I wish to pay tribute to the cities of Kyoto and Sendai for their effective solidarity with Kiev and Minsk at the time of the Chernobyl tragedy. Our gratitude goes to Mr. Yokomichi, governor of Hokkaido, who organized treatment there for stricken children.

Those of you who have visited our country in recent years will probably have felt that the attitude toward Japan, toward everything Japanese, and toward the Japanese is no longer simply one of cordiality and respect. The desire to learn more about your achievements, about your life, about your culture and history is growing among our people, particularly among young people.

In determining its policy in the "Japanese salient" the Soviet leadership is underpinned by these sentiments and by the Soviet people's clear desire for friendly, serious, businesslike cooperation with Japan.

The dynamics of cultural exchanges are particularly significant. Painting, the cinema, literature, and music are a life-giving source of not only mutual familiarization and enrichment. They nurture an old truth: If ordinary people maintain direct contacts, it is hard to shake their inner respect and trust, imprinted on their soul. And then "dissimilarity" becomes a stimulus for rapprochement and cooperation.

Maybe things are slightly more complex for the Japanese than for us in this respect. For they have before them not just a different world and a different culture but the multitude of worlds and cultures making up a community of incredible complexity—the Soviet Union.

Our country is inhabited by dozens of nations with their own culture, characters, and beliefs. Now they have all begun speaking at the top of their voices. And a foreigner accustomed to the image of a monolithic and gloomy country might be dazzled by the surging multiplicity of colors and, to put it bluntly, the quite discordant and contradictory chorus of voices.

The Soviet Union really is a huge, distinctive quantity in the world, an entire civilization. Thanks to its situation in both Europe and Asia, many ideas of its humanist scientists, philosophers, and writers carry within themselves a synthesis of the cultures of East and West.

Today, as the Soviet Union is overcoming the legacy of ideological and economic self-isolation, we are turning our face, above all, to our neighbors in all directions, and we sincerely seek to gain from them what is valuable and acceptable to us.

What is happening now in Soviet-Japanese relations is also an indicator of general changes in the world. Mankind is tired of confrontation, of the ideological struggle and abuse, of fear for its future.

Dialogue and compromise—this is what is increasingly confidently taking over from the imperatives of the old political thinking. They must also determine Soviet-Japanese relations. And it seems to me that this has been promoted by my coming to you, dear friends.

Finally, a few words and remarks of quite a personal nature.

This is the first time I have been to Japan. I have read about your country, I am quite well informed about your political and social life, and, when the opportunity presents itself, I watch your movies. I have long dreamed of visiting Japan.

My impressions have not yet become fixed. But I will say what I feel: The real, "living" Japan has eclipsed all my knowledge of it.

The beauty of nature, the cherry blossom, the organic juxtaposition of the past with the present and with a breakthrough into the future, the amicable people with a sense of their own dignity and respect for others, their healthy curiosity and interest in life, their desire to realize themselves and to display their talents—in short, these Japanese people are an amazing creation of nature and culture.

All this captivates and arouses profound liking. I am pleased to have been able to feel the living pulse of your country and see for myself its achievements which have given Japan its rightful place among the leaders in world progress.

On my way here I made a stopover in Khabarovsk, where I paid tribute to the memory of the Soviet and Japanese soldiers who died during the years of World War II.

Our joint history with you makes its presence felt. In it, I will repeat, there has been much that arouses bitterness and regret. But history cannot be allowed to separate us. Those who have fallen victim to it forbid us to do this.

The memory of their suffering calls to us and returns our thoughts to the need for reconciliation. Reconciliation and concord in the name of the present and the future.

This is a mandate to politicians of both countries. We must learn to take a broader view of things and not confine ourselves to the particular and the transient. We must be guided by the deep-seated interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples.

I can state most frankly that this was the theme of my talks with Prime Minister Kaifu.

This meeting with you has also strengthened my conviction that the peoples of Japan and the Soviet Union sincerely strive to live in peace and to build bridges of good-neighborliness.

I thank everyone once again for the cooperation, the support, and the excellent atmosphere of our contacts.

I wish the participants, all of you, and the Japanese people peace, happiness, and prosperity.

Gorbachev Departs for Kyoto, Nagasaki

LD1904033691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0255 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Tokyo, 19 Apr (TASS)—Emperor Akihito of Japan and Empress Michiko paid a farewell visit to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and R.M. Gorbacheva today at the Akasaka Palace which has been the official residence of the Soviet leader during his stay in Tokyo.

After a short conversation M.S. Gorbachev and R.M. Gorbacheva proceeded to the station where they set out for Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, on a high-speed train.

It is expected that the USSR president will go sightseeing in this museum city, as well as meet with representatives of business circles. Then M.S. Gorbachev will head for Nagasaki. There he will visit the cemetery where Russian sailors who perished in the 1904- 1905 war are buried, as well as the park of peace which is devoted to the victims of the U.S. atomic bombing of the city.

After completing his visit to Japan, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev will fly to the South Korean island of Cheju today where he will meet with No Tae-u, president of the Republic of Korea.

Visits Cities, Departs Japan

LD1904231791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Report by correspondents V. Lyubovtsev and V. Ilyashenko; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Kyoto, the ancient Japanese capital which has managed to preserve the inimitable charm of the former imperial residence, is the second city visited by the USSR president on his visit to Japan. [video shows street scenes, palaces, parks, train arriving at station, official greeting Gorbachev] Unfortunately, a shortage of time—as is known, the president's second working day did not end until today, in fact—had its effect in disrupting the schedule for his arrival in Kyoto. [passage omitted]

As they alighted from the train Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and his wife were met by the governor of Kyoto Prefecture Aramaki and Mayor of Kyoto Tanabe. As they left the station they were greeted warmly by Japanese schoolchildren. Just look at the winning sincerity with which they express their feelings. These photographs look destined to appear in all the newspapers and news agencies. [video shows crowds waving flags, Gorbachev picking up small boy]

The motorcade then set off for the Miyako hotel, where a luncheon in honor of the Soviet head of state was hosted by political and business circles of the Kansai industrial region. Gathered here were leaders of some of the biggest Japanese and international corporations with enterprises located in the region. [passage omitted] [video shows motorcade moving off, Gorbachev meeting with businessmen]

Aramaki, governor of Kyoto Prefecture, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev exchanged speeches. The USSR president said, among other things:

[Gorbachev] There are people seated here on whom much depends, I believe, even much in politics. And perhaps the main thing of all: I invite you to cooperate, and in the Soviet Union you will find a partner with whom it is both interesting and important and profitable to do business. [applause] [video shows Gorbachev addressing businessmen; cuts to show scenes of Nagasaki city and the port; then the Russian cemetery containing graves of Russian seamen who died in the 1904-5 war; Gorbachev shown laying wreath] [passage omitted]

The president's last stop in Nagasaki, and on Japanese territory, is the Peace Park. [passage omitted] [video shows Gorbachevs arriving with large crowd of officials, in darkness, at the peace park monument to the victims of the 1945 bomb; he adjusts flowers, steps back and bows his head. Unidentified journalist shown asking Gorbachev questions; Gorbachev replies]

[Unidentified journalist] Mikhail Sergeyevich. It is said that you are the first leader of a nuclear power to have visited Nagasaki. What are your impressions?

[Gorbachev] You know, I wasn't too interested in the fact of actually being the first or not. But, being in Japan, I could not imagine not visiting this place. I do not think I would have been understood by our Soviet people who are now experiencing a great misfortune after Chernobyl, and have still not dealt with it. Chernobyl was a most grave reminder and for many people a grief and a disaster. And I could not do otherwise than bow to the memory of the people who first experienced this terrible force. And I would have considered that I had committed a disrespect to the Japanese people. And so I am here. The main thing, I believe, is that we understand that there are threats to our civilization to which we cannot fail to react and on which we cannot fail to act. And the fact that I am here is also an action, my stance.

[Journalist] You will soon be leaving for home. Before you go, do you have anything to say to the Japanese people?

[Gorbachev] I asked government representative Mr. Nakayama, foreign minister...[pauses for interpreter] now that I shall be leaving Japan in an hour's time, to convey to the government my deep satisfaction with what we have done in these days to give Soviet-Japanese relations a new character, a new dynamism, a new content, and broaden their scale in all directions, including the most difficult issues that exist. I don't want to list them, I spoke of them yesterday. That is the first thing. We met here on Japanese soil in the afternoon, in Kyoto, and Osaka and here in Nagasaki there is so much warm-heartedness and feeling which, even in some degree...[hesitates] you know, for me is unexpected; and that unexpectedness simply staggers me. And the fact that our people, of late, when they were asked more than once by sociologists and politologists and journalists, especially in connection with this visit, the great and overwhelming majority of them expressed themselves sincerely in favor of cooperation, of developing good-neighborly relations with the Japanese people, this fact is finding an appropriate response here. You know, when that is so, it promises much. Let us hope for a fine future. And I hope our relations will develop and we shall become closer to each other.

[Video cuts to show motorcade arriving at Nagasaki airport; the Gorbachevs bidding farewell to crowd of officials at foot of aircraft steps, then mounting steps; aircraft taxiing away] [passage omitted]

Diplomat Notes 'Importance' of Japanese Accords

LD1904102191 Moscow TASS in English 0958 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—"The signing of a joint Soviet-Japanese statement by president Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu marked the beginning of qualitatively new relations between the two countries," Soviet Foreign Ministry expert Dmitriy Gorbunov told TASS.

Fifteen agreements were signed during the Soviet president's visit to Japan, including an agreement on cooperation on environmental protection, peaceful use of nuclear energy and cultural ties.

The importance and topicality of bilateral agreements is self-evident, Gorbunov said. For the first time ever, the memorandum on inter-governmental consultations signed by the foreign ministers fixed an agreement to hold annual official bilateral consultations between the foreign ministers. The sides also agreed that it is necessary to hold direct contacts between the two countries' leaders more often.

The agreement on Japan's technical assistance during the Soviet Union's transition to market relations will help to establish wide-scale cooperation in the study and use of Japanese experience in financial policy, setting up small and medium-size enterprises, managing the market, privatising enterprises, demonopolising the economy, stabilising prices, ensuring normal circulation of goods and regulating trade relations, Gorbunov said.

The Soviet-Japanese agreement on prisoners of war is particularly important, as it helps resolve a sore point in bilateral relations. On his way to Japan, Gorbachev stopped over in Khabarovsk, where he visited a Japanese cemetery. In Japan, the Soviet president visited a Russian cemetery in Nagasaki to lay a wreath in memory of the Russian sailors who died in the war of 1904-1905, Gorbunov said.

On the whole, the signing of Soviet-Japanese documents will promote bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level, which is expected to stabilise the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world, Gorbunov said.

Fedorov Criticizes Gorbachev Position at Talks

PM1904135391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed report under general headline "Tokyo Summit": "What Is Happening Behind the Scenes"]

[Text] As is now known, V.P. Fedorov, chairman of the Sakhalin Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee], cut short his visit as part of the Soviet delegation in Japan and flew back from Tokyo to Moscow ahead of schedule. Before flying out he gave an interview to journalists in which he criticized the president's position at the talks with the Japanese Government. According to Fedorov, Gorbachev is not thinking about the well-being and interests of the inhabitants of the Far East. The chairman believes that during the talks the starting point in the disputes on the territorial problem was erroneous. The stance of Fedorov himself is well known: He believes that a joint economic zone should be created on the Kurils.

Kuznetsov Absence From Tokyo Assessed

PM1904134591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 3

[S. Avdeyev report under general headline "Tokyo Summit": What Is Happening Behind the Scenes"]

[Text] Vladimir Kuznetsov, chairman of the Maritime Krayispolkom [Kray Soviet Executive Committee], did not go to Japan with the president. A.S. Golovizin, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party's Maritime Kraykom [Kray Committee], wrote an article for the kray party newspaper, KRASNOYE ZNAMYA. His article makes it clear that it was he who had called the president, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and convinced him in a confidential conversation that "there is no particular need" for Kuznetsov to go to Japan.

Obviously, this is our local affair, a totally internal affair. But will the Japanese understand, since they are well acquainted with Kuznetsov the businessman from Vladivostok, and they associate the broadest prospects of future cooperation with neighboring Primorye?

Near East & South Asia

'Shamir Plan' Considered Obstacle to Peace

91UF0646A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 91 p 5

[Article by D. Kulik: "Shamir's Three No's"]

[Text] *The new plan for a settlement proposed by Israel is structured on old principles.*

The conflict in the Middle East, ongoing now for more than 40 years, is still seeking resolution. A great many plans for settling the conflict have been proposed over its history, but they have had no success. All the same, they were attempts at a peaceful, not military, solution to the crisis. Time has shown that the military option leads not to an unraveling of the tangle of contradictions, but rather tightens it further. This is what happened following the Arab-Israeli wars, irrespective of who came out ahead when they were over. And this is the way it was during the direct military intervention by the United States in the affairs of Lebanon in 1958 and 1982. It is evident today that the war in the Persian Gulf, which was successful for the Americans and their allies, has also failed to bring peace to the Middle East, and indeed could not do so, since the very basis of the conflict was not eliminated—Arab- Israeli contradictions existing since as long ago as the second half of the 1940's.

Almost half a century ago, the world community, in the embodiment of the United Nations, faced the task of making a "decision of Solomon": either establish a single state with identical rights for the entire population residing therein, or divide the territory in dispute into

two states. The second variation was adopted. The Jewish population supported this and in 1948 declared the creation of the State of Israel. However, the Arab countries surrounding Palestine rejected the plan for its division and attacked the newly established country. Agreement on a truce reached the next year, in 1949, shifted the Arab-Jewish conflict to the level of Arab-Israeli confrontation. After this the entire world observed a classic picture of the development of regional conflicts—Israel and the Arab countries began an arms race and attempted three times to resolve their mutual contradictions through military means. The great powers were gradually dragged into the conflict, and it became a most dangerous international bastion of tension, tension which could have been avoided from the very first days of the formation of the State of Israel.

In December 1947, that is, immediately following the adoption of UN Resolution No. 181 on the creation of Jewish and Arab states, the Jewish leaders of Palestine headed by Ben-Gurion advanced a program for their activity prior to proclaiming independence—a program which both the adherents of a "tough" discussion with the Arabs and those who see Israel only as an enemy are trying to forget. At the same time, Ben-Gurion's proposals stated in part that it was necessary to create a national coalition on three "pillars"—Zionist immigration, a democratic regime, and Jewish-Arab friendship—and that Palestine had to secure the hegemony and unity of workers who would possess a **class** consciousness and would strive to build an independent state. It would be necessary to decisively repulse the propaganda of extremists demanding territorial seizure in the name of the "indivisibility of the country."

This program was enthusiastically adopted by the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population of Palestine. It followed from it that Jewish leaders made no territorial claims beyond the borders of the future Jewish state as determined by the United Nations, and that they had no intention of provoking armed conflict but desired to live in peace and friendship with the Arabs. If this program had been placed at the foundation of the Middle East policy of Israeli ruling circles and their great Western ally, the Arab-Israeli conflict would long since have been resolved.

Since the end of the 1980's, a trend has again been observed in Israeli public opinion toward strengthening those forces which advocate settlement of the Palestinian issue on a mutually advantageous basis. Influencing this to a great degree were the uprising conducted by Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip in December 1987 and the factual recognition of Israel as a state by the Palestine Liberation Organization. All of this imparted an additional impulse to development of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians and required Israel to reevaluate various possible positions regarding the future of the occupied territories, i.e., to begin political dialogue. Unfortunately, the events in the Persian Gulf reinforced the position of Israeli circles which are against resolution of the Palestinian question on a basis of "exchanging territory for peace." Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that on 10 March of this year, the Israeli Government officially ratified the not-unknown "Shamir plan" as its program of action for the post- crisis period without any alteration whatsoever.

This plan is based on three "no's": "no" to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; "no" to negotiations with the PLO; and "no" to an international peace conference on settling the Arab- Israeli conflict. Judging from everything, the Israeli leadership continues as before to be indisposed toward taking into account its own history, and has decided to utilize the results of the Persian Gulf crisis to settle the Palestinian issue by virtue of the so- called "Jordanian scenario." This entails the resettlement of Palestinians from their own lands into the territory of a neighboring state.

Initial statements from the Bush administration provide grounds to assert that the United States is also inclined toward resolving the Palestinian question through Jordan. The U.S. President let it be understood that, as before, he does not support the idea of creating an independent state for the Palestinians.

This position of the United States and its chief ally in the Middle East can be explained by the sentiment of euphoria which was seen following the victory in the war against Iraq and in the striving to play first violin in the region. However, so far there has not been a single state which has attempted to resolve the Middle East conflict just to its own advantage, without taking historical development and the interests of the other sides into account, which has been able to establish peace and equanimity in relations between Israel and the Arab countries, and therefore avert the potential of new wars. We can only hope that sooner or later in the plans of the Israeli Government there will appear three "yes's" in place of these three categorical "no's."

Booster Rocket To Put Indian Satellite in Orbit

LD2004001991 Moscow TASS in English 2021 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—IRS-1B Indian satellite will be launched on a commercial basis from the Soviet cosmodrome Baikonur in June 1991. It will be put into orbit by the Soviet booster-rocket "Vostok", TASS learned from the Soviet Space Agency Glavcosmos.

Two more Indian satellites are to be launched under an agreement signed in Moscow early this year. This work will also be conducted on a commercial basis. The first one of these satellites, IRS-1C, is a spacecraft of the new generation for distance probing of the Earth's surface and ocean. It is to be launched in 1994. The second satellite, "Gramsat", is a communications satellite.

Joint work for the peaceful exploration of outer space by means of Earth satellites was started 15 years ago. The first Indian satellite Ariabata was launched from the Soviet cosmodrome on April 19, 1976.

Late in the sixties India began to work out the national programme for the exploration and use of outer space.

The Indian side then asked the Soviet Union to give technological assistance and consultations in creating the first Indian scientific satellite and in putting it into orbit by a Soviet booster-rocket. Bkhaskara and Bkhaskara-2 Indian satellites were also launched from the Soviet territory. The latest Indian satellite IRS-1A was launched in 1988.

The spaceflight of the Soviet-Indian crew—Soviet cosmonauts Yuriy Malyshev and Gennadiy Strekalov and India's first cosmonaut Rakesh Sharma in 1984 became an important stage of Soviet-Indian cooperation in space.

West Europe

Supreme Soviet Chairman Continues France Visit

Meets Mitterand

LD1904235891 Moscow TASS in English 1840 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris April 19 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov visiting in France summed up his impressions from meetings with French statesmen and politicians and his opinion of prospects for the development of Franco-Soviet relations in an interview with TASS today.

The third day of his visit in France had a very busy programme. Lukyanov said meetings are wide-ranging. He said he had already met French President Francois Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, leaders of the National Assembly and Senate and representatives of all political groups in the French Parliament.

The contents of these conversations warrant the conclusion that representatives of all parliamentary groups are cautious and realistic about processes taking place in the Soviet Union. They are interested in the success of perestroyka, in preserving unity of the USSR. Lukyanov said everyone told him that disintegration of the Soviet Union would pose a threat to Europe and the world and would do nothing to promote the consolidation of peace.

Lukyanov said that most of the leaders with whom he talked would like France to assist changes in the Soviet Union as much as it can, also by developing economic ties.

It is believed that there should be cooperation between enterprises of the state sector of the two countries, that crediting policy should be upgraded. France could also render USSR technological assistance and assistance in personnel training.

Many parliamentarians also said that instability and social tension in the Soviet Union compel a number of French firms to approach cautiously the development of relations with some organisations in the USSR.

Lukyanov said he understands them, but it should still be noted that wise financiers and entrepreneurs always orient themselves at main, not secondary processes.

He also said conversations show that there exist vast potentials for the development of relations between the USSR and France in every sphere. "We have excellent historic heritage, and it should be replenished," Lukyanov said.

Lukyanov also noted that parliamentary affairs were also discussed at meetings. French parliamentarians closely follow the work of their Soviet colleagues. They believe that many similar features manifest themselves in the work of the French National Assembly, one of the oldest parliaments in Europe, and the Soviet parliament, one of the youngest, although a direct comparison cannot be made between them because of the difference of the socio-political systems.

Asked about details of his meeting with the French president, Lukaynov said: "First of all, the head of the French state asked that the Soviet president be told that he agrees with the date suggested by the Soviet side for Francois Mitterrand's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, May 6".

"Besides that, Mitterrand said he shares the Soviet president's concern for the destiny of the country and is prepared to give him every support in all his undertakings, specifically to give him political support by suggesting certain ideas of development of the European Community, to give moral support and also to encourage the development of economic, cultural and other ties between France and the Soviet Union. The two leaders are linked by profound mutual understanding.

"So far as I can see, France and its neighbours wish to assist the processes taking place in the Soviet Union and help avoid disintegration of the USSR."

"On the whole, we had a prolonged and very candid conversation on every aspect on Franco-Soviet relations and problems of the USSR," Lukaynov said. "We have trusting relations built on mutual understanding. The French president has profound understanding for our problems," Lukyanov said.

"We regard Mitterrand's upcoming visit to Moscow as another coordination of our joint efforts. This refers, first of all, to such important matters as disarmament policies, the construction of the 'common European home' or 'European confederation' whose idea has been

suggested by President Mitterrand, institutionalisation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and, undoubtedly, problems of bilateral relations. We appreciate very highly France's balanced realistic stand with regard to the processes taking place in our country. I would like to emphasise again that we have vast potentials for mutually advantageous development of bilateral ties, including those contained in the treaty on accord and cooperation between the Soviet Union and France which has just been ratified by the Supreme Soviet," Lukyanov said.

Meets Defense Minister Joxe

LD2004113491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Here is a report from Paris where Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been staying on an official visit.

[Correspondent Iezuitov, identified by caption] Late last night the head of the Soviet Parliament visited the France-USSR Society. The society plays a great role in developing friendly ties with our country. In recent years its efforts aimed at expanding contacts have been encountering ever greater difficulties. They are related to a sharp fall in tourism from France to the USSR. [passage omitted]

But despite this it continues operating, organizing concerts, festivities, and days of our country's republics, wanting people to know, understand, and love our country. To know and to understand—this is what was discussed at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists which Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov held this morning at his residence at the Grenaille which housed at one time the embassy of Tsarist Russia. Questions were on the most diverse aspects of life in our country. The journalists were above all interested in the trends of development in the internal situation in the USSR, perestroyka, processes of democratization that have taken place in our society, the future of our country when it is renewed and united, as Western Europe would like to see it. Today when we speak of the old continent striving toward a political and economic unity, we naturally compare it with our great country, where separatist tendencies are growing, where the forces trying to destroy that which has been created in our century-long history. And this comparison is not in our favor.

On the same day Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov met Robert Badinter, president of the Constitutional Council. [passage omitted] It was a tete-a-tete conversation. In the evening, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet talked to Pierre Joxe, the French minister of defense. Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin, USSR ambassador in France, took part in the meeting.

And in conclusion here is something else. They are still commenting here on the visit to France by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. In the view of the local press, the visit took place in a somewhat ambiguous atmosphere. [passage omitted] Partly, this was because the mass information media presented a rather negative image of Boris Nikolayevich.

Regrettably they do not always understand our ways here. And when Yeltsin stated live that he wanted to meet Mitterrand, many were slightly bewildered. The French adhere sacredly to their protocol, and in order to meet the president, you must apply in writing. The meeting did in fact take place, it was literally very brief in the courtyard of the Elysee. Boris Nikolayevich stated that he was pleased with his visit to France. Its main aim was to establish political contacts—something that was carried out. But newspapers were not that optimistic since Yeltsin's status is still unclear. No one is sure that Yeltsin and Gorbachev will cooperate and will not try to push one another—this is what the papers say. [passage omitted]

France's Fabius Addresses Reception

LD1904223391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1705 GMT 18 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Viktor Khrekov]

[Excerpt] Paris, 18 Apr (TASS)—[passage omitted] Yu.V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador to France, took part in the conversations.

L. Fabius, chairman of the National Assembly, held a reception in honor of the Soviet guest which was attended by parliamentarians and representatives of the French public and business circles.

France and the Soviet Union, L. Fabius stated, have made a big contribution to establishing a new international order. We must continue to work together in this direction in the future, too. The events in the USSR—the process of working out a new Union treaty, international relations, and the situation in the economy—are being followed with great attention in France. All of this is directly linked with the equilibrium on the continent of Europe.

The parliamentarians of France and the Soviet Union, he pointed out, have great opportunities for developing cooperation and interaction. One may name among these the problems of the Near East, disarmament, and European construction. We also have great opportunities to exchange experience and for enhancing the role of parliaments in the life of our countries.

The current visit, A.I. Lukyanov emphasized in his speech in reply, is a continuation of the well tested traditions of regular ties between our parliaments at various levels. A new chapter in the diverse contacts between the French National Assembly and the renewed

Soviet parliament has been opened recently—they have become more businesslike and informal. The dynamic development of events in the world demands an increasing role by parliamentarians both in international affairs as a whole, and in the advancement of Soviet-French bilateral relations. In this context quite a lot has been done over a short period. The intensive and businesslike dialogue, which at the same time enabled USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and President Mitterrand to confide in each other man-to-man has played a decisive role here.

Touching on the situation in the USSR, A.I. Lukyanov stressed in particular that we we shall not shift from the path of reforms which we have chosen. Life itself has led us to understanding the need for the most profound changes, the results of which will determine for decades what the Soviet Union will be like and what its place in the world will be. We will always remember, he noted, that France, especially through its president, was one of the first to come out in support of perestroyka. We are also highly appreciative of the fact that the French leadership is stating its readiness to assist our reforms where possible, and its interest in preserving the Soviet Union as a unified, stable power which plays a unique role in international affairs. And we hope that France will continue in the future to show an understanding of those difficulties which our country and our leadership now finds itself up against.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1754 GMT on 18 April reports that in the second half of the day Lukyanov met with the leaders of various political groupings in the National Assembly and met with members of the National Assembly's foreign affairs commission. Ambassador Dubinin also took part in the meetings. Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1905 GMT on 18 April reports that a meeting was also held today between Lukyanov and members of the Presidential Council of the France-USSR Society. During the evening Lukyanov visited the French Senate and attended a dinner given in his honor by the Senate chairman]

Visit Reviewed

LD2004091791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1511 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] [Announcer] I would now like to tell you about another visit. I am referring not to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Japan but the official visit to France by Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Lukyanov is there. Over to you Yevgeniy.

[Lukyanov] Good evening. Today, on the second day of his visit to France, the head of the Soviet parliament met Roland Dumas, the foreign minister. According to an official spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, a broad range of international questions was examined during the talks—in particular the implementation of the Paris Charter, that important document which was signed in November last year right here in Paris during the all-European summit, as you will recall. Special attention was paid to aspects of nonnuclear disarmament in Europe. Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov and Roland Dumas also discussed questions connected with the situation in the Soviet Union and the prospects for the signing of the Union treaty. During the talks Roland Dumas said he was keen for the current session of the French National Assembly to ratify the Franco-Soviet treaty, which, as we know, was signed at the summit meeting in Rambouillet in October last year.

Also today, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov had another important meeting, this time with Laurent Fabius, president of the French National Assembly, who in November 1989 paid an official visit to our country. At today's meeting they discussed the international situation after the Persian [Gulf] crisis. Anatoliy Ivanovich spoke about the Soviet Parliament's ratification of the Soviet- French treaty. For his part, Laurent Fabius noted that he would endeavor to secure the earliest possible ratification of this treaty by the French Parliament. The desirability of parliamentarians in both countries taking a more active part in the implementation of the provisions of this treaty was also expressed.

[Announcer] Thank you. Those were today's events. Is there any information about tomorrow's events?

[Lukyanov] Yes. Tomorrow, as we learned today, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov will head for the town of Le Creusot, where he will visit a state-owned enterprise for the development and manufacture of aircraft engines. At St. Pierre de Varennes the Soviet delegation will also visit an agricultural firm, and then depart for Beaune—not Bonn—where it will meet the prefect of Burgundy.

[Announcer] Thank you. Well, I'm not surprised that the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet should be visiting Paris so soon after Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. After all, Strasbourg—that's in France—is the headquarters of the European Parliament. What parallels or distinctions can one draw between these two visits?

[Lukyanov] Yes, as we know, France continues to be one of the centers, a major center of international politics. Many questions affecting Europe's present and future are now decided in Strasbourg, the political capital of Western Europe, as we call it. Therefore, as you rightly said, there is nothing surprising about the head of the Russian Parliament's recent visit there, to establish the first contacts with the leadership of the European Parliament. Russia, as Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin stressed the other day, aspires to integration with the United Europe. On the whole, one may say that the leaders of both the Soviet and Russian Parliaments regard France as a reliable and influential partner of long standing and they consider that the further development of relations with this partner is in the mutual interests of the Soviet Union, France, and Russia.

[Announcer] Thank you, Yevgeniy. Goodbye.

[Lukyanov] All the best.

Concludes Visit, Departs 21 Apr

LD2104112291 Moscow TASS in English 1117 GMT 21 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris April 21 TASS—Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov left Paris for Moscow today at the close of his official visit to France at the invitation of the president of the French National Assembly.

At Orly Airport Lukyanov was seen off by Jean-Louis Destaing, diplomatic adviser to the president of the National Assembly, and by other officials. Among the send-off party was Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet ambassador to France.

Spokesman Denies Lukyanov To Challenge Presidency

LD2004100191 Hamburg DPA in German 0926 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—USSR Parliamentary Spokesman Arkadiy Maslennikov has described reports in Western newspapers that USSR Parliamentary President Anatoliy Lukyanov is prepared to challenge President Mikhail Gorbachev for the presidency as "pure speculation". "Lukyanov was and is Gorbachev's closest aide, I am quite sure of this," he told DPA in Moscow today. "I do not know a more reliable and closer confidante and aide to Gorbachev than Lukyanov," Maslennikov added.

Maslennikov thereby denied rumors, according to which there has been a rift between the old friends Gorbachev and Lukyanov. Lukyanov has always been the man supporting Gorbachev in the background. Rumors say that Lukyanov, who supports a harder line, might have been chosen by the conservative apparatus to oust Gorbachev. However, there are no specific indications of this.

Pavlov Stresses Prospects for European Bank

LD2104025991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Vsevolod Shishkovskiy in Great Britain; from the "International Panorama" program]

[Excerpts] [Shishkovskiy] So, another bank is being added to the numerous banks situated in the city of London—the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. [passage omitted]

On the day the Soviet delegation left for Moscow, we spoke with its leader, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov.

Valentin Sergeyevich, the opening ceremony of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was of course very extensively reported in the West, especially here in England. For Soviet television viewers, what is your evaluation of this bank and what are the prospects and opportunities for it?

[Pavlov] The creation of such a bank is now virtually the first experience in our history when we have from the very beginning joined such an international organization at which, incidentally, and not by chance, it was not only Europeans who are represented. A whole series of countries from Asia have joined, even South Korea, Japan, the United States, and those who considered it absolutely necessary for them to join the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. I hope that this will be a very useful step for our economy and for our people and that this bank will also bring great advantage to our country, including from the point of view even of the simple search and selection of partners who would be advantageous to us. If we are, as they say, investors in this bank, well any bank always guards the interests of its investors because it so happens in life that if things go well for the investor then he of course has funds, and the bank, as it were, thereby reinforces its position. Thus everything in the world is interdependent. Therefore we may rest assured here that we will gain first the necessary timely consultation which we do not always have and do not always know and we will receive support, from the point of view of the bank. In addition to this is the opportunity for training personnel at a completely new, high-quality level which is especially important for us in this period where a new system for managing the economy is coming into being. [end of Pavlov remarks] [passage omitted]

Latin America & Caribbean

General Criticizes Perestroyka, Urges 'Arms Race'

PY2004175691 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 14 Apr 91 p 50

[Interview with General Viktor Filatov, editor of the Defense Ministry's VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, by O GLOBO correspondent Monica Yanakiew in Moscow—date not given]

[Text] [Yanakiew] Why will the Soviet Union spend 96 million rubles ($171 billion) [as published]—over one-third of its 1991 budget—on defense at a time when the country is facing a serious economic crisis and the cold war is said to be over?

[Filatov] Everything is relative. If we compare our defense expenditures with the those of the Americans, we will see that they spend more than us because sophisticated electronic equipment is not entered in the books as military purchases. The United States and its West European allies still view the Soviet Union as their primary enemy, in spite of all the talk about the end of the cold war. If we add all the U.S. and European resources earmarked for the defense industry, the sum is $400 billion, twice as much as the Soviet military

budget. Are they saying that we are spending too much? We are spending little. We should increase our military budget because the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and its member countries, which were allies of the USSR, no longer contribute to the common defense. After all, NATO, the military organization comprising the Americans and their European allies, remains in place.

[Yanakiew] It is not true then what the Americans, the West Europeans, and Gorbachev himself are saying—that the cold war is over?

[Filatov] The cold war is not over. The arms race continues and so does the threat to the Soviet Union. I could see it in Iraq—where I was in the last ten days of the war. The United States turned American journalists into one more unit in its Army. The U.S. tanks fought on land and the journalists fought through the media—exactly as it was during the cold war. Nothing has changed. In the final analysis, the war that the 28 allied countries waged against Iraq was fought against the USSR. The only thing that changed was Soviet journalism, which with perestroyka, became more stupid. Iraq did not lose the true war; it lost the information war.

[Yanakiew] What happened in Iraq? CNN, which can also be seen in Moscow, showed the world images of surrendering Iraqi soldiers.

[Filatov] The Iraqi soldiers did not surrender. The Americans occupied Iraqi villages, captured the men, and made them parade before the television cameras. The prisoners who were shown were not soldiers. The Americans were unable to capture Iraqi military men because they carried out the entire war in the air, launching missiles. They dreaded facing the enemy in land combat.

[Yanakiew] If the Iraqis did not lose the war, why did they withdraw from Kuwait?

[Filatov] Because they wanted to. It was a strategy and, from a military standpoint, I would say that Iraq won the war. A military defeat necessarily implies the destruction of a country's army, the occupation of its territory, or the overthrow of its regime. In the case of Iraq, its air force and a good part of its army remain intact, the country's sovereignty is in force, and President Saddam Husayn continues in power.

[Yanakiew] But the coalition's objective was not to occupy Iraq, but to evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. The objective was achieved. What did Iraq win?

[Filatov] And who says that the war has ended? It has just began. The Americans will have to withdraw their troops from the Persian Gulf because the oil spilled in the sea is reaching the filters of Kuwaiti water desalinization plants. The drinking water will run out. And, then, nobody will be able to impede Iraq from struggling for the unity of the Arab people.

[Yanakiew] Do you believe the Gulf war will touch off a new arms race?

[Filatov] If the Soviet leadership is patriotic and wise, they will have learned a lesson from the Gulf war—not to disarm or reduce the Soviet Army. On the contrary, the arms race should be continued. The problem is that the Soviet press is doing the impossible by leading the Soviet leadership into taking a different position. This is why the Soviet leadership will not initiate a new arms race and will do anything the United States says. This is unfortunate, especially for Third World countries like Brazil. When the Americans become masters of the world, they will not even take into account the opinions of poor countries. If Brazilians wish their people well, they should approve of the arms race in the USSR.

[Yanakiew] In your opinion, did Gorbachev launch perestroyka to save the Soviet Union from bankruptcy and he had no other option other than to cut military expenditures, or was it a political decision?

[Filatov] That story about the lack of an option was a lie. We were all deceived. Do you believe we are better off now than before? We are worse off. There is a shortage of everything, as never before. When Gorbachev invented perestroyka, he told us we were going to have more socialism, that we could then modernize our factories. Now, what we have is just a large market open for bandits.

[Yanakiew] What was Gorbachev's intention then?

[Filatov] Gorbachev wanted to transform the USSR into a capitalist country but forgot one detail: The Soviets went through one civil war to replace their capitalist economy with a socialist economy. And they will have to go through another civil war to reverse the process.

[Yanakiew] Is capitalism bad in your opinion?

[Filatov] It is not bad. I just do not believe it should be mandatory. We can have our system also, without copying the American system. What is the United States, after all? A huge railroad station where people meet on the way to work. The United States is a country of immigrants, people rejected by their home countries. This is why the Americans harbor a deep inferiority complex and are so aggressive. When I was in the United States recently, several people stopped me to ask: We have a good country, do we not? This is like me going down the streets asking anyone I run into: My mother is a good person, is she not? How can anybody else say? She is my mother, not theirs.

[Yanakiew] Word is going around that Gorbachev is leaning more and more on the so-called CPSU hardliners for support. Is it true?

[Filatov] Perestroyka will fail, but not because of the military. Gorbachev is said to be paying more attention to the military and giving the cold shoulder to supporters considered to be progressive. This is not true.

[Yanakiew] What do you think of Boris Yeltsin, who is currently Gorbachev's greatest political rival?

[Filatov] If Yeltsin comes to power in the USSR, we will have civil war and concentration camps. He says that he wants the Russian Republic to have its own army. To fight who? The other 14 Soviet Republics? He says he will do away with the communists. How? There are 18 million members of the Communist Party. I will not just sit here waiting for Yeltsin to strangle me.

[Yanakiew] How do you think the arm wrestling match between Gorbachev and Yeltsin will end up?

[Filatov] We are going to resolve the problem as we have always done it. Stalin quarreled with Trotsky and sent him into exile. Stalin had a spat with Tuhachevsky and killed him. The same thing happened when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917; 30 parties were involved in the struggle for power and asked to have a round table to form a government of national reconciliation. A round table of 460 people was called, but they never met. And everybody knows how the story ended: All of the parties were dissolved. The same thing will happen this time. Yeltsin wants to have a round table, but the past will be repeated. I just do not know who will shoot first: Yeltsin or Gorbachev.

[Yanakiew] None of the republics are complying with orders from the central power. How will this situation be resolved?

[Filatov] If we do not first resolve the problem of Russia, which is the largest of the 15 republics, we will not be able to solve the problem of the others. Up until recently I thought it would be sufficient to dissolve all paramilitary organizations that have recently been created in the republics and then sit down to talk with the politicians. Now I know the disintegration of the USSR cannot be halted. Gorbachev has failed.

[Yanakiew] For months rumors have been heard about Gorbachev's fall. Do you believe this is probable?

[Filatov] The Communist Party has its hands tied now because Gorbachev is CPSU secretary general as well as president of the country. We cannot criticize the government without criticizing our own party. But with the economic crisis, tension is mounting. Strikes have begun, and these strikes were not inspired by the so-called progressives. The communists are leading these strikes, which are jeopardizing Gorbachev's power.

[Yanakiew] Do many military officers have the same thoughts as you, Sir?

[Filatov] Yes. In general, the military is in favor of perestroyka, but is against destruction of the Armed Forces. The Army must not be touched because as long as the military remains united and in favor of the government, there will be no risk of a civil war. The military are said to be conservatives. They are and they must be. Their mission is not to be revolutionaries, but to defend the establishment.

Supreme Soviet

Shcherbakov Discusses Anticrisis Program

LD1904225591 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1630 GMT 19 Apr 91

[From the "Parliamentary Diary" program]

[Text] Today, at a joint meeting of several committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, members of the union parliament discussed an anticrisis program, prepared by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which will be examined by by the Supreme Soviet next week. Taking the floor at the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Shcherbakov emphasized that, since the program was at present being finalized and amplified, he would not deliver an extensive report on it but merely present its general conception to the deputies. Speaking about implementing the proposed program, the deputy prime minister stressed that harsh measures, which will be unpopular, would have to be applied when the program is realized. He also noted that the Cabinet of Ministers would not like to impose specific measures for its implementation on the republics today, since it was a program of Cabinet of Ministers actions which the republics delegated to it. Revealing the nature of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers program of action for taking the economy out of the crisis, Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov said in part:

[Begin Shcherbakov recording] This is not a program for reviving the economy. The situation is such that the economy has reached a critical level—I would like to tell you this as a specialist who has now, more or less, managed to work out what his new duties are—a critical level. The beginning of a stochastical collapse of the market is but a short step away. The economy collapses completely, it is uncontrollable. This, as you may see, gives rise to a new question: What do we need a union for? What do we need interethnic conflicts for? Against this background, there can be no other political activity. We faced two solutions. One, which is demanded en masse—it is demanded by deputies at every level, it is demanded by trade unions, it is demanded by economic leaders—puts the country in order, restores economic links through a presidential decree, and so on and so forth. That's one solution. In our view, it is completely unrealistic. That kind of arrangement is unrealistic; hence, the conclusion and the idea of the program. We must not organize a flight, so to speak, like you sometimes get in war. We must arrange an organized withdrawal; arrive in an organized manner at a fall in production volumes, which is inevitable; prepare appropriately for the social consequences of this fall in production; pursue it in a most organized manner, with a regrouping of forces and the creation of strategic and tactical reserves for coming out of this crisis. In this situation, we think the only realistic way of presenting the issue is for the harsh anticrisis policy measures—administrative, organizational, legal—to be unfailingly combined with measures for creating a new economy and new reserves. [end recording]

Furthermore, the deputy prime minister informed the deputies that one of the government proposed measures for overcoming the crisis was a full separation of the crediting system from the executive authority and a course for increasing the role of commercial credits. In the second six months, the Cabinet of Ministers proposes to introduce extraordinary budgets at every level of authority in which expenditure should be rigidly conditioned by legislation. Banks would be forbidden to credit the executive authorities' expenditure over and above a rigid limit which it is proposed to set. The government also intends to promote rapid destatification and privatization, as well as a forced creation of a market.

Speaking about the government's early measures for implementing the anticrisis program, the deputy premier emphasized that it was necessary to remove all artificial barriers obstructing economic links, the local customs offices, and to restore linked production, since our whole economic complex is interdependent, and the removal of any one link from it brings about major disasters. In particular, he cited examples when the stoppage of some enterprises led to tobacco and soap crises in our country. One of the main tasks, Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov emphasized, is to make it possible for enterprises to be independent producers and purchasers. The main thing, the deputy premier noted, is that this program should be a program of national accord. Unless it becomes such, it will be virtually impossible to implement it.

Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov dwelt in detail on measures for creating an economic space within our country. Moving to the question of measures for its protection, he said:

[Begin Shcherbakov recording] First, this market must be protected from internal perturbation phenomena, because production is strongly monopolized and, quite clearly, many will want to take advantage of their monopolist position. The market must be protected against this. Second, it must be protected against influences from the richer external market, bearing in mind that these mutual relations must be built on a normal basis, so that monopolism and the higher development level of other countries does not swallow us up and, conversely, so that no one can take advantage of our present lack of skill in good business management.

Among those whom we do not want to give an opportunity to take advantage of the wealth of a single economic space purely for, in a sense, personal ends or to a detriment of the people inhabiting the territory of the single economic space, we also include the republics, which do not intend to sign the union treaty. We consider that, in this case, the comrades, or let's say our former fellow citizens, fellow countrymen, are saying that they do not wish to be in a single space with us or to pursue a single policy. Fine, that's their right, but we

have a right to protect the interests of the people inhabiting this space, living within this space. Consequently, we say and openly give notice: We consider that, as the first steps, we should not repeat what I consider to have been the mistaken, greatly mistaken, steps in restricting resources to the Baltics, as was once done. We must move over to civilized forms. Since it is a state, we are capable of working with other states. There are world prices; there is world practice of work; there is world currency; there are export and import duties. All this should be done. If it is necessary to set up customs posts, then customs posts should be set up. That is, there is an independent state which is not part of our space. Fine, we are prepared to cooperate with it, and we will sell it resources if it is able to buy these resources. We are prepared to take back something in return if they can offer us something in return. We, too, are going to select what we should buy from that space. Meat, bread, and milk are one category of products, but tangerines, tomatoes, cucumbers, and flowers are another category of products. We are prepared to pursue a policy here and to create priorities. It's one thing to exchange oil for meat but another to exchange oil for flowers. That's quite another thing. We must, so to speak, determine our position of behavior.

We have assumed all this in the program, so to speak. We have not started to develop this system of measures. I can only tell you that I have instructed our appropriate economic agencies to prepare developed proposals to this end. What do we do when people from a foreign state come to our country? Are they entitled to use our free health service? Culture? How do we cooperate with them and so on and so forth? [end recording]

After a fairly comprehensive discussion of the report by Deputy Prime Minister Shcherbakov, on the Cabinet of Ministers action program for taking the economy out of the crisis, the members of the Supreme Soviet observed that the idea, conception, and structure of the document prepared by the Cabinet of Ministers corresponded to the main directions for stabilizing the national economy and transferring to a market economy. The deputies decided to note the draft of the program and recommended that the USSR Government, in finalizing the draft, determine for this year specific early measures, and their deadlines, which would ensure the stabilization of the economy and social protection for the citizens over this period. The deputies also expressed their wish that the government consider their observations and proposals in finalizing the program with a view, first and foremost, to strengthening its political aspect which would ensure public support for the set objectives. The Supreme Soviet members proposed to organize with representatives of the republics a roundtable for working out long-term agreements and a convention for the purpose of preserving a common economic space and elaborating unified rules for economic and pricing policy.

On 22 April, a joint sitting of the chambers of the union parliament will begin a specific examination of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers action program for taking the country's economy out of the crisis.

Reviews Economic Problems

LD2104080591 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1938 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Remarks by Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov at the joint meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions in the Kremlin on 19 April—recorded]

[Text] This is not a self-contained [anticrisis] program. It is an action program to implement the principal provisions for the transition to the market, which you have already adopted. I think that a question arises straight away here. This is not the first time we are dealing with a situation when congress or Supreme Soviet decisions are adopted in one set of circumstances, and the cabinet, or previously the Council of Ministers, are instructed to draft the measures and a month later...While we are drafting the measures, you judge that the situation has changed during that period and that it is impossible to follow the strict letter of decisions adopted earlier. That is what we have done with the action program. Individual points in it, of course, may not fully reaffirm certain provisions in the program for the transition to the market. We wanted to take account of the present-day situation in drawing it up. We did not consider we could foist concrete actions on the republics from the outset. But we did feel it absolutely necessary to outline a policy and a strategy in this area and to obtain your support in principle.

The second point here is this. In a number of cases, certain phrases were employed in places where we intend to take a series of unpopular actions, and I'll be frank about this. On the one hand, these could be measures to combat the shadow economy. We do not intend to discuss them publicly. We will go ahead and take action, and we will account to you for our actions, knowing that you will hold us to account. But we still intend to act, not discuss.

The nature of this program: During discussion, we were asked a very great deal of questions. Have we not ended up with the following situation—37 pages or so of text have been submitted and once again there is everything here: extraordinary measures and non-extraordinary measures, long-running measures, including a structural reorganization, and so on? We defined the scope of the program in the following way: First, the cabinet cannot today set out an action program in line with the law and the constitution for the entire period of its term in office. That would be wrong, because the situation is changing so drastically and rapidly that it is impossible to predict what we are going to be doing in even two years' time. It cannot be a program for a five-year period, to say nothing of whether the cabinet is going to see out a five-year term—that is a separate question. I am not burying the cabinet, but I am just taking a realistic look

at the situation. So our starting point was that we needed anticrisis measures that would enable us to halt the decline, and at the same time this halt could only be achieved and the crisis overcome by large-scale strategic measures. We must prepare the necessary reserves to enable us to overcome the crisis. If we merely spasmodically try to stop incipient processes, we shall be unable to surmount the crisis. We will not have anything to surmount it with—we will not have the reserves—hence the program's logic.

Note well. This is not a program or reviving the economy. The situation is such that the economy has reached a critical level—I would like to tell you this as a specialist who has now more or less come to grips with his new duties—a critical level. The beginning of a probable collapse of the market is but a short step away. The economy would collapse completely, uncontrollably. This collapse of the economy, as you will see, would give rise to a new question: "What do we need a union for? What do we need interethnic conflicts for? And so on and so forth. Against this background, there can be no other political activity.

We faced two solutions. One, which is demanded en masse—it is demanded by deputies at every level, it is demanded by trade unions, it is demanded by economic managers—to put the country in order, to restore economic links by presidential decree and so on and so forth. That is one solution. In our view it is completely unrealistic. That kind of approach is unrealistic.

For a start, as far as economic links are concerned... in order to call a halt to it all, we would need to repeal everything we have done over the past four years. We would need to revoke the law on enterprises, on ownership, and so on and soforth. And restore the old dictatorship. First, it would be impossible to restore it. Society would no longer countenance it. Second, even if it were restored by monstrous methods of some sort, we would, all of us living in this country, be worse off for it. So we think that route is no good. It is also no good for technical reasons, for in many cases the disintegration of links has been caused by the fact that the enterprises have already been switched to different types of output and retooled. So however much any president—the union president or a republican one—might bang his fist on the table, and whatever decisions the procurator general might take, nothing could be done because the equipment would simply not be there any more.

Hence the conclusion and the idea of the program—we must not organize a retreat, so to speak, as you sometimes get in war, with a disorderly abandonment of weapons until the troops have to be stopped with a pistol from behind and the threat, "One step back, for whatever reason, and you'll be shot!". That is the situation we shall have if we do not take steps. What we need is an organized withdrawal, to arrive in an organized manner at a fall in production volumes, which is inevitable, to prepare properly for the social consequences of this fall in production, and to pursue it in the most organized manner possible, with a regrouping of forces and the creation of strategic and tactical reserves for getting out of this crisis. In this situation we think the only realistic way of going about things is for the harsh anticrisis policy measures—administrative, organizational, legal—to be unfailingly combined with measures for the creation of a new economy and new reserves.

What should be the basis for these measures? What is the pivot of it all, that key element that we need to grasp hold of in order to halt the negative processes? Our view is that the basis of everything is a hard ruble. All our measures are hopeless without it. They can only drive the disease deeper and turn the boil into some sort of internal abscess which will sooner or later have to be lanced. Hence the ruble means the preservation of the union, the ruble is the basis of a single economic space, the ruble is also the foundation of production and the foundation of the freedom of the consumer, something we have not mentioned yet.

We have always talked only of the freedom of the producer, and never mentioned the freedom of the purchaser. I know that you have discussed a law on protecting the rights of the consumer, and it is stated there. But it has not been contained in a single one of our programs yet. And it is absolutely clear that if the consumer does not have a freedom of choice, there can be no market economy. The market means an interrelationship between producer and consumer. Our basic stance derives from this in social policy too. We believe that we should not curb incomes, as proposed earlier, but should opt for increasing the earnings of the population, increasing them consistently, but in a balanced manner. And we should not even set the task of restricting incomes ecause as a principle it is wrong. We need to set the task of systematically increasing everyone's income—enterprises, local budgets and, above all, members of the public. And people must be allowed to use these earnings as they choose. But this increase must not of course be such that at any turn we could run aground and hyperinflation could break out. There must be regulation here, and we are proposing how this is to be done.

USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 15 Apr

PM2204090191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Sitting"]

[Text] A USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sitting was held 15 April in the Kremlin under the chairmanship of A.I. Lukyanov.

According to R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, the Presidium examined the question of the procedure for discussing at the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft treaty on the union of sovereign republics.

The Presidium discussed the USSR president's statement on the USSR Law "On Changes and Addenda to USSR Legislative Acts on Labor." Under Article 127 (3) of the USSR Constitution the president returned this law to the Supreme Soviet for another [povtornyy] discussion and vote, having deemed some of its provisions to contravene existing legislation and to require removal. The Presidium submitted this question to the USSR Supreme Soviet for consideration.

Questions of continuing the work of the Fifth USSR Supreme Soviet Session in April and the first half of May were discussed.

The Presidium also considered questions of developing the USSR Supreme Soviet's interparliamentary ties and certain other questions of state life.

Political & Social

Cabinet Meets, Discusses Anti-Crisis Measures

LD2004191291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Government leaders of the republics took part today in an enlarged meeting of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which discussed the program of anti-crisis measures. Our correspondent Valeriy Kiosa reports:

[Kiosa] Let us set out the main elements in the program prepared by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. The cabinet believes that neither the center nor an individual republic can, on its own, extricate itself from the crisis in which our economy now finds itself. The Cabinet of Ministers categorically rejects the option of going back to the old system, because a return to previous methods of running the economy would require, at best, a state of emergency and, at worst, a military dictatorship. As Deputy Prime Minister Shcherbakov stated today, we categorically reject this path. Hence, the two sets of measures in the government's program: stabilization measures and market measures.

Before going on to talk about them, there is another point that I would like to stress. According to Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov, the role of the center in the implementation of each point in the program would, on each occasion, be agreed with the republics. The main question is the activity of the republics themselves within the single economic space. So, the essence of the program is the molding of owners and entrepreneurs in our economy. The state's interference in the economic activities of enterprises should be terminated—this term was used today—and they should be given complete freedom. The processes of denationalization and privatization are geared to this end. They would begin with retail trade, consumer services, and small enterprises. At the same time the monopoly of state ownership at major enterprises would be ended and they would become, first and foremost, joint-stock undertakings. Emphasis is being placed on this rather than on dividing up ownership between union republics and other levels of power, as Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov stressed.

Regarding finances, there will be a drastic reduction in state spending, above all a restriction of credit which is currently being poured into the economy and which is, of course, adding a vast amount of money to that already in circulation. There will be harsh restrictions on spending by all executive authorities, including the Cabinet of Ministers itself. There will be a drastic reduction in military programs. However, growth in the population's incomes and the revenues of enterprises will not be restricted. It is even intended to reduce the tax burden on all our wages. There will be a liberalization of prices and a simultaneous freeing of wages. There will not be any administrative restrictions whatsoever.

What can one say about the debate itself? Many leaders of republican governments, who spoke at the meeting, were basically in favor of this program as the basis of a program which could be adopted. However, they voiced very insistent demands for an intensification of privatization processes and for action to be taken against monopolies, without which our monopolists, the monster of industry, will be able to twist the arms of their consumers. They called for an acceleration of land reform and the creation of powerful elements of competition.

There was great criticism of the fact that the structure of the government itself, the central government, has hardly changed at all. Many speakers asked why there are still so many industrial ministries.

The speech delivered by (?Malyshev), deputy chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, was somewhat different. He said that Russia could not agree to this program and would carry out its own, although he did not explain how this could be done in isolation from the other republics. Two points in his speech aroused a restrained rumble of disapproval from the Cabinet of Ministers, a body which is not normally given to sudden expressions of emotion. First, he said Russia does not rule out the possibility of returning to the previous system of prices, including wholesale, procurement, and retail prices, on its own territory. Many subsequent speakers in the debate described this as signifying, effectively, the destruction of the country's economic space.

The second point concerned ways of sharing out ownership. Russia is proposing that each citizen of the Russian Federation be given a personal check conferring entitlement to a certain portion of ownership. There were very many questions about this as well. One simple point was made: The difference between the relative affluence of, say, the town and the countryside is very great. As a result inhabitants of rural areas will immediately find themselves in a difficult situation. This was pointed out by many speakers.

A final speech was delivered by Prime Minister Pavlov. He said that, of course, it is now an urgent necessity to

set up a working group, including representatives of all the republics, to finalize all the normative acts designed to flesh out this program. But why is it necessary to hurry this program along? And why was he left somewhat dissatisfied, let's say, with this meeting of the cabinet? Because, in his view, very little was said about the fact that there are now processes under way in the country which tend to suppress the economy. We have reached a critical point, beyond which lies disintegration, he said. One of the main reasons for this, the prime minister went on, is the fact that the republics are not carrying out the agreements which they themselves have signed.

In conclusion, he said it was essential to end the economy's dependence on political passions, no matter from where they stem.

PRAVDA Reports Meeting

CM2204105591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 91 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Concept of a Tough 'Package'"]

[Text] The program for taking the country out of the most serious socioeconomic situation was the subject of a detailed discussion 20 April at the sitting of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers chaired by V.S. Pavlov, head of the Union government.

Opening it, the prime minister said that a fundamental agreement was reached with trade unions on raising salaries of the working people on the basis of a simultaneous increase in production. Now this agreement is to be implemented in republics, regions, industries, and enterprises.

Then Deputy Prime Minister V.I. Shcherbakov, who spoke on the single item of the agenda, dwelled at length on options for possible development of the situation in the country—options which had been considered by the cabinet as it was preparing a package of anticrisis measures. There are three such options, each of which leads society to different socioeconomic consequences.

If decisive and tough measures matching the complex current times are not adopted immediately, society will inevitably incur great material losses and there will be a further sharp fall in production. This will be reflected especially in the falling output of consumer goods. Living standards in the country will fall at an average rate of 20 percent.

If a package of tough anticrisis measures is to be adopted now, society will have a real opportunity, while gradually changing over from economic chaos to order, to slow down the pace of retreat and to stabilize the economic situation by the last quarter of the year. In other words, an opportunity will emerge not only to stall the decline but also to start preparing a gradual rise by means of a market economy.

The third possible option is to completely abandon administrative measures of management in favor of "purely" market levers. Based on this option he forecasted unemployment on an especially large scale and a fall in living standards, and as its consequence, a reaction among the population, the scope and the timescale of which cannot be forecast.

A return to the administrative-command system of economic management is impossible. This thought could clearly be heard in the report and many other speeches. This is why only one option is acceptable—that of combining efforts at the center and at local level to make the concept adopted into a general policy for the implementation of the whole package of anticrisis measures.

Those named among these included urgent specific steps aimed at taking ownership out of state control, improving the finance and credit system, and new pay and prices policies. According to this program, the social basis for this approach is a speedy creation of a true property owner and a completely unrestricted opportunity for growth of personal incomes—something which will enhance incentives for more efficient and better-quality work. Therein lies precisely the key link on which the whole range of the proposed measures hinges. Thanks to it, society will receive the opportunity to regroup its forces which is so necessary for coming out of the crisis.

The program also envisages protecting spheres which directly determine the life of the state and every citizen. This in particular defines approaches to problems in agriculture—a sphere which must obtain a most favored status—as well as to the basic economic spheres.

Such is the ideology of the program which is to be considered by the USSR Supreme Soviet in the next few days. The course of the discussion has shown that representatives of the center, republics, and individual departments fully realize how serious and responsible will be the work to rescue the country.

Most speakers agreed: the government chose the most realistic variant of the three. The very concept of emergence from the crisis and simultaneous accumulation of forces for a decisive breakthrough did not evoke any objections, as a rule. It is not in the restoration of disrupted economic ties but in a systematic transition to new production relations that both the regions and ministries, on behalf of which speakers analyzed the proposed package of measures, see the guarantee for stabilization.

At the same time critical remarks were voiced in that, for instance, the program does not take into account all interests of the republics, that the mechanism of implementation of planned measures is not consolidated in it, and that strict barriers are not erected to populist solutions, being adopted in some regions, which are unsubstantiated from the point of the economy and which are aggravating the inflation. Having noted in principle the need for fundamental measures envisaged by the program, a representative of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, in

particular, voiced a specific position. Many amplifications and ammendments with regard to the procedure for the removal of property from state control were introduced.

Of course, V.S. Pavlov stressed, summing up the results of the discussion, many proposals which were voiced here are justified. Republican representatives and the public could have been more actively involved in the work on the document under different circumstances, he said. But life and the alarming situation in the country are pressing us. It is necessary to adopt decisions, and fundamental ones—here, in the cabinet, and they should be filled in with specific details in the process of implementation in the localities, in the republics, first and foremost. It is most important to take the initiative into our hands and to begin acting jointly.

Pavlov Comments on Meeting

LD2004210591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1846 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Interview with USSR Prime Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov by correspondent A. Kraminov in Moscow on 20 April; from the "Topical Interview" program—recorded]

[Text] [Kraminov] Valentin Sergeyevich, a session of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has just ended. What were the results? What measures are planned? What questions were asked?

[Pavlov] You know, a series of such meetings is now under way in our country with various public movements, with state bodies and with economic bodies relating to discussion of ... well, I would say first and foremost of the situation in which the country has found itself and logically, as it were, we have come to a conclusion about the necessity for creating a special program on extrication from the crisis situation in which we have found ourselves, all together. Here, of course, we have carried out all of this work to analyze, well first, strictly speaking, what has occurred and the depth of our fall, where we have ended up.

What are the reasons and what do we need to do urgently to quickly set all of these matters straight? Because our meetings and our analysis have shown that the matter really is very urgent. It is today no longer a question of us having begun to live better or worse, or of how much worse. It is a question of the fact that altogether a real threat to the existence of the state as a whole has taken shape nowadays. Therefore, today there was an expanded meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, with all ministers and representatives of the Union republics taking part, about how this program is seen by them from the point of view of... [changes thought] well, whether it presents in general an opportunity for getting out of the situation which has taken shape, whether it corresponds to... [changes thought] that is, if it is implemented then whether we will get out of this threatening situation. If we get out of it then what does each of us need to do, in our own places as it were, what forces should be brought to bear for this? What should we undertake in this sphere now without delay?

[Kraminov] How have the republics received your program?

[Pavlov] You know, we have in general, well prior to this there were meetings. I can say that we began our meetings with representatives of various branches of industry, first and foremost the basic branches of industry and major collectives. Not only did I meet with them, but my deputies and other members of the cabinet also met with them. Unfortunately, the formation of the cabinet itself was drawn out. The law on the cabinet actually appeared only a little more than 10 days ago.

Therefore, there is much talk so to speak, and criticism aimed at the cabinet, of which, anyway, there practically hadn't been any previously, basically. We have been more or less acting at our own risk and on our own personal responsibility, rather than referring to the law.

Thus, today the republics have effectively approved this total concept on the whole, but, of course, there have been many remarks referring, I would say, to some lack of agreement in the program, to some omissions in the program. There are indeed some. Basically, I think, objectively, this is how it should have been. It would have been wrong not to see this. Why? Because after all we understand that we have not been making a program in a situation which would allow us today, speaking bluntly, to examine everything in detail. It was important for us to find those main points which it is possible to get involved in, in order to crawl out of the whirlpool into which we are all being pulled.

[Kraminov] Good, thus, the program will be curbed so that it suits other republics. Is there any guarantee that now this cooperation of the republics will arise on the basis of this program? After all, we are now witnessing a totally different trend.

[Pavlov] You are absolutely correct. This matter consists in what decision we have after all basically adopted. And on this, basically, a general accord in principle has been achieved. This is the conclusion which we have come to from this today. Anyway, the majority of those who spoke put the question in exactly this way—that, on a conceptual plane, on the plane of the basic, so to speak, fundamental, points and directions along which we must move to get out of the crisis situation, everyone agrees.

But there are questions which are concerned with the fact that specific ways of solving the problem are seen in a different light by certain republics. We consider that we must draw in not only the union republics, which today, as it were, by virtue of their statehood are declaring their rights, but—which is very important—also various alliances and public movements there must be involved in the evolution of this program, in contrast to former approaches.

Thus, we have therefore met with them and, I think, we have reached a very good level of mutual understanding. For example, they are prepared to undertake preparation of a whole range of normative acts and are ready to defend them and discuss them. I think this is correct, because, basically, they are telling the truth. As they say, well, let's say that someone will prepare normative acts, legislation, about how to provide support for small enterprises. Why should someone do this, and not the people themselves from these small enterprises, who, as the saying goes, have gained firsthand experience at the cutting edge?

Therefore, we are putting them onto this, have put them there now, and also the appropriate scientific research institutes. Well, as always, our science is criticized, but I would say that they have also... [changes thought] today and the day before yesterday we met them. Well, perhaps they hadn't even expected from us... [changes thought] certain comrades all took us for apostates and were profoundly surprised that so far we have not been moving to a new era. Well, perhaps, this will also inspire them somehow to more intensive work.

[Kraminov] The people, however, expect something else. I think they expect a different answer to the question. When will the program start to work, how soon will people—ordinary people—feel it; feel it in the shops, in their pockets, their apartments, or whatever?

[Pavlov] You know, unfortunately, I have to say what is true: the speed of drawing up the program—I say this again—has confronted us with this necessity of life. The fact is that today the economy has started rolling downhill at enormous speed. We see quite clearly that processes are taking place in our country which could lead to our being unable for years to stop the situation we have today. So clearly what we're talking about is that no populist measures of any kind—that there should be, here on this program, as used to be said, that the present generation will live under communism—we don't promise anyone any such things and we don't write them in our program. We warn that everything depends on how we all work. And we say that, yes, if we now begin to put this line into practice, a practical component of all our actions, then we are capable of stopping the backward slide of the economy within a short time and of beginning to restore the situation that existed, bearing in mind that the first priority must be to restore the situation in the consumer market, above all the food market. Most likely, we will not be able to get another harvest like last year's, so we shall now be engaged in looking for—and the work is already under way—how we can compensate for that loss. Initially, we can compensate by cutting drastically the losses that we have had. Then we have to look at how to rationalize our economic links with foreign states; how to improve, generally speaking, the condition and availability of the finished product. So in that sense we believe we will succeed, by around October, given certain conditions, in stabilizing the food supply to the population.

The thing we have to keep in mind is of course the proviso that we do not get this chaotic movement from the point of view of squeezing out extra wages. We have, so to speak, come up against this business today and we are now conducting talks also with trade unions, so that people understand us correctly. Simply increasing wages means deceiving people. Nothing more has happened in the country. Some people are trying to say: if the government is against doubling wages; by how much do you agree to raise them? But we would like to be understood correctly. We agree they should go up twofold, threefold, fivefold. We think that our wages are low. We are clearly aware of this. But the whole thing amounts to the fact that we can also imagine something else. For wages to increase in real terms, they inevitably have to be accompanied by growth in production. I would say that now we can see specific ways, we understand and know what can and must be done.

First of all, I should tell you frankly that we see that perhaps this thunder over Russia can at times be very rejuvenating and purifying, that is today it has sharply made everyone turn toward reviewing the whole structure of production, the structure of capital investment. If we had recently somehow been talking leisurely about restructuring, about conversion, it was because it was still possible to move somewhere by inertia. Today, when it turns out that there is no metal, today the attitude has at once changed sharply—where do we use the coal and coke, in which metallurgical installations, in those old ones which have double the rate of consumption or in the new ones? Where do we use the fuel coal; at which stations do we use more, where is the average and where do we use less?

That is, an immediate redistribution in the structure of production and consumption is taking place. Here we are making an absolutely sharp change from the point of view of the efficiency of our production. Today we are making, well, I would say a general move, one unprecedented in terms of speed—perhaps unless we recall the time of war—in the stucture of produced goods. Well, today everyone, all together, and that is the only way the country can function, have started to seek answers to the question of how to make the quickest possible use of the best quality, I would say, of the most technological methods of production. How do we use the reserves for which, forgive me, we were calling for years but which just would not move at all. That is, the turnover in the national economy has sharply speeded up.

Apart from that, nowadays we are also solving, I would say very successfully, the issue of rationalizing economic relations with foreign partners.

[Kraminov] And the very last question. It was very gratifying to hear that you observe a positive trend of some kind which has begun to show in our economy. But when will we—I have in mind the 200 million viewers now sitting in front of their television sets—feel the effects of this?

[Pavlov] Well, it is likely to be different in different places, as far as how the effect will be felt and how it will manifest itself is concerned. I should say with utter frankness that the first thing that will happen is that the shops will become full—not so much because of increased production, initially, as because of steep prices. One has to be honest about that and frankly understand all of that. Yes, prices are painful, but we hope that in a short time—in something around five or six months—it will prove possible not only to fill the retail channels but also to build up a sufficient inventory of goods to effectively force price levels down. Then we shall obtain the effect we are calculating. In effect we shall fill the market for goods through increased production.

So, I would say that it is my view that, in realistic terms, the people will begin to feel this effect somewhere from July onward and then this process will move forward. That is, of course, if we work. There can be no two ways about that. If we continue only to try to prove that some of us are more concerned about the land of the Soviets, some of us about the Russian people or some other people, no good can come of that. God forbid!

[Kraminov] Fine. Let us work and hope.

Pavlov on 'Crisis Situation'

LD2104094191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Interview with USSR Prime Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov by correspondent Valeriy Kiosa in Moscow on 20 April—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The conversation began with a question about the philosophy of the governmental program.

[Pavlov] The philosophy is a simple one. The country has got into a crisis situation and it is moving further and deeper, with great acceleration, downward. This is already having an effect on the work of virtually all branches of the national economy. In essence, as it were, mass unemployment is already becoming a reality in our country. Not in the sense that people are losing their jobs, but in the sense that people do not have work, and this threatens unpredictable consequences, because we may simply paralyze the whole economy. This is what is under discussion today, and this is why we are compelled to speed up this program.

But at the same time, the main thing which we are talking about today is that there are two paths, and we must make a choice today. One—and this is unfortunately acquiring quite mass circulation in society today—is that things were better before, let us urgently return to the system which existed. Such debates, in essence, are extremely dangerous. Why? They call for a system and for a situation which objectively brought us to a dead-end. It is a different matter that we also made some mistakes when we first started to move out of this dead-end. Much was done that was inconsistent and indecisive. We declared this transition in many cases. But in the case at hand, our program is continually trying to explain that the way out can only lie in an acceleration of movement forward, only on the basis of the fact that we must change social relations in our society altogether. Only here, generally speaking, is it possible to find in essence the solution to the crisis.

The main thing of which the change in social relations is comprised is the fact that it is necessary to find the owner who would then become the driving element of our whole social system. We have exhausted our motors, as it were: Both the fuel and the engine of the old system have been completely worn out, so a new engine is needed. This may only be the owner. This program counts on him, on the accelerated creation of the owner. It is a question of the owner being able to be both a collective and a group of people; in the final analysis each of us may be an owner because we are also going to transfer to the contract system. We, as in the world as a whole, will be selling our brains, hands, our knowledge. Thus each of us is an owner.

[Kiosa] You speak about owners. In the case at issue we are talking about producers of goods, not about the division of property between some sorts of levels of legislative and executive power.

[Pavlov] In no event. We are categorically against division, because generally speaking, this will lead the country into an impasse. This will erect another Black Re-division [chernyy peredel, name of 19th century revolutionary organization led by Plekhanov] in the country, because immediately the question arises: How should the division be done? Should it be done in an egalitarian way again? On the other hand, there is this fundamental question: Why do we want to make all these changes in social relations? To redivide what there is, or to augment what we have, and to advance? That is the main question. If we want to advance, then we must learn to earn our living and to increase production. It is this that gives something to society and to every member of society at present living and working within it.

[Kiosa] The idea was frequently heard at the session that the sole condition for the successful implementation of the government program is the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the country.

[Pavlov] Without discipline, responsibility and order, there is no point in saying we are going to overcome the crisis. There is one simple reason for this. Everyone who takes it upon himself to speak for the people has to know that he bears not just some sort of theoretical responsibility for that, but that he is accountable for people's destinies. In that sense, one must on no account—for no finely stated aims, whatever they may be—mortgage away the prosperity and life of one's fellow man. As I see it, there is about this a whiff, if not of falseness, then of something very close to the word "betrayal". You must

not make one person a hostage, you cannot make one person answerable, for the sake of everyone else's well-being. That is not right.

[Kiosa] Valentin Sergeyevich, your program provides for the adoption of tough and unpopular measures. It is said that such measures can only be taken by a popular government. What do you say to that?

[Pavlov] One of the greatest mistakes of perestroyka was indecisiveness and inconsistency. The point is that all economic transformations must follow a strict sequence. You cannot skip stages and put things off for later. In the years of perestroyka which have passed—we are into the sixth year now—we regrettably put off all the unpopular measures. Everyone preferred to pursue popular measures. Everyone knows what the results have been. So our government was unpopular even before it came into being. What is to be done? History is always like that. Someone has to clean out the Augean stables. One can of course say that this is to some people's liking, but I very much doubt that a normal person of sound mind and in command of all his faculties can be found who will say that he likes it. We do not like it either. But what can you do? This has to be done. If we were not firmly convinced that no further progress can be made without this, I can assure you that none of us would embark on this.

Pavlov Discusses Action Program With Officials

LD2004183191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] USSR Prime Minister Pavlov held a meeting in the Kremlin today which examined a draft program of action of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers for taking the economy out of crisis. The government is taking advice from representatives of business circles on the problems of moving the national economy toward market relations. Among the speakers were Bunich, leader of the leaseholders and entrepreneurs union; Vladislavlev, leader of the Scientific- Industrial Union; Vainberg, leader of the Association of USSR Joint Enterprises; Tikhonov, leader of the Union of United Cooperatives; and others. On the whole they gave a positive assessment of the main points of the proposed program and made constructive suggestions.

Cabinet, Trade Union Council Reach Agreement

LD2004152191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] An agreement on labor and socioeconomic issues for this year was concluded on 20 April between the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the Council of the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions [GCTU]. It aims to stabilize the economy and the socioeconomic situation in the country, to reinforce the social protection of working people, and to check the fall in living standards for the people as well as checking other possible negative consequences in the conditions of the transition to a market economy.

To ensure the implementation of the agreement and the resolution of all the issues which could arise during its implementation, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the GCTU Council have set up a commission. It is to be headed by the USSR deputy prime minister and the deputy chairman of the USSR GCTU as joint chairmen.

The agreement was signed by Pavlov, the USSR prime minister, and Shcherbakov, the chairman of the USSR GCTU. The agreement will be published in the press.

Unions Want Talks With Gorbachev on 'Crisis'

LD2004123691 Moscow TASS in English 1228 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—Economic disarray has brought social and economic tensions in the Soviet Union to boiling point, according to a statement of heads of six key industrial trade unions to President Mikhail Gorbachev and republican parliaments.

"At this critical moment, we categorically insist that leaders of the centre and republics immediately sit down at a negotiating table to reach agreement and overcome the crisis," the statement said.

If agreement is not reached an emergency congress of Soviet people's deputies should be convened to resolve the political crisis, it said.

Leaders of key industrial trade unions—the metallurgy, oil and gas, aviation and chemical industries, construction and rail transport—called on striking miners to return to work in order to prevent economic collapse.

PRAVDA Criticizes Inaction on Strike Groups

PM1904154991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 91 Second Edition p 1

[Untitled "Editorial Commentary" under the rubric "Alarm Telephone 257..."]

[Text] Every day the editorial office's teletype machines and telephones bring new reports of strike actions in various parts of the country. These strikes are taking place in different ways, and their participants advance different demands, but a single common trend is becoming increasingly obvious during them—the transfer of real power in "hot spots" to unconstitutional structures.

In this connection it is impossible not to appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the republic Supreme Soviets to take notice of the unjustified inactivity and confusion of the legitimate authorities in respect of the unconstitutional organs of power which are taking shape in the country—the strike [stachechnyy i zabastovochnyy] committees. PRAVDA is receiving telegrams and letters from all corners of the Soviet Union. Anxious citizens are making telephone calls about the tremendous material harm that the miners' strikes are doing to our sick economy. Yes, things are hard for them. Yes, they have

many difficulties. But wrecking the economy is no way to resolve either economic or political problems. Steelworkers, chemical industry workers, machine builders, railroad workers, and peasants have already felt the consequences of these strikes.

PRAVDA readers are amazed at the silence of deputies. Quite recently some of them, who pass themselves off as "friends of the people," were stigmatizing from all manner of Soviet and foreign platforms the equally unconstitutional national salvation committees in the Baltic republics. Accusations also rained down upon the USSR president, claiming that he had not made a resolute assessment of those invisible committees. Today unconstitutional strike committees have thrown down a challenge to the whole of society with the direct support of certain deputies of the country and the republics. But why are our parliamentarians, justice organs, and the Constitutional Oversight Committee silent?

Secretariat Condemns Armenian Property Seizure

LD1904174891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1649 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat today issued a statement, which says:

On 17 April 1991 the Armenian Supreme Soviet adopted a decision "On the Nationalization of the Property of the Communist Party of Armenia and the Former Leninist Komsomol of Armenia". In this connection we consider it necessary to state the following.

The aforementioned decision and the earlier adopted law of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] "On Sociopolitical Organizations" are to all intents and purposes directed at banning the activities of the Communist Party of Armenia and show that a course of establishing an antidemocratic and authoritarian regime and removing opposition forces from the political arena is being implemented in the republic.

The decision is a gross violation of the USSR Constitution, the Armenian SSR Constitution, and the USSR laws establishing the rights of public associations to own property and to protect it. The USSR president's decree of 12 October 1990 envisions that among the acts passed by the organs of state power and administration, those connected with the illegal confiscation of material assets and other properties belonging, among others, to public organizations, are not subject to implementation.

In accordance with the rules of the CPSU registered at the USSR Ministry of Justice, its property does not belong to communist parties of individual union republics, but is a party property which cannot be expropriated by a republican act.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat protests the antidemocratic acts adopted by the Armenian SSR, and calls on the republic's Supreme Soviet to demonstrate common sense and a sense of responsibility and to reconsider its unlawful decisions.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat calls on the USSR president and the USSR Supreme Soviet urging it to adopt necessary measures to insure the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens in Armenia.

Nikolayenko Appointed Deputy Foreign Minister

LD2004063791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0612 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 20 Apr (TASS)—The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has appointed Valery Nikolayenko as a USSR deputy foreign minister.

Valeriy Nikolayenko was born in 1941. He is a Ukrainian. In 1964, he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He is a candidate of historical sciences.

He worked in USSR embassies in the Republic of Cuba (1964-1968), Mexico (1969-1974) and the United States (1975-1979) and in the USSR Foreign Ministry's Latin American Department.

From 1981-1987, he was deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's First Latin American Department.

In 1987-1988, he was USSR ambassador to the Republic of Colombia. In 1988-1990, he was USSR ambassador to the Republic of Nicaragua.

Since 1990 he has been head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Latin American Countries Administration. He holds the diplomatic rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

TASS Reviews Press for 20 Apr

LD2004091891 Moscow TASS in English 0750 GMT 20 Apr 91

["Soviet Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—Today's newspapers highlight the results of President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan.

The first visit by a Soviet leader to Japan was successful, newspapers report. PRAVDA writes about a budding breakthrough in Soviet-Japanese relations.

The newspaper underscores the importance of several conceptual provisions in a joint statement, which deal with a post war settlement and the resolution of the territorial problem.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA praised the importance of the joint Soviet-Japanese statement, calling it "a major political document".

The visit opened the door to understanding, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes. However, it doubted that the signed agreements could bring immediate returns.

PRAVDA carries the full text of the Soviet-Japanese statement and a transcript of Mikhail Gorbachev's press conference in Tokyo. SELSKAYA ZHIZN too, carries the joint statement.

Newspapers cover the last day of Gorbachev's stay in Japan and his arrival for a brief official visit to the Republic of Korea on Friday at the invitation of President No Tae-u.

Newspapers carry materials in the run up to Vladimir Lenin's 121st birth anniversary on Monday.

PRAVDA publishes an address by the Soviet parliament to Soviet lawmakers. "Lenin's ideas were grossly distorted, turning the Soviet Union into a totalitarian state", it says, calling on people's deputies to mark the anniversary of the founder of the Soviet state.

Current difficulties should "not undermine our conviction in the necessity of perestroyka", it says.

The newspaper also publishes an article by Natalya Morozova in Lenin's defence.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA devotes two pages to analysing Lenin's legacy.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA carries an interview with Vladimir Melnichenko, director of Moscow's Vladimir Lenin Museum.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA covers a debate in Leningrad on Lenin's economic programme. The programme did not contain any "communist" measures, one of the speakers said. Lenin proposed nationalising only large monopolies, leaving small and medium enterprises to private owners, she said.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA publishes an interview with historian Roy Medvedev, who was expelled from the Soviet Communist Party in the 1960s and was readmitted in 1990.

Newspapers quote a Soviet statistics committee report about economic performance in the first quarter of this year.

Soviet gross national product fell by eight per cent against last year's figures and productivity fell by nine per cent.

The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat issued a statement protesting the decision by the Armenian parliament to nationalise the property belonging to the Armenian Communist Party and Komsomol and a bill "on public and political organisations" aim to ban the Armenian Communist Party.

TRUD carries reports from Soviet mining areas and the Belorussian capital of Minsk, where government officials are negotiating with representatives of the city strike committee. Strikes in Kuzbass, Donbass and Vorkuta continue, it says.

The Council of the Federation of Russia's Independent Trade Unions has decided to hold a one hour nationwide strike on April 26, TRUD reports.

Commenting on the government's anti-crisis measures, TRUD writes that this is "not a concrete programme but declarative statements", smacking of command-administrative methods.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publishes an article by Aleksandr Yakovlev on Soviet democratic reforms.

PRAVDA carries an article by writer Yuriy Nagibin about culture.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA writes about Aleksandr Rutskiy, the leader of the communists for democracy parliamentary group. Rutski should consider running for Russian president, it writes.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries a report from a once-secret nuclear weapons plant near Chelyabinsk.

The break up of the Soviet Union would threaten international stability, analyst Vsevolod Ovchinnikov writes in PRAVDA, calling for international aid to perestroyka.

Economic

Vorkuta Workers Adopt Immediate Strike Action

LD2104121991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 21 Apr 91

[Text] A report from the northwest agency from Vorkuta.

A session of the Vorkuta coordinating worker's council has adopted a decision on an immediate strike. Chairman of the City Soviet Kolesnikov announced that the miners will not work until the Union Government resigns.

In connection with this decision by the coordinating council, the Vorkutaugol Association has developed a plan of measures for stabilizing the financial situation, including measures such as conserving some mines, closing kindergartens and miners canteens, and refusing to pay compensation in connection with the price reform. In the opinion of Ryzhkin, a member of the workers committee, these measures are a normal attempt to economically pressurize the miners. If they are implemented the Vorkuta miners will face the necessity of leaving the town.

Today 12 out of 13 mines are not working in Vorkuta.

Striking Kuzbass Enterprises Total 94

LD2004102491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] The situation in the Kuzbass remains complicated. A total of 94 enterprises are taking part in the strikes. The April debt of the Kuzbass miners to date amounts to 3.5 million tonnes of coal.

Majority of Mines on Strike

LD2004124191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Miners' strike in pursuit of political demands for resignation of the USSR president, the Union government, and USSR Supreme Soviet continue in Kuzbass. We were informed by the strike committee of Novokuznetsk that 63 out of 76 mines are on strike.

As has been reported, Raspadskaya mine, the largest in the Soviet Union, stopped its strike on 18 April. This happened after the mine was transferred into the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

Commentary Views 'Radical' Crisis Program

LD2004141391 Moscow TASS in English 1356 GMT 20 Apr 91

[By TASS World Service analyst Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The radical new government programme designed to pull the Soviet Union out of economic crisis has deprived most of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov's critics, who used to accused him of backpedalling on market reforms, of arguments.

A discussion in parliamentary committees and commissions preceding a parliamentary debate on the programme on Monday showed that there were few objections and most criticism was purely populist.

Many participants supported sections of the programme dealing with financial revitalization and privatisation.

The proposal includes ideas put forward by leading economists. Under the measures, the government will stop unredeemable crediting of state expenses and will raise interest rates on commercial loans.

This will sharply reduce budget expenses and help balance the market by making money more "expensive".

Lawmakers also welcomed the government proposal to divide shares in privatised enterprises between union, republican, and local authorities. This will probably help untangle one of the most complex knots in an argument on property between central and republican governments.

In contrast to authors of the 500-day programme (prepared by economists Shatalin and Yavlinsky and rejected by the parliament), who regarded privatisation as a key to financial stabilisation, the cabinet believes its impact will be less profound.

According to the government, public savings that can be spent to buy shares in enterprises do not exceed 100 billion roubles, where as production funds are estimated at 2.5 trillion roubles.

Nevertheless, the government believes that at least two thirds of small enterprises in services could be denationalised in 1991-1992.

However, although the programme is feasible economically, its implementation could be derailed due to political problems. Its authors openly admitted that it could not be implemented without coordination between the centre and republics and agreement between all political forces.

Economic Statistics Show Extent of 'Crisis'

LD1804230291 Moscow TASS in English 1952 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The crisis has embraced all spheres of the Soviet economy. Judging by the economic intentions of enterprises and organisations the overall slump in business activity may be expected to continue until the end of the year. First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Statistics Nikolay Belov today told a news conference devoted to "the results of the first three months of 1991."

The gross national product decreased by eight percent as compared with the same period last year, the produced national income fell by ten per cent, the productivity of social labour by nine percent. Investment activity plummeted, the amount of export-import operations decreased by one-third. The standards of living have declined.

For the first time production dwindled not only in the basic branches of the national economy, especially in the fuel, metallurgical and chemical industries, but also in those which produce consumer goods.

Also for the first time the cost of the gross product of agriculture fell by 13 per cent during the first three months of this year as compared with the same period in 1990.

The slump in production, Belov stressed, is mainly caused by imbalances in the economy and disruptions in the economic links—factors that sharply worsened the provision of resources to the economy, as well as strikes and interethnic conflicts.

The state of the union budget worsened considerably due to the confrontaitional policy pursued by some republics, which fail to contribute to the Union budget as envisaged by the agreement for 1991 on the stabilization of the social and economic situation in the country. The

budget deficit has reached 26.9 billion roubles as against the planned ceiling of 26.7 billion roubles for the current year.

At the same time, receipts of republican and local budgets doubled.

Nevertheless, some positive results have been achieved: The individual sector is stepping up production, individual farms have begun successful operation in Russia, Uzbekistan and the Ukraine.

Still, further worsening of the social and economic situation in the country may be expected, Nikolay Belov said, unless a crisis programme is adopted promptly.

Economist Interviewed on Anticrisis Program

PM1904184191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Interview with Ye. Gaydar, director of the Institute of Economic Policy, by IZVESTIYA correspondent I. Zhagel; place and date not given; first paragraph is an introduction: "Anticrisis Program: Invitation To Cooperate"]

[Text] As already announced, USSR Prime Minister V. Pavlov held a meeting 18 April with the country's leading economic scientists at which they discussed the government's draft anticrisis program. IZVESTIYA's correspondent met with one of the participants in the meeting, Ye. Gaydar, director of the Institute of Economic Policy, and asked him to answer questions of interest to us:

[Zhagel] Yegor Timurovich, the anticrisis program is of course only feasible if it can rally our entire society around it. Did it succeed in doing this as far as the economists at the meeting were concerned?

[Gaydar] To be honest, I saw no signs of particular unity. My colleagues and I made many comments although the program does have a number of merits.

[Zhagel] Let's begin with its merits then. What are they?

[Gaydar] In view of the crisis situation in our country, one might have been afraid that the stress would be laid on purely administrative measures. However, the market orientation can nonetheless be traced in the draft. One can even say that the government sees a most speedy transition to the market as the main means of escaping from the crisis.

The draft stresses on several occasions the need to liberalize prices most speedily. The government also cleaves to the line of privatizing state property. Realism is also manifested in the fact that the Cabinet is effectively abandoning the idea of extricating the entire economy, all sectors at a stroke. Given the growing industrial crisis, particular attention has been devoted to vital sectors.

One can also see that the program's authors understand the simple idea that you cannot extricate the economy from the crisis today with popular measures. But is society prepared for further tough action by this government?

[Zhagel] Are you talking about the degree of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers? Yet, in order to evaluate its actions, it must be given at least six months to work in peace...

[Gaydar] Nevertheless, the question of confidence does indeed exist and it must not be discounted. It was also raised at the sitting. You yourself can see how people in various regions are reacting to steps taken by the Cabinet.

[Zhagel] So, it is not the program itself that arouses doubts but the possibility of its implementation in the political situation in question.

[Gaydar] That's not all. While noting that the thrust of many of the draft's provisions is by and large correct, I am bound to point out it contains effectively no figures. And that is extremely important for me as an economist. Without them it is impossible to even roughly work out the state of the economy in two or three months, or in six months, or to understand what the government specifically intends to do—not verbally but in fact.

[Zhagel] That is, you're saying that the program looks more like a political declaration?

[Gaydar] More or less. The whole series of actions that the government has taken of late have given rise to doubts both at home and abroad as to the government's readiness to proceed with market reform. In my view, the proposed program is primarily an attempt to persuade public opinion of the consistency of the reformist course in the economy. It is not for me to judge whether the draft will be able to persuade their political adversaries. I am an economist, not a politician.

[Zhagel] Should the program perhaps be regarded as an invitation to cooperate at this time of difficulty for the country? Incidentally, wasn't further cooperation between the government and this group of our leading economists discussed at the meeting?

[Gaydar] That question was not discussed, however, virtually the same group of us met a few weeks ago. Moreover, the country's president was also present then. This enables us to talk of some kind of system.

Report on First Quarter Economic Performance

PM1904185591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Gennadiy Yastrebtsov article: "Our Work in the First Quarter"]

[Text] However hard it is to admit, we have all of late somehow gotten accustomed to our hard, unsettled, and,

regrettably, still deteriorating lives. Soaring prices, undiminishing lines outside stores, strikes relentlessly waging war on the economy—this all represents present-day reality for us. Nonetheless when you take hold of the latest USSR State Committee for Statistics report on the results of the first quarter of this year, it is simply dumbfounding. If only there were just a single bright spot!

Compared with the same period last year, GNP and social labor productivity dropped by 8 and 9 percent respectively. Production of industrial consumer goods and agricultural produce is also declining.

We know from cables and telephone calls to the editorial office how plant, factory, and association collectives are suffering in the terrible conditions resulting from the severing of economic ties. Crisis, inflation, and recession—we have always treated these words as part of life "over there". Now they are knocking on our door. Do we know how to defend ourselves, how to bear the incredible burden that has landed on the country's shoulders?

Every day we publish a report about miners' strikes. Here are the official statistics. As of 1 April, consumers' coal stocks totaled 37.4 million [tonnes]—that is 83 percent of last year's stocks. Metallurgical enterprises had just 0.8 million tonnes for coking—half the level of last year. And the coal shortage has brought in its wake a long chain of disruption in other industrial and agricultural sectors.

The Union budget is cracking up under hard pressure from the republics. Compared with the first quarter of last year, revenues have dropped almost by a factor of four. The population's monetary income has risen by 36 billion rubles, but this figure is by no means a source of delight—despite the tremendous price hike, there is still virtually nothing to buy. The State Committee for Statistics states that food production has dropped in all union republics. On the other hand, an increase in spirit production has been recorded—32.7 million dekaliters of alcoholic beverages were produced in the first quarter of this year. Only you cannot put vodka on bread.

In March, prior to the price hike, the consumer market exploded with unprecedented panic buying. All the goods that were in the stores were cleaned out. As always, speculators and smart operators managed to make profits. Statistics attest that the population's expenditure on commodities and payment for services increased by one-fourth, mainly due to the price hike and overpayment in buying goods from speculators at prices that were higher than state prices by a factor of two, three, or even more.

The situation on the nonfood market has also deteriorated. In comparison with the fist quarter of 1990, 25-30 percent fewer television sets, refrigerators, and cotton and wool fabrics were sold. At the beginning of April we received reports of industrial goods shortages (apart from cooperative goods and those sold at high commercial prices) from Blagoveshchensk, Guryev, Vladikavkaz, Orel, Kostroma, Novgorod, Sukhumi, Ust-Kamenogorsk, and many other cities.

It cannot be denied, it is a sad report even if you do not print malicious, stunning figures. But we should, we should! Let us take a look at ourselves today: Disheartened or taking part in rallies on squares, "democrats" and "conservatives," miners, petroleum workers, medics, grain growers. Let us take a look and have a think: Can we continue to live and work like this, can we call ourselves citizens of a great country if we are now by our own hands impelling this country on into thick darkness?

Military

Pugo Fails To Attend Security Forces Meeting

LD2004003191 Moscow TASS in English 2210 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The spacious hall of the Oktyabrsky Cinema-and-Concert Center, one of Moscow's biggest, was filled to capacity by people wearing militia uniforms on Friday.

The leadership of Moscow's law-enforcement agencies came to meet Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov and Moscow Executive Committee Chairman Yuriy Luzhkov and discuss their pressing problems and the problems of the multi-million city. The discussion centered around the key point: To whom should the law-and-order forces be subordinate—the city, Russian republic or union authorities.

Popov stressed in his opening address that the Moscow City Council aimed not at fanning up discord within the militia system but in working towards solutions which in the final account fully meet the interests of the city and citizens.

He referred to the dispute between the city authorities and the USSR Interior Ministry concerning the appointment of the chief of Moscow's law enforcement department. The two bodies nominated different candidates for the post. Eventually President Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Major General Nikolay Myrikov to the post.

Popov pointed to the role played by the Moscow militia force, as well as by conscientious Muscovites, in averting violent developments like those in Baku, Tbilisi, Tskhinvali and Fergana.

Yuriy Luzhkov said that the city would triple its investments into law enforcement this year to 35 million roubles as against 13.7 million roubles in 1990. He had to admit that the housing problem is the most acute one for Moscow militiamen. A total of 20,000 Moscow law enforcers, or every sixth, are on the waiting lists. Luzhkov said the situation was bound to improve considerably in 1991.

Regrettably, Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo could not attend the meeting as planned.

Polish Troops Commander Views Army Withdrawal

LD2004180191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1515 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, commander of the Northern Troops Group in Poland, by Vyacheslav Rusinov; place and date not given—recorded; from the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, introduced by Kim Kukholev]

[Text] [Kukholev] Recently, public attention has been focused on the countries of Eastern Europe, whence the withdrawal of Soviet troops is continuing. Here is an interview with Colonel General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, commander of the Northern Troups Group in Poland, gave to our correspondent Vyacheslav Rusinov.

[Dubynin] I evaluate the actual withdrawal of Soviet troops as none other than an example of good will on the part of the Soviet Government, in withdrawing the troops before a treaty between the Soviet Union and the Polish Republic has been signed. We must return to our motherland and build the defense of our Soviet state and I consider that according to many indices it is also economically disadvantageous for Soviet troops to be situated on Polish territory.

[Rusinov] Viktor Petrovich, tell me plase, the material relations between the Soviet and Polish sides—how are they being or how will they be resolved?

[Dubynin] I will tell you that to date we have no agreement whatsoever with the Polish side regarding the transfer of sites which were leased by us in 1956 and for which we are now paying money and for those establishments which we built, according to the estimate of the Ministry of defense, in the course of 45 years. I will tell you that we have built establishments approximately to the value of 3 billion rubles, and, of course, we do not want to give them up just like that. These questions are not agreed.

I will give you an example. You have seen our buildings. Residential housing, headquarters, equipment stores, and barracks built by us. Now we have to give them up. Well, can you really abandon these establishments, the material expenses that we have had, leave them here? We have to sell them somehow. Now we are taking measures to turn immovable property into movable property; that is, to take it apart and sell and convert that building material which was in use into money.

Of course, we are in a difficult situation. How exactly are we to recoup the investments that we made there earlier and return them to our state, so that with this money we may acquire some building materials and acquire goods for those same military units which are (?arriving) on the territory of the Soviet Union, and create conditions for resolving (?housing and personal) problems?

Submariners Score Rescue, Training Methods

PM1904151591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report from Army and Navy News Service roundup prepared by Lieutenant Colonel A. Plotnikov: "Appropriate Conclusions Have Not Been Drawn"]

[Text] Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee Yu. Samsonov and V. Opolinskiy, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral V. Zaytsev, Commander of the Northern Fleet Admiral F. Gromov, and chief designers of nuclear-powered vessels and of weapon and life-support systems have taken part in a military-technical conference held at a Northern Fleet submarine garrison.

Submariners told them that in their opinion the appropriate conclusions have not been drawn from the tragic loss of the Komsomolets submarine. To this day work to improve crew safety and rescue measures or to devise new ones has still not been stepped up. Furthermore, the system for training submarine crews at educational centers and in detachments needs to be reviewed, and it is necessary to reequip the training and material base at locations where the ships are based.

Baltic Republics

Latvian Party Holds Plenum, Reviews Situation

LD2104083791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1730 GMT 20 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 20 Apr (TASS)—Despite a superficial appearance of tranquillity, the sociopolitical situation in Latvia poses an acute threat to society. This is the conclusion drawn by the participants in a plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee which was held in Riga today.

A report on "the tasks of the Latvian Communist Party in the struggle to prevent an infringement of human rights, and measures to reinforce the social protection of the republic's population" was delivered at the plenum by Alfreds Rubiks, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

In his report Rubiks noted that such organizations as the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia and the Congress of Citizens are increasing their pressure for Latvia to secede from the USSR. At the same time centrist tendencies are increasing within the parliamentary group of the People's Front. The Latvian Communists are proposing that compromise solutions be sought through talks. It is precisely this approach to the realities of life which prompted the leader of the Latvian Communists to propose to Romualds Razuks, leader of the People's Front, that talks start between the Communist Party and the People's Front. The participants in the plenum believe that such a meeting would have a beneficial impact on the sociopolitical atmosphere in the republic.

The resolution of the plenum stresses the need for the restoration of constitutional order in the republic on the basis of the decisions reached at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee proposed that the republic's Supreme Soviet and government should take part in preparing and signing the Union treaty. It said that they should suspend laws and decisions adopted by the Latvian authorities which make it difficult for the republic to take part in the conclusion of this document.

Decisions adopted by a number of party bodies in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, in which assessments are made of the critical situation in the country, were unanimously supported. It was decided to demand that Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, account to the regular plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee also proposed to the republic's leadership that it should bring current retail prices into line with those throughout the Soviet Union, and that it should publish details of what the government is doing with the additional funds obtained as a result of the price increase.

Latvia Adopts New Regulations on Exports

LD2104193391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] The Latvian Government has adopted new regulations on the export of goods from the republic. In connection with the catastrophic situation on the republic's consumer goods market, it has been deemed necessary to considerably tighten controls on the export of goods, as well as placing new restrictions on the amount of goods to be exported. In the future, residents of the Republic of Latvia, when crossing state borders, may take out goods to a total value of no more than R50. Earlier there were various categories of goods for export, whereby restrictions on what could be taken out allowed a considerably greater value for the goods.

It has also been deemed necessary to tighten controls by customs officers, because the first reports of corruption among customs officers have appeared, even in the newly-formed customs of the Republic of Latvia. Likewise, the resolution adopted provides for changes in relation to the regulation of foreign economic activity by enterprises. The new regulations for the export of goods, which take effect in June, provide for an even bigger list of so-called licensed goods. This means that certain kinds of products may be exported from the republic only within a specified quota.

Army Seizes Lithuanian-Belorussian Checkpoint

LD1904191291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Armed persons today seized the Medininkai border checkpoint on the Lithuanian-Belorussian border. This event is commented on by the press representative of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Audrius Azubalis.

[Azubalis] The Lithuanian chief customs officer and minister of internal affairs, Misiukonis, reported that at 1300-1330, the Ural [word indistinct] arrived at the customs checkpoint located one kilometer from the Belorussian border carrying 15 soldiers dressed in paratrooper uniforms without marks of their unit, armed with automatic weapons. They surrounded the territory of the customs office containing a hut and a trailer. They destroyed the hut, overturned it, destroyed road signs, and blocked the work of this customs office. According to available information, the soldiers were behaving sufficiently correctly; that is, they were not beating up six customs officials and young men from the country's defense department present there. Questioned by our law enforcement representatives who arrived there on whose orders they were acting, the soldiers answered that they were carrying out a commander's orders. One can

only guess what commander. They did not deny that they might receive an order to repeat such an operation. [passage omitted]

At 1730, the soldiers left the customs checkpoint and departed. Before that, they threatened: Do not stand here any more. Otherwise, if you stand and [words indistinct] the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] will come and introduce order. [passage omitted]

Attack Called 'Serious' Act

LD1904222391 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Today, Soviet armed paratroopers seized and for four hours held captive servicemen of the Lithuanian National Defense Department and the Lithuanian customs system at the Medininkai post, in southern Lithuania, disturbing its work on the Belorussian border. No arms were used and the Lithuanian servicemen did not resist. The action was carried out by 15 paratroopers, and according to an eyewitness account, their behavior was within the limits of correctness. The paratroopers said that they were acting on the orders of an unidentified commandant. However, before leaving, the paratroopers warned the Lithuanian servicemen to stop guarding the border, otherwise the Black Berets were going to restore, so to say, order.

Today's attack of the Soviet troops against the Lithuanian border control system is the most serious of all acts of this kind. The provocation was carried out after the Lithuanian state security institutions had started to receive information that attacks were being planned against the customs system, the Lithuanian banks, and objects of communications. It was stated at today's briefing by the parliament representative for the press that this information was incompetent [as heard]; however, on the other hand, it might be true.

According to the parliamentary spokesman, information of this kind may be created for the special purpose of keeping the Lithuanian parliament and government in a constant state of tension so that their vigilance would relax. The enemy forces hope that the Lithuanian authorities are going to make some kind of a mistake, the spokesman for the parliament noted. After today's incident at the Medininkai customs post, he told the Lithuanian radio that the Soviets were probing the reaction of the international community to such unarmed attacks. The Sajudis Movement has called on the people of Lithuania to renew round-the-clock vigil by the parliament building from tomorrow on. It was reported this evening that an unidentified type of battalion has arrived today near Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city. Algimantas Vaitkaitis, deputy general director of the Lithuanian State Defense Department, reports that the staff members of the Vilnius commandant's office are being transferred to the city of Sovetsk, of the Kaliningrad region. Meanwhile, Soviet officers from elsewhere are brought to Vilnius. Whole military units stationed on the territory of Lithuania are being changed, as well. An official from the State Defense Department did not deny reports that starting from 3 May young men were going to be drafted into the Soviet Army by force. It is possible that paratroopers are being brought into Vilnius and [words indistinct] regions of this country (?first).

Landsbergis Calls District Commander

LD2004123791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] The press representative of the Supreme Council, Audrius Azubalis, reports from the legislature building:

[Begin Azubalis recording] Yesterday's events—the attack on the Medininkai border checkpoint and the stationing of a military unit in Rokai—have provoked anxiety among Lithuania's inhabitants, and late last night, at 2220, the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis, phoned the commander of the Baltic Military District, Colonel General Fedor Kuzmin.

The chairman expressed his anxiety about the incident at the Medininkai border checkpoint and about the stationing of an airborne assault unit in Rokai near Kaunas.

The reply was that the customs officials are themselves to blame for the incident at the Medininkai border checkpoint. They have been stopping military vehicles. It was a reciprocal action by the military. The chairman stressed that our customs officials had strict orders not to check military vehicles and avoid any incident with the military.

Then it was agreed that this incident would be investigated in cooperation by both sides. It was agreed to refer this matter to Fedor Kuzmin's deputy, General (Viktor Okhterov) who will come in the near future to Vilnius.

It was stated that the airborne assault battalion stationed in Rokas was not new, that it was returning from exercises.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Col. Gen. Fedor Kuzmin twice pressingly, so to say, assured Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis that such and similar movements of the units should not cause any axiety and that the military does not have any evil intentions. [end recording]

Interior Ministry Denies 'Incidents' in Lithuania

LD2004101891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] We have phoned the official on duty at the Ministry of Internal Affairs asking whether there were any incidents last night with the military, OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] and so on. [passage omitted] The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not have any information causing anxiety last night. [passage omitted]

Our colleagues who worked last night in radio programs saw and heard a convoy of military vehicles driving from the direction of the railway station toward the northern townlet. It happened about 0300. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Issues Appeal to Soviet Forces

LD1904104991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1315 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Appeal to officers and soldiers of the armed forces, interior troops, and KGB forces of the USSR stationed on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, read by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at a Supreme Council session held on 18 April in Vilnius—recorded]

[Text] The former USSR is facing great changes. Not a single Union republic, including the Russian Federation, wishes to be a colony plundered by center departments. All republics and all nations hope that the words about the federation of sovereign republics and states, about the confederation of countries of free self-determination, or the association of independent states, will not become yet another great deception. They all wish that the will of the peoples, and not the projects by center officials will decide the future of this part of the world. The will of the people is expresed by their participation in free elections, when there is something to choose, and by taking or not taking part in plebiscites and referendums. The Baltic states and Georgia have already clearly expressed their will in an irrevocable and indisputable manner. Therefore, the leaders of the USSR and its officials, even its highest-ranking officials, have no authorization to speak or to issue orders on behalf of these states and people.

The question arises: What, today, is this state of bankrupt socialism? As yet it is not an association of states, in the name of which talks and threats are being made, pledges are assumed and broken, and demands being made to take and adhere to an oath.

If you think that you have taken an oath to the Union, which at one time was created by the good will of 15 republics, you must know that this is not true. There has never been such a Union created by good will. Moreover, it does not exist today. When you were ordered, or proposed to make an oath to such a Union, they simply deceived you. When a Union minister or other high-ranking official shamelessly tells lies on television about the events in Lithuania, he is not the voice and conscience of your homeland. Quite the contrary.

Thus your oath to defend the homeland is not an oath to defend one or another group of officials who ordered, and may order you again, to shoot at unarmed people, not only in Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, but also in Moscow, Leningrad, Donetsk, and Kuzbass.

The people of Vorkuta, Kiev, Minsk, and Sverdlovsk are tired of 70 years of deception, of the crimes of the Bolshevik government elected by no one. The work, hopes, and aspirations of these people fighting for their homeland are true to their homeland, and maybe your homeland, and not to the conquests of tsars, generals, and marshals. The wishes of party secretaries to continue to govern with the crude law of the Middle Ages have nothing in common with the interests of the homeland or the people.

You should not be among those who have attacked Lithuania, which is striving for freedom, and escaping from the prison of the Stalin and Beria eras. You must not be among those who, having given oath to the deceivers, are presently speaking of the [word indistinct] of the oath, who are being forced against people living beside you in order to compel them to bow their heads and not to sing the songs of freedom.

If you think that you have taken an oath to the Union—the number of the republics of which is not clear—and in the name of which orders are still being given by lying generals and fascist-minded colonels, understand that Lithuania decided a long time ago, and confirms once again, that it does not belong to that Union. Therefore, like last January, you can become only assistants of a foreign power, only attackers, only conquerors.

Attempts by some Baltic Military District commanders to present the army as a sociopolitical force are even more dangerous preparations for the justification of future armed bloody dictatorships.

Do not forget that each of you, although having received orders, is himself responsible for his actions, first of all, to his conscience. No oath obtained by means of coercion or all-Union deception can oblige you. When you freely take an oath to your chosen and true homeland—whether it be Lithuania, Russia, or the Ukraine—such an oath will make you citizens, officials, and defenders of the homeland.

Comments on Appeal

LD1904111191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2030 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A sitting of the third session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania was held today. Together with such issues as the work regulations of the Supreme Council, which was adopted, and the restoration of the rights of private ownership, the draft of which is still being debated, Vytautus Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania has submitted to the Supreme Council an appeal to the officers and soldiers of the armed forces, interior troops, and KGB forces of the USSR stationed on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. The appeal was approved by the deputies. Vytautas Landsbergis is now in our studio. The appeal was adopted in the Lithuanian language, but I think that it is very important that those officers and soldiers to whom it is addressed could listen to it in Russian. I hand over the microphone to Vytautas Landsbergis:

[Landsbergis] Such an appeal of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic could have been adopted much earlier, because we have witnessed more than once how those people and groups of people who struggle to regain their lost positions of power are using officers and soldiers as a means for suppression, coups, the restoration of the old order, and the restoration of themselves in power.

Thus, officers and soldiers are placed in an unseemly and even criminal situation. We all remember the tragic events of January. This has been repeated, and, God willing, this may have been for the last time. But such hopes may be premature.

We are again observing an increase—despite the promises given to the world public—of military force in Lithuania. This creates inconvenience to the military themselves, increases irritation, tension, and social problems, which [words indistinct] Lithuanian Government. These forces are being increased. High-ranking military leaders, almost forgotten, are reemerging. Voices and publications are coming from Riga saying that the Baltic Military District is attempting to present itself in the role of some socio political force, of some public organization. Of course, once the alleged political organization, possesing tanks and rockets, emerges, what can other political organizations say or do?

This is a direct way toward a military coup and to the coming to power by people who understand only the language of the fist, who even openly scoff at such words as law, Constitution, people, or the rights of people. They know better how to solve problems, how to manage affairs. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Thank you. I think that the soldiers and officers stationed on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania have heard us. I know they listen to our broadcasts, despite the fact that they are officially forbidden to do this. I hope that these words will penetrate to their spirits and hearts. No one wishes evil to them. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis, Sajudis Deputies Meet 17 Apr

LD1904140591 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Yesterday evening, chairman of parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, and a group of Sajudis-backed deputies had a meeting with representatives of the Sajudis movement from various cities and districts of Lithuania. The Sajudis representatives spoke strictly against the activity of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party in the districts. They spoke of cases when laws of the Lithuanian Republic were boycotted, and when attempts were made to set people against one another.

Vytautas Landsbergis stressed the necessity for parliament to establish a better information network and links with the provinces. He proposed that at this complicated period the Sajudis movement should work out its new program and take a more active part in preparing alternative laws.

Vilnius Party Committee Appeals for Unity

LD1904195391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1833 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius, 19 Apr (TASS)—The council of secretaries of Vilnius party committees has sent USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev an appeal which proposes that the most energetic and urgent measures be taken to restore the sovereignty of the USSR throughout the entire territory of the country.

The appeal, which is published in today's LITVA SOVETSKAYA notes that "the collective of Union enterprises in Lithuania are being placed in intolerable economic, financial, and legal conditions. Demands that the Union enterprises be registered as repubican property are accompanied by threats to close bank accounts or take away profit into the republic's budget and to impose monetary fines on their managers. In addition, the threat to deprive one of civil rights and legal and social guarantees if one does not accept citizenship in the Lithuanian republic hangs like the sword of Damocles over every inhabitant of Lithuania."

The authors of the appeal propose, inter alia, that Lithuania and the country be purged of the agents of Western states and anti-Soviet emissaries, instructors, and advisers; that channels for delivering weapons and material, technical, and financial resources to separatist and anti-Soviet organizations be closed; and that resolute measures be taken to protect Union property in Lithuania.

Lithuanian Central Committee Discusses Economy

LD2104163491 Moscow TASS in English 1621 GMT 21 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius April 21 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee here today discussed pressing social and economic problems.

In his report, head of the Lithuania Communist Party Central Committee's Social-Economic Department Yakov Prokhorov said figures proved that the republic's economy was in deep crisis. Last year, Lithuania's national income dropped by 10 per cent and the amount of industrial production by 3.5 per cent, compared to 1989.

Over the first three months of 1991, the amount of industrial production has dropped by 3.5 per cent, compared to the same period of 1990. Recession in the food industry was most striking. Agriculture in the republic is in crisis, Prokhorov said.

Lithuanian Communists supporting the Soviet Communist Party Platform, confirmed the conclusion by the Lithuanian Communist Party's 21st congress that "destructive forces that have come to power in the republic, will lead the economy to the brink of chaos and dislocation".

General Blames Defense for Vilnius Explosion

LD2104161191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1525 GMT 21 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius, 21 Apr (TASS)—In an interview with a TASS correspondent, Major General Ginutis Taurinskas, chairman of the Central Committee of Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of Army, Aviation, and Navy] today described yesterday's explosion of a home made device carried out by unknown persons outside the DOSAAF driving school in Vilnius as a "premeditated act of provocation." In his opinion this act was aimed at disrupting the training of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces which was resumed after USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops began guarding the DOSAAF school.

"I am in no doubt whatsoever," said the general, "that similar actions that have recently become increasingly frequent in Vilnius are organized and coordinated by the heads of the Department for the Defense of the Country who sooner or later must face direct responsibility for this."

Interior Ministry Not Informed

LD2204105291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Statement by Supreme Council press spokesman Audrius Azubalis]

[Text] According to a report from our law security and law protection agencies, last night passed quietly with the exception of one report by TASS. I would like to quote it since it is connected with certain events. On 21 Apr, TASS reported than an explosion had taken place, namely, at the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] driving school. By this, as is evident, they are referring to the driving school of the [word indistinct] club recently-occupied by the military.

Unfortunately, this explosion—the fact that this explosion had taken place, was not reported to our international ministry's officials. They only heard about it on the radio this morning, and dispatched on their own initiative an investigative group from the Naujoji Vilnija Police Commissariat, a group which is presently working at this location.

So far, they have only confirmed the fact of the explosion itself—that such an explosion has taken place. They have [words indistinct] What can be said about this, such a fact having been established? Well, that, as announced by TASS, this was done by hostile forces which are attempting to interrupt driver training, etc. It can be stated that we, that is our side, at least—the side of the Republic of Lithuania—we have never destroyed property and we will not destroy it. That for us, [incomplete sentence as heard]

Lithuanian Prime Minister Arrives in Montreal

LD1704220391 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Summary] Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Vagnorius arrived in Montreal yesterday afternoon. The government information service reported that G. Vagnorius left for Ottawa where he met with a group of Canadian Lithuanians.

Today G. Vagnorius met with Canadian Foreign Minister Joseph Clark, a group of deputies who support the Baltic states, and the leader of the opposition.

According to the Voice of America the meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was cancelled because he had to leave urgently for Florida where his mother is gravely ill.

This afternoon G. Vagnorius was to leave for Toronto where he is to meet with the Canadian minister of finance.

RSFSR

Reportage on Creation of RSFSR Presidency

Shakhray Outlines Three Drafts

LD2104230791 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 2318 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Remarks by RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation Chairman Mikhailovich Shakray, with interjections by RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium First Deputy Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 19 April; from the "From the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session" program—recorded]

[Text] [Shakhray] Esteemed people's deputies! Esteemed chairman.

[Khasbulatov] Comrades, please pay attention!

[Shakhray] Beginning with the second Congress of People's Deputies....

[Khasbulatov] Please pay attention! Go ahead, Sergey Mikhaylovich.

[Shakhray] It was decided to adopt a package—to examine first, of course, and then adopt a package of normative acts connected with the introduction of the

post of president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. It was envisaged that, together with the powers, with the definition of the powers of the RSFSR president, normative acts on the arrangements for the election of the RSFSR president, on the RSFSR's constitutional court, and on the legal arrangements for a state of emergency would also be examined and adopted. The draft law on the legal arrangements for a state of emergency is scheduled for discussion in May. The draft has been prepared. Today outline proposals for three draft laws are being offered for your attention. These are the laws on the RSFSR president, on the RSFSR's constitutional court, and on arrangements for the election of the RSFSR president.

First of all, the law on the president. I do not think that, following the referendum held on 17 March and the Third Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, there is any need to renew the debate and once again explain the arguments in favor of introducing the post of president. The congress instructed us to draft powers and a mechanism for introducing this institution. A draft law consisting of 11 articles and a decision on the arrangements for bringing this law into force are being offered for your attention. Furthermore, the second section suggests that the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies should examine constitutional amendments connected with the introduction of the post of president.

I would like to point out that it is very difficult for me to speak when such stormy discussions are still going on following the adoption of the social laws. Naturally I congratulate you on those drafts.

[Khasbulatov] Carry on, please.

[Shakhray] Taking advantage of the powers conferred by the Third Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, the commission is submitting the text of the law in a positive sense, if I may put it that way; in other words, the powers of which will be vested in the RSFSR president. In accordance with the congress's decision, this law has to be tabled for endorsement by the congress, which, it is planned will also study constitutional amendments.

The concept of the institution of the presidency: The president of the RSFSR is the head of executive authority in the RSFSR and the highest official in the RSFSR. The principle that the instituion of the presidency is incompatible with holding a parliamentary seat has been introduced. The president may not be a people's deputy. The president of the RSFSR may not belong to a political party and must not occupy any post in state or public bodies or organizations. This means, of course, that any party affiliation must either be suspended or terminated when office is assumed. However, a candidate for the presidency may belong to any legally registered political party. Age limits have been set. The president may not be younger than 35 or older than 65. Furthermore, the president of the RSFSR may not occupy this post for more than two consecutive terms.

What are the powers of the president? I do not wish to draw your attention to the entire list, but rather to those powers that affect the president's relationship with the legislature and his relationship with the third authority in the country, namely the judiciary. The president of the Russian Federation does not have the right to dissolve or suspend the legislature of the Russian Federation. Under the draft, the president of the Russian Federation does not have the right of absolute suspensive veto on laws being adopted by the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies.

What does this mean? It means that within 14 days, after a law is adopted, the president has the opportunity to return the law to the legislature for the legislature and its commissions and committees to hear the president's arguments on why he disagrees with the law. But if the legislature again votes for the law with the same majority in each of the chambers, the law has to be signed within three days. That is, there is no ceiling which says that a law rejected by the president can only be adopted by a two-thirds majority. We were to introduce such a criterion, then the president—considering the party and other composition of our parliament—would be entitled to bury any law.

Relations between the president and the executive authority: Since this offers the concept of the head of executive authority, the president is obliged to get agreement from legislature for only one thing—for the candidacy of the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, that is, only a person approved here, at the Supreme Soviet, and subsequently confirmed at the congress can be the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Incidentally, it is planned to present the government program at precisely this time. Appointment to and dismissal from ministerial posts is the president's personal prerogative, upon recommendation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. That is, he is given the fairly major right to form the cabinet—the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation—by himself. This fact notwithstanding, the Supreme Soviet retains the right to express nonconfidence in the entire government as a whole; I emphasize, the parliament can pass a vote of no confidence not individually in ministers Petrov, Ivanov or Sidorov but in the Cabinet of Ministers as a whole. I think that this arrangement of checks and balances, as they say, between the presidential and executive powers, and legislature makes it possible to create a strong executive authority, but does not allow it to replace by an inch, as they say, the legislative authority.

An important presidential prerogative is participation in personnel policy—the appointment of higher official figures and higher judicial figures of the Russian Federation. The right to propose such candidacies resides with the president, but here the decision is made by the Supreme Soviet and the candidacies are presented for approval by the congress.

As far as the constitutional court is concerned, the president has the right to put forward candidates—I shall

talk a little later about how this is done in respect of the constitutional court. The Congress of People's Deputies either approves or rejects these candidacies, and from then on the constitutional court is independent of both the executive authority and judicial authority [as heard]. That is, we have the well-known triangle, the well known balance—the presidential authority proposes, the legislature approves, and from then on the constitutional court is independent in its activity.

The RSFSR president gets the right, in pursuance—I emphasize here, in pursuance—of the RSFSR Constitution and its laws, to issue decrees, that is, we are speaking about normative acts of delegated legislation. The principle of impossibility of contradiction between decrees and the constitutional and the laws of the Russian Federation is being introduced. Violations of this rule constitute a basis for the dismissal of the president from office. You will see that the bill assumes a model under which the president is removed from office by the legislature following a ruling by the RSFSR constitutional court.

Unlike in the bill which has been handed out to you, in accordance with proposals from a whole number of commissions, committees and groups of deputies, it is proposed to examine the question of introducing the office of the vice president of the Russian Federation. The RSFSR vice president, on the president's instruction, carries out the latter's selected powers, and deputizes for the RSFSR president in the event of his absence and incapacity. Those eligible for the RSFSR vice president post are citizens of the RSFSR, not younger than 35 and not older than 65, who have the right to vote. The RSFSR vice president cannot be a people's deputy.

Bill two: a bill on the constitutional court of the Russian Federation. As you see, this is a very large and very important document which resulted from long and painstaking work, and according to comments from the Ministry of Justice, according to preliminary conclusions of the USSR Constitutional Supervision Committee, it is a document of high legal caliber, if you like.

A model has been laid down whereby the Constitutional Compliance Committee can give conclusions and deal with the question of the constitutionality of decisions of officials and state bodies. In particular, a very substantial point is that citizens of the Russian Federation who have not found protection of their rights in either the procuratorial or in the judicial branches of power may also appeal to the Constitutional Compliance Committee.

Members of the constitutional court of the Russian Federation may only speak in a personal capacity, not as representatives of parties, not as representatives of trade unions, nor as representatives of republics. (?But) the model laid down for the formation of a constitutional court obliges the Russian Federation president to put forward the candidature of a member of the constitutional court at the proposal of the republics, including those belonging to the Russian Federation. That is, a reflection of our multi-ethnic federative nature in the composition of the constitutional court is insured at the stage of the preparation and proposal of candidatures of members of the constitutional court.

A rule is laid down that the constitutional court cannot be used for the resolution of political disputes—which body is right, which body is guilty—it will be involved in just one thing, settling questions of the correspondence of legal or legal administrative [pravoprimenitelnykh] acts to the Constitution, the literal text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The third draft law: on the elections for president of the Russian Federation. I understand perfectly that this is the draft which will today meet with the greatest opposition, but want to put forward my reasoning on the given draft.

When this draft was being prepared, the committee on legislation proceeded from the premise that the date of 12 June 1991, established by the Congress of People's Deputies for holding elections for the first president, was compulsory. If this date is not to be reviewed, then the proposed construction of the law on the elections—if you look at the calendar schedule—constitutes, well, if not the only possible one, then something close to this.

It is proposed dividing the whole procedure up to 12 June into two stages. The first stage, up to the 21 May, up to the opening of the next Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. At this stage registered republican political parties, trade unions and mass socio-political movements receive the right to put forward candidates for the post of president of the russian federation.

Taking into account a possible deficiency here, it is proposed investing with this right the republican bodies of Union-wide political parties, trade unions, and mass socio-political movements not incorporating independent republican associations. I think that this is an important amendment. It ensues from the draft proposed by the group of Russian communists.

Labor collectives, gathering of citizens according to their place of residence, and other movements and organizations not offcially registerd also have the right to put forward a candidate for the post of president of the Russian Federation, but in this case candidates must receive the support of 100,000 citizens of the Russian Federation possessing the right to vote. Not 1 million, as was written in the law on the referendum, but 100,000 citizens. Well, this figure can be discussed and changed.

A proposal by a number of committees has been entered, taken account of, that every subject possessing the right to put forward a candidate for president has the right to put forward just one candidature. The central commission for the elections of the president registers presidential candidates, and the presidential candidate has the right to propose the candidature of a vice president, and elections are held together for these two persons.

The second stage: With the adoption of this logic the election campaign could begin at the end of April of this...at the end of April, that is, in the course of this month. At the second stage is a Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. Each presidential candidate is given the floor of the lofty gathering and the right to put forward his program, union-wide and, naturally, on Russian television, and other media. But—so far this model is proposed—only those candidates who receive the support, in the present concept, of not less than two-thirds of the people's deputies of the Russian Federation can go through to the second round.

We could discuss this point and, say, reduce it to one quarter or one fifth. But let me explain why it was decided to stipulate one-third in the draft as it stands at the moment. We felt that the choice in the second round should be as crystallized as possible, with just two candidates. This will force all political movements and parties to decide where they stand at the Congress of People's Deputies. This will make the election a real one for the citizens of the Russian Federation. Most important of all, the first and last round in the election for the president of the Russian Federation can then take place on 12 June, as enviaged in the draft. From a purely theoretical angle, a multi-stage election, with a great multitude of candidates, might be more democratic. But in view of the present situation and the fact that each round would cost the taxpayer several million rubles, this is not the approach adopted in the draft. The candidate who wins over half of the votes cast in the election will be considered to have been elected president of the Russian Federation, and in this respect we have gone alone with the proposal made by the committees and commissions. However, a minimum ceiling is set for turn-out. At least 50 percent of the citizens eligible to vote must take part in the election.

Organization of election commissions in charge of the presidential election: It is proposed that a tried and tested mechanism be used, namely the law on the election of RSFSR people's deputies and certain articles in the law on referendum dealing with supervision and organization of voting on election day, articles that have already proved themselves in practice.

I would ask the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to vote and take a decision today on one specific thing: Should proposed amendments to the draft law on the presidential election, which change the date of the election from 12 June and, thereby, overrule the congress' decision on this question, be examined and considered? This is a very important issue. If we decide that such amendments can be adopted, this will change the concept of the election law and, naturally, the election of the first president will have to be postponed. If this is not to be done, I would ask the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, at its sitting today, to set a day by which amendments must be received and considered. This day should be no later than next Tuesday. The law on the election of the president of the Russian Federation must be adopted no later than next Wednesday. If this does not happen, I can state quite authoritatively from this high rostrum that the election will not take place on 12 June. Therefore, I would ask the Supreme Soviet to make a decision on this by at least today.

All other questions, ways of improving the election law and the other laws which I have submitted, are open to discussion. Compromise is possible. Maybe we shall decide to abandon the idea, contained in the draft, of using the congress as a kind of filter. If so, we will have to arrange more than one round of voting. But I ask you to make a decision on dates today. Thank you.

[Khasbulatov] Thank you. Comrade deputies, I would suggest the following course of action: Since there are so many, very complex questions, let us not start the debate now. This is merely the presentation of the bill. What should we do? First, I think that, since the congress has set a date, there is no reason for us to start expressing doubt about it. We should strive to do all we can to comply with this decision. Is that not so? My view on future work is as follows: This is an area where the parties can make great contributions. Unfortunately, it is only at congresses that parties get down to work, when Novikov and I, for example, get the parties together and start seeking compromises and so on. If we do not achieve general agreement within the Supreme Soviet on this question, we will not achieve anything at the congress either. So, what we must do is bring positions closer together on all these laws, on the powers, terms, elections, and so on. On the most democratic basis possible, we must try to find these mutually acceptable solutions. Then, I think, we will be able to adopt the entire package of laws in the week which has been mentioned.

[Shakhray] Ruslan Imranovich, excuse me, I should like to say a few more words.

[Khasbulatov] Go ahead please.

[Shakhray] An important amendment to the draft has already been tabled. During the discussions within the groups and committees it was suggested that, if the idea of the congress is accepted, the voting for candidates at the congress should, of course, not be an open roll vote but a secret ballot. This is a fair criticism. But, all the same, I repeat the point I made before. Criticisms and amendments must be dealt with no later than Tuesday, and we must vote now on whether or not to accept and examine amendments which change election day from 12 June. If this is not done, our work will be impossible.

[Khasbulatov] No, Sergey Mikhaylovich, if we do that, we shall be doubting the congress's decision, the way in which this question was raised. So, I....

[Shakhray] That is precisely what is happening.

[Khasbulatov] No. Why do we need to confirm one decision, by the congress, with another decision by the Supreme Soviet?

[Shakhray] I am not talking about doubts but proposals. There has been a number of proposals and alternative drafts, containing completely different dates and procedures.

[Khasbulatov] But why is it necesary. We will try....

[Shakhray] Therefore, it is of fundamental importance.

[Khasbulatov] All things happen in life, Sergey Mikhaylovich. If something does not work out, we will take a specific look. But right now we have a congress decision. I am certain that we will be able to compromise and adopt these decisions. So, are we agreed? We will not torment Sergey Mikhaylovich with questions? Good, take your seat, Sergey Mikhaylovich. Thank you.

TASS Details Package of Bills

LD1904205491 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—A package of bills dealing with the creation of an executive presidency in the Russian Federation was submitted today to the parliament of the largest Soviet republic. The election of the first Russian president is scheduled for June 12.

Russian legislators will analyse the blueprints of three laws—on the executive presidency in Russia, on the constitutional court and the election of the republican president.

The blueprints are sure to evoke a heated discussion. Even before their official presentation some lawyers and political scientists, who read them, called attention to their defects.

Thus, Dr. Boris Kurashvili, a prominent Soviet lawyer, regards as undemocratic the articles of the bills on the presidential elections which allow only two presidential candidates to reach the stage of secret ballot.

The bill does not ban the financing of electoral campaigns from abroad, which Kurashvili regards as dangerous. He objects in principle to a free, non-state financing of presidential candidates. He believes that as a result of it a president will have to "pay debts" to those who financed his victory.

Some people believe that it would be advisable to prepare more thoroughly the important changes in the Constitution and not to hurry up with elections. This idea was put forward today by Nikolay Malkov, who represented the Communists of Russia group.

Authors of the bill, whose representative Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Legislation, addressed the parliament today, regard as a strong point of the package of bills the fact that they create legal conditions for the creation in the republic of strong executive authority, which will not, however, replace legislative authority.

The bills are only a concept of the introduction of executive presidency in the republic and for this reason they did not evoke any serious disputes today. The main work on them will begin at committees and commission, as well as at parliamentary sessions.

The parliament also adopted today a package of laws, aimed at enhancing social guarantees of working people and ensuring the employment of the population. Amendments were made to the law on pensions in the Russian Federation. As a priority measure for ensuring the social protection of the population, it has been decided to set minimal wages at 180 rubles, beginning with October 1, this year. A working week will be reduced from 41 to 40 hours.

Ryzhkov 'Possible' Candidate

LD2004145591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] As has been reported to us from Sverdlovsk, Ivan Antonovich, secretary of the Communist Party of Russia, speaking at a plenum of the CPSU city committee, named the country's former Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov as a possible Russian Communist Party candidate for the post of president.

Potemkin Nominated as Candidate

LD1904175891 Moscow TASS in English 1752 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—The Russian League of Independent Scientists on Friday nominated V. Potemkin as a candidate for Russian presidency.

Scientists believe that his participation in the election campaign will be the best way to advertise the league's programme for a comprehensive development of the Soviet Union and Russia.

Zhirinovskiy on Election Prospects

91UN1323A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 15, 17 Apr 91 p 2

[S. Yerinets report on interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Russian presidential candidate from the Liberal Democratic Party: "Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: 'I Have No Rivals in Russia!'"]

[Text] **The first Russian presidential candidate has been nominated. This event occurred at a congress of the Liberal Democratic Party. Its chairman, 44-year-old Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, is the one. This is what he told our correspondent:**

"I have every chance of winning. The sole person who could constitute competition for me is Yeltsin, and then only because of his unconcealed populism. His avowed anticommunism is already repelling many sober-minded people. I am prepared in my election program to accept all the ideas of Democratic Russia in the sphere of the

economy, and on questions of national-state arrangement I am closer to Gorbachev. That is, I could be that actual third force about which so much is being said today and whose advent is awaited.

"I will be supported by all honest communists for the Russian Communist Party has no one to put up as a candidate. I will be supported by young people, after all, I am young too. The army. I would not allow anti-army hysteria. My main slogan for the election campaign is 'Protection of Russians Throughout the Territory of the USSR.'

"I am counting on the support of Russian business people: co-operators, entrepreneurs, businessmen. I need money, I need a good team! If all this comes about, I have no rivals. I will even beat Yeltsin. On the air in person, in a television marathon, I could demonstrate the advantages of my education and, please excuse me, my intellect.

"My forecast is that I will beat Yeltsin in a vote of 52:48. The main thing is the two of us left together in the home stretch."

Continuing Reportage on Yeltsin's France Visit

Meetings Detailed

LD2104135491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian, in its "Parliamentary Herald Program" at 1650 GMT on 20 April, carries a 14-minute video report on the recent visit to France of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet Chairman Boris Yeltsin.

The video first shows Yeltsin boarding the aircraft for the visit of the RSFSR parliamentary delegation to Strasbourg. Pictures show Yeltsin and other members of the delegation aboard the aircraft, then Yeltsin being greeted at the aircraft steps with flowers when he reaches France.

On 14 April Yeltsin addresses his first news conference. (No quotes). On 15 April Yeltsin is shown visiting the European Parliament and meeting the leaders of the parliament and the Council of Europe.

In the evening of 15 April Yeltsin is shown speaking on the Antenne-2 television program. In a brief voice extract Yeltsin says: "I have not come for any aid. I have come to get contacts established with a major political institution—namely, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. These contacts between Russia and the European Parliament are indeed essential and inevitable." The interviewer asks: "Would you like Russia to receive observer status at the Council of Europe?" Yeltsin replies: "I think that gradually, when everything has been legally formulated in respect of the state sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the independence of its foreign and internal policies, we shall strive to be not just observers but also participants and members of the Council of Europe."

On 16 April Yeltsin informs members of the European Parliament's socialist and democratic groups about the situation regarding Russia's sovereignty. He is then shown meeting Giscard D'estaing and is heard exchanging a few words. Addressing Giscard D'estaing Yeltsin says: "I know you through your very extensive political work and not only through photographs and television."

Yeltsin is then shown seated at a microphone and addressing a gathering at the European Parliament. He says: "This is my first trip abroad in the nine months since I was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It is not fortuitous that this trip is to Strasbourg and to the European Parliament, since the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and the government and I personally consider that the European Parliament here has accumulated a very large amount of experience in legislative practice, experience in bringing about the unification of states, experience of integration and experience in coordinating the diverse actions of many European states."

Yeltsin is next shown addressing the people's party group at the parliament: he says: "I have reached the conclusion that very rich experience has, of course, been accumulated here, furthermore, the kind of experience that we shall very much need now during our implementation and realization of those reforms which we have begun to put into effect or else for the main part have only been considering."

Yeltsin is shown briefly attending the European Parliament session as a guest of honor and then meeting Perez de Cuellar.

Yeltsin is then shown addressing another gathering at the European Parliament. He says: "Allow me first of all to express my gratitude to Mr. Crespo, president of the European Parliament, to the leaders of certain parliamentary groups in the European Parliament, and a number of deputies who initiated our meeting today, and to express the good wishes with which I today address you. Your commitment, competence, and objectivity have strengthened my conviction that the collective wisdom of Europe is presently concentrated precisely here and that noble concern for the future and practical work to firmly establish all-European solidarity and human prosperity today define the face of Strasbourg and all those working here.

"In my meetings with the groups there has been discussion on a vast number of issues relating to the most diverse spheres of life, Russia, the countries of Europe, and the European Parliament. I have endeavored to give specific answers to the many questions I have been asked—questions that have sometimes been difficult and sometimes harsh."

The video then shows Yeltsin's motorcade en route from Strasbourg to Paris. He is shown meeting Fabius, chairman of the French National Assembly. On leaving this meeting he is asked by a reporter what he thinks of the Georgian president's call for civil disobedience. Yeltsin replies: "The policy toward the leadership of Georgia should have been more subtle and mild, to not push them and drive them out of the Union."

Yeltsin is then shown being interviewed by France's fifth television channel. He says: "Russia is striving more to take part in various international forums and to have its representatives at them. However this process will not happen immediately. For example, first we shall have our representative at the United Nations, since this is an expensive pleasure, so to speak. Gradually we shall strive to attain permament membership of the United Nations. We also want to be members of the Council of Europe and the European Community, since Russia has traditionally, since the times of Peter the Great, always been involved in Europe and been considered part of Europe. We consider that this process will gradually be legally formulated, and it will begin with consultations and contacts at the level of commissions and committees."

On 17 April Yeltsin held a news conference in Paris on the results of his trip to France: Yeltsin says: "Pay attention to the fact that Russia can play a unique role as a bridge between Europe and Asia and help in the development of a European area, above all an economic area, on territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

"This visit has provided an opportunity to familiarize a broad range of political forces with the processes taking place in Russia and in our country and to show that Russia's leadership is following a consistent course of democratizing the life of society and implementing radical reforms in the economic sphere aimed at securing a worthy place for Russia in Europe and the world and at improving the lives of Russia's inhabitants. On the basis of the talks that we have held, the opportunity has arisen to go over to the formation of specific mechanisms for Russia's interaction with European institutions and to organize direct bilateral cooperation with France that accords with present realities."

A female reporter asks: "Do you consider yourself to be Gorbachev's rival?"

Yeltsin replies: "I should not like, while I am here abroad to discuss the problem of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Yes, indeed, I have criticized and do criticize him, just as he and others criticize me. The two of us are not outside the realm of criticism. Therefore this needs to be pereceived in the right way. If he has departed from some of his principles, which at the start he dubbed perestroyka, then I was simply forced in that way to issue a warning that he has been plainly giving up a number of democratic principles, freedom of the press, glasnost, and some other things. The events in the Baltic republics and so on attest to the fact that he has indeed been moving to the right. I have, frankly speaking, been warning him for three years now that, if anyone were to rejoice in promoting his resignation, it would be first and foremost the right-wingers and not the democratic forces."

Yeltsin is then shown meeting leaders of the French Senate, and meeting Jacques Chirac. At the Elysee Palace he had a meeting with President Mitterrand.

His motorcade is then shown going to the airport, and Yeltsin is seen boarding the aircraft for home.

Commentary Evaluates Visit

LD2004162491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1230 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Commentary by Nikolay Agayants on the unofficial visit to France by Russian President Boris Yeltsin]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is hardly surprising that the official media gave wide and exhaustive coverage to Mikhail Sergeyevich's trip, while giving fairly restrained, even scanty coverage to the other visits, especially that of Yeltsin. They are, moreover, once again attempting with this to displace the emphasis, and if not blacken the material on Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's stay in France, then present it in a sufficiently negative way as the commonplace voyage of a man not very well-versed in the subtleties of diplomacy. Today, however, it is completely clear that despite the difficulties arising from the relations between President Francois Mitterrand, and some other Western leaders, and the Union, perestroyka, and Gorbachev, and despite their reluctance to intervene in our endless internal mixups and disagreements and reluctance to take a sovereign Russia and its leaders, into account they can no longer continue to do this.

Yeltsin's meeting with the representatives of various parties and public organizations in France, and his talks with state figures, were undoubtedly useful. Incidentally, right up to the last day it was not certain whether or not there would be a meeting between Yeltsin and Francois Mitterrand, but eventually I think the Elysee Palace decided that it would be a great insult to refuse an important guest, the head of the Russian legislature, representing the interests of more than [passage indistinct], and the meeting took place.

Yeltsin, in his final news conference, expressed satisfaction with the results of his visit, and it seems that there is every basis for this, if only because the visit, although an unofficial one, encouraged the destruction of the Kremlin-initiated impression of our Russian leader as a rather irresponsible populist inclined toward adventurism and overamibition.

Incidentally, the actual invitation for Yeltsin to speak in front of the deputies of the European Parliament in Strasbourg is a clear indication of the sincere wish on the part of these ambassadors of a single European to establish just what the potential of his reformism, which could eventually be supported by concrete measures on the part of the West, really is. During his time in France,

the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet repeatedly emphasized that Russia by no means wants to leave the USSR, but to the contrary will encourage the unification of the republics and the conclusion of a new Union treaty. Yeltsin emphasized that he is ready for constructive cooperation with Gorbachev.

I am convinced that the coming days will show how the center will react to this expression of good will, and will show whether there will be a resumption of the important dialogue between the Union and Russian leaders, which is so eagerly awaited by millions of our fellow countrymen, and on which so many hopes are pinned.

Overall Aim of Trip Achieved

LD2004101391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1346 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Commentary by news service commentator Anatoliy Doronin]

[Text] We have already reported that the visit to France by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet, has ended. It was an unofficial visit. Boris Yeltsin traveled to France at the invitation of the International Political Forum organization and, incidentally, for the first time as head of the Russian legislature. To sum up the results of that visit, one needs to say that it was not simple, mainly because the old image of the Soviet Union and of the fact that Russia is primarily a part of the USSR is still maintained in Europe. In this connection, even at his first meeting in Strasbourg at the European Parliament, instead of an open dialogue free from prejudices, Yeltsin ran up against icy alienation and sometimes even overt hostility, as the European press noted. He was also accused of promoting the growth of nationalism and that his opposition to Gorbachev threatens the stability of the Soviet Union. He was told outright that his single combat on the brink of abyss—the situation in the country is meant here—does not find any understanding in Europe where Gorbachev, with his idea of constructing a common European home, is still quite popular.

On the whole, according to the Western press, Yeltsin, for many with whom he had meetings—and there were many such meetings in Strasbourg, as well as in Paris—turned out to be an uncomfortable partner. On one hand, they feared that the reception given to Gorbachev's arch-rival would harm the USSR president, and on the other hand, they could not ignore the fact that they had the leader of Russia in front of them, with a population of 150 million.

Yet despite all these difficulties and the sometimes full absence of mutual understanding, I dare to assert that the visit by the head of the Supreme Soviet of Russia to France was useful. First of all because it gave an opportunity to the leaders of the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the leaders of France to hear first hand what a sovereign Russia is and how the Russian Government sees the internal development of the republic and its foreign policy. In addition millions of French people and inhabitants of the neighboring European countries saw Yeltsin's address on television, heard it on the radio, and read his interview in newspapers. These meetings and speeches, according to many Western commentators, make not only ruling circles but the millions of Europeans think about the changes which are taking place in the USSR, and start to understand what a sovereign Russia is striving for.

On this plane, I think it can be said that the aim of the visit by the head of the Russian legislature to France was achieved. Regarding the practical integration of Russia in Europe, as Boris Yeltsin said at a news conference in Paris, its foundations are beginning to take shape. An opportunity has appeared to go over to creating specific mechanisms of interaction between Russia and European institutions. But this is a task for the future.

Reiterates Formula for Isle Dispute

OW1804040791 Tokyo KYODO in English 0220 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Paris, April 17 KYODO - Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday reiterated his five-stage proposal for a peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute with Japan over four Soviet-held islands off northeastern Hokkaido.

Yeltsin again outlined his step-by-step process to resolve the territorial issue over the next two decades at a press conference in Paris, while his archrival Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is trying to reach an agreement on the issue in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu.

The Russian Federation, the largest among the 15 Republics in the Soviet Union, administers the four islands—Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, the Habomai—seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II.

Yeltsin first floated his idea in January last year when he visited Japan as part of efforts to resolve the territorial dispute, which Japan insists must be settled before it will sign a peace treaty with or give full-fledged economic aid to its giant neighbor.

The five-stage proposal includes official Soviet recognition of the territorial dispute, conclusion of a peace treaty without settlement of the territorial issue as a precondition, making the islands a free enterprise region, demilitarizing the region, and leaving a final solution of the dispute to future generations.

In Tokyo the same day, V.P. Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, expressed satisfaction over talks between Gorbachev and Kaifu on the territorial issue.

In an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Lukin, accompanying Gorbachev on his four-day visit to Japan,

said that an agreement was reached between the Kremlin and the Russian Federation over policy on the territorial problem.

"The visit by Gorbachev to Japan signaled a start of serious discussions on the territorial issue. But, as the two sides seriously deal with the issue, the negotiations will not end in a short period of time," Lukin said.

Yeltsin Allegedly To Play 'Miners Card'

PM1904163191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Ye. Sorokin article: "How the 'Miners' Card' Is Being Played"]

[Text] The current miners' strikes are a misfortune and a tragedy for the entire country. We realize that the mines have loads of problems. The sector's social sphere has been very neglected.

Now there are strikes again. But this time accompanied by political slogans in a number of places. Their ultimate aim was formulated by one of the people interviewed by B. Kurkova, presenter of Leningrad TV's "Fifth Wheel" program: "turning the country into dust and ashes."

The miners are being given an enormous amount of support by the position adopted by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Boris Nikolayevich has repeatedly spoken in support of the miners, expressed his sympathy for them, and invited them to switch to Russian jurisdiction—which will allegedly help them to solve all their problems. And the extraordinary Russian congress recognized the justice of the miners' demands.

Boris Nikolayevich has played the miners' card very successfully to achieve his power goals. He has asked for extraordinary powers for himself and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Explaining the need, as he diplomatically put it, to "redistribute powers," he said that this step is also needed in order to solve the miners' problems. It seems that the very word "miners" now scares people. You just need to say that you will solve the miners crisis and people will give you any powers.

It is 10 days since the "redistribution of powers." What has the esteemed Russian leader been doing during this period? First, he has been relaxing in comfort in a sanatorium in Kislovodsk. Second, he has traveled to France in order, as he noted, to promote Russia's return to the common European home.

What about the miners? Where is the promised Russian Parliamentary deputies' group which was to negotiate with the miners to jointly arrive at common approaches to solving the problem? Clearly, it too is relaxing somewhere.

But the people are seething. The PRAVDA editorial office has receive perplexed letters asking: What about the miners, why have they not had a dialogue with Yeltsin?

"More than a week has passed since the end of the Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, which adopted a decision on preparing to introduce a presidency to Russia and gave you additional powers within the framework of a resolution on redistributing the powers of the congress, the Supreme Soviet, and its presidium," an open letter to Yeltsin from Communists at the Machine Building Central Scientific Research Institute states. "Most deputies and Russians largely linked the decisions adopted on this resolution to the conviction that your personal participation in solving Russia's socioeconomic problems will make it possible to halt the growth of social confrontation in society and the collapse of economic ties in industry. First and foremost, this is connected with your popularity and prestige in mining regions of Russia. However, this is not happening. As a result, we have a catastrophic situation in a number of industrial sectors and, most frighteningly, an almost inevitable deterioration in the lives of most inhabitants of Russia and the entire Union in the very near future. The restoration of lost positions in industry will require that the RSFSR Government and the future president take extremely unpopular measures to curtail social programs for a relatively long period.

"We propose that you appeal to miners collectives to end the strikes. Political problems should be resolved by political methods and constitutional means."

This was just one of many letters. Yeltsin has already received several perplexed telegrams asking him to solve this knotty problem. There has been just silence in reply.

It seems that Yeltsin has instructed the Russian premier to handle the miners issue. Thus, yet again Ivan Stepanovich Silayev is having to carry the ball for Boris Nikolayevich. And how is he doing this? Clearly in accordance with his instructions, in a very unusual way. He has sent a telegram to Vorkuta suggesting that the miners and the Cherepovets Metallurgical Combine set up either an association or a joint-stock company. As a result the Cherepovets metalworkers would obtain their legitimate 9.5 million tonnes of coal, while the coal workers would receive output from the metallurgical combine.

The expediency of this agreement is more than problematic. Since, you will agree, all this is very reminiscent of "Soviet-style" bartering—you scratch my back and I will scratch yours. It is planned to set up an insurance fund of 41 million rubles [R] for the Vorkuta coal workers' independent trade union. This trade union, I would note, covers just some of the miners, and far fewer than the "official" trade union organ. But, as is clear, the Russian Government prefers the former trade union, which is calling for the strikes to continue "to victory," to the latter.

Last Saturday representatives of certain pits were invited to meet with the Russian Government. It was directly put to them that they switch to Russian jurisdiction. And in exchange (or as compensation?) it was proposed that 20 percent of their coal be sold at free (contractual) prices, to whoever they please—even abroad. That is how, without consulting either the Union Government or the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry (it is simply being ignored by the "White House" [popular name for Russian Government building] on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment) they are encroaching on the sector, completely disrupting its operations.

After all, what does putting 20 percent of coal on "free sale" actually mean? It is clear that neither kindergartens, schools, hospitals, or any homeowners will be able to buy the coal, and it will either go overseas or be sold to rich monopolists in our own country. What about contractual deliveries or the USSR presidential decree on preserving economic ties? Ultimately, what are those customers who are "tied" to the "Raspadskaya" Pit—which was made such an attractive offer—going to do?

Does the Russian leader really need emergency powers for all this?

But it is well known that this year the miners are no great prize, as they say. If they switched to Russian jurisdiction, they would bring with them the many problems which they have seen build up over the years. There is also another factor which Boris Nikolayevich should remember when he is courting the strikers: Today metalworkers have already brought a suit for R500 million against the miners. And the railroad workers have brought a suit for R300 million. That is today. We can only guess how the miners will make Boris Nikolayevich happy upon his return from "foreign parts." One thing is definite: No powers, not even emergency powers, will be enough to pay for the damage done by the strikers.

Dagestan Deportees' Representatives Meet Yeltsin

PM2204090991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian9 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium press service report: "Meeting With Delegation"]

[Text] B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, met 6 April with a delegation of people forcibly deported from the Novolakskiy and Kazbekovskiy Rayons of Dagestan in 1944. R. Abdulatipov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; M. Magomedov, chairman of the Dagestan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; M. Abdulbasirov, first deputy chairman of the Dagestan ASSR Council of Ministers; and also S. Dzhamaldinov, RSFSR people's deputy and representative of the Chechen-Aukhovtsy repressed in 1944, took part in the meeting.

B.N. Yeltsin listened attentively to the deported peoples' representatives and appealed to their wisdom and patience, as well as proposing that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities study the issue carefully by going out to the places in question and work out a means of coordinating all the parties' interests.

Silayev Discusses Economic Program, Reform

Situation 'Difficult, Complicated'

LD2004150791 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 0958 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Interview with Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev by unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, the Russian prime minister, is traditionally a studio guest on our program. But he could not be in the studio today. He has gone off on a business trip to the United States of America. He is in the plane at this moment. So our conversation about the market, about Russia's economy, about the new program for Russia that was presented by the Russian Government at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress of People's Deputies in March and April is the subject of the conversation, the chat, that I had here with Ivan Stepanovich Silayev the other day. So, the prime minister of Russia discusses the economy of Russia.

I have in my hands a book, The program for Stabilizing the Economy and Transferring to Market Relations in the RSFSR. Ivan Stepanovich has already talked to viewers more than once about the stabilization of the economy and the transfer to market relations in Russia. We return once more to that program. What has occurred in the meantime, how is the work on the program going, and when will it start to operate?

[Silayev] Well, you are quite right. We did inform the esteemed viewers once, and published something in the press, but nevertheless, since the well-known events connected with the 500 days program, quite a lengthy period has passed, and questions have begun to be asked. What next? We ourselves felt that we could not be in some kind of vacuum, without restructuring our work, let's say, adjusting it to the real circumstances of today and striving to the utmost to make it feasible, even, let's say, if it is carried out within a single republic, the Russian Federation. That is why only the second Congress of People's Deputies instructed us to prepare such a program, and we, essentially, prepared it for the third congress. It was circulated among all the delegates....

[Correspondent, interrupting] Yes, I saw (?it, a huge volume). But the version that I have today is very much altered. What's the reason for that?

[Silayev] Well, that's quite natural, actually, since it was the subject of very active discussion. There were proposals from several authors, and variations, because, in

accordance with those discussions and conferences, the program today has virtually taken on its definitive form. Moreover, it is not just a program of wishes, but a realistic program, and, attached to that program, we already have a plan of action, too, that determines what specific part of the program is to be implemented in what time scale and by whom. In other words, we have the program ready for practical implementation.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, I know that the 500 days program underwent all kinds of expert appraisal. Did this program undergo expert appraisal? If so, what kind and where?

[Silayev] This program underwent, and is undergoing, I would say, expert appraisal, both in the first stages of its formation and before the congress. On the whole, fairly well known economists, including my adviser, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, also looked at it attentively. But we nevertheless, understanding that there must be an all-around appraisal, including one by completely independent experts, we asked some specialists in the West to give their conclusions. We have a preliminary appraisal of individual sections, not as a whole yet. We are optimistic that the foreign specialists will also give a positive appraisal of the basic directions of this program.

[Correspondent] The title of one of the first points is: An Appraisal of the Situation. When I looked at it, I was to some degree frightened, although on the whole such information is being published. For example, state resources of grain on 1 April this year were 4.4 million tonnes, with a normative requirement of 9.5 million tonnes. That is 70 percent. And so on. In the appraisal of the situation there are many, I would say, critical situations, critical questions. How do you yourself regard the level of the situation from which the program begins?

[Silayev] Well, in general, the program naturally begins under very difficult conditions, and I won't give any scientifically based appraisals now. In my opinion, our citizens, every man, every family today sees it and they have already appraised the situation as being difficult, complicated, and a way out of this situation is necessary. It is necessary that our Russians should know that we can see this way out, that this is not endless, this depressing atmosphere, and it cannot be endless. Maybe there will be a totally bad end, but maybe there will be an end-...[changes thought] taking the situation in hand with unusual methods. I won't scare our citizens by telling them that sacrifices are necessary, that it will be terribly difficult. Enough has already been said about this and in my opinion our citizens have already been well frightened. I think that they nevertheless are waiting to see what will be said by those who, on the whole, are responsible for the situation in Russia. We feel this responsibility, and on the whole today we intend to talk to you about what we are laying down here.

I do not doubt that all are waiting with hope. They almost certainly want to know that we will survive this difficult period. Then an improvement should come. It cannot be otherwise. What kind of leaders would we be, if today we only thought about how to cover some kind of shortage situation, and thus keep our citizens in unending uncertainty? For this reason this program is aimed at the citizens, and I would like to comment on some of its basic points, especially since we are approaching this in a completely healthy way, and are aiming this program directly at people.

[Correspondent] All right. It seems to me that the main and most interesting part of the program is the stimulation of the business activities of the population. Much is being said about this at the present time, and how this can be specifically...[changes thought] and whether active people will really be stimulated. And not just stimulated.

[Silayev] Yes, of course. In one interview here I said that Russia will be saved by entrepreneurs.

[Correspondent] Yes.

[Silayev] This has even been in the press. Perhaps this sounded somehow unusual and perhaps it even aroused some suspicion. I nevertheless claim that Russia may be saved by enterprising people and businesslike people engaging in specific work, not only as part of some collective, works, or enterprise, but also engaging on a personal basis, among other things, in the sphere of individual and private ownership. Well, let me say that individual farming, let us say peasant holdings, are, you know, examples of enterprise. Equally, however, enterprise can exist in the town, and we wish to stimulate this. A person wishing to engage in some kind of work and have his own business must be able to have this and have the legally protected opportunity and the financial possibility to engage in this. I think even that at the present time there are, not just in the countryside but in the town, too, families, housewives, and women who can cook well and who can do many things, but they are doing these things for themselves. They might wish to make use of their skills, let us say, to start up their own business and to start up, if you like, their own small shop. This too is enterprise and it is an example of a business person, whether it be a woman or a man, and so on. This then is what we want to interest people in and what we want to stimulate.

First and foremost, we intend to give a person the opportunity to earn money, without, moreover, oppressing him by taxation. Presently the existing system of income tax is progressive, beginning from 1,000 rubles and above. This is presented as a method to combat the mafia and non-labor incomes. Well, those who are inclined to this, the swindlers, thieves, and so on, know a host of ways both to deceive the financial inspectors and to conceal their incomes. Our policy should not be based on this.

It is important that those who are able to earn honestly are not pushed by us into concealing their incomes. For this purpose we are introducing a procedure whereby a citizen's income tax will not exceed 30 percent. Then he

will get some opportunities and funds and he will be able to start to invest these funds in whatever business he would like to get started.

We plan to issue a series of laws which would allow him to do this, to work without looking over his shoulder, within the framework of the law, declaring his income. Of course, he will have to do that. The state has to know that. Everything else is his, and he has to know that it will not be taken from him, just as the little shop which he acquires, buys, or somehow builds, will not be taken away. In other words, he has to be confident that the state is supporting him, together with and alongside the large factories and works which it is planned here to transfer in a fairly short space of time to joint-stock forms of ownership, when each employee also feels that he is a part-owner through his shares; not that he is the outright owner, but he has shares, and through his shares he receives the appropriate dividend. Here one might ask: Where is a poor person to get the money for those shares? Particularly, say, in a family with many children, for the more children there are, the harder it is. We are intending, planning, to introduce so-called people's shares. It is the principle that, let us say, everything which is located on Russian territory, fixed assets in the main, will be valued and then matched to each citizen of the Russian Federation. Each citizen will acquire, will be presented with, a named cheque, a share, which he has either earned already or will earn by his past or future labor. Therefore, a family with many children will have more of those cheques. In other words, they will also have the opportunity, if they want, to invest their resources in some kind of entrepreneurial activity.

[Correspondent] What if they don't want to?

[Silayev] If they don't want to, they can, of course....

[Correspondent, interrupting] If a person does not appear capable of entrepreneurial activity....

[Silayev, interrupting] The state can buy them from him. We will also provide for that, but we feel such a family will hardly refuse the fairly attractive interest on their money invested there. Then, evidently, they will work out where to invest it, where they will obtain greater opportunities; and, consequently, in conjunction with the state policy of support for production for the consumer market, it will be attractive to invest principally in that. Of course, this is a new action. Not everyone might understand it. We intend to hold a series of popular explanatory sessions. The businessman, the entrepreneur, should be a respected figure in our society. Businesslike means capable of doing things.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, I want to say again that I have acquainted myself with this plan. I was struck here, as, probably, everyone who acquaints himself with the figures will be, by the fact that Russia cannot have control over the billions of foreign currency rubles which it has at this time. This is definitely terrible. It is written here that Russia's hard currency account now amounts to zero, while the data cited here say that, in general, it is far from zero and Russia alone is the only republic which accounts for 100 percent of the union's exports of oil and 99 percent of its gas. So, how will events develop on this front, and what will the Russian Government do here?

[Silayev] First of all, I should like to say that in order to stimulate the activity of our population we are planning to introduce free trade in currency through the stock exchanges and banks. This is also going in the same direction, from the point of view of possibilities for engaging in entrepreneural activities. Here the appropriate laws are needed, and we shall be submitting them to the Supreme Soviet in the very near future. Your question was right, however, in that today there are many collectives, especially in the light industry, textiles, and other branches of the national economy, which are standing idle. They incur losses and the workers are losing their salaries because they cannot purchase raw materials and spare parts from abroad. This is a grave situation and we intend to change it radically, although this will take place starting next year. This year everything is, in general, still centralized. The colossal debts of the state put the infallibility of our obligations in question. We intend that the bulk of the income from exports will remain with those who sell the goods. Moreover, the practice—which I see as simply shameful—of counting everything that comes into the currency account as currency profit is wrong. There are the raw materials which should be bought. Not all of this is currency profit. Other supplies may be needed, let's say, which are necessary for the normal technological process. This is not profit, this is expenditure. This is currency expenditure. This part of the expenditure is being put together with the currency profit. It is, however, what is being earned in addition, after purchasing what is necessary out of the currency earnings, that are the real profits. We shall impose a merciful tax only on this part of the profits. The whole world is working on the premise that there is always something that one is producing oneself and something one has to buy—this is normal. Sometimes it is even less profitable to make something than to buy it. Therefore, the enterprise should be able to have the unlimited use of that part of its currency reserves which goes into the production process itself and also into its expansion. I think that I have already spoken in detail about private enterprise, but we are also building up serious economic stimuli for collective enterprise as well, in the plants, the works, and especially the joint-stock companies.

[Correspondent] What about the entrepreneurial activities of the ministries? Can you tell us about this?

[Silayev] Well, I could talk about this, too, although we think that only those ministries that should really be engaged in state functions and not entrepreneurial ones can remain under the market system. If a minister wants to engage in enterprise, he should resign.

[Text] [Correspondent] [passage indistinct]

[Silayev] He should engage in what he considers necessary within the framework of the law. Please let him do so. This is perfectly realistic. This is how it seems, certainly. A senior person is authority, even more so a minister, is well provided for there, and so on but he has a drama, he has a tragedy; he has stopped work, he has retired on a pension, and he has nothing more. Now he can set up in business, if he is capable of that.

[Correspondent] Certainly.

[Silayev] So, I want to say....

[Correspondent, interrupting] (?If he ran a ministry), then he certainly is.

[Silayev] So, I want to say that, first, from next year onward, we are limiting profit taxes. We will not set taxes higher than 30 percent for enterprises, and, what is most important, we will not levy any tax at all on that share of the profits which they are investing in developing production. After all, we are now looking for ways to ensure compensation, for ways to protect the unprotected sections especially. We are spending money. We must see where this will end.

One or two more reforms of retail prices of some sort—no more—and we will run dry, if we do not increase the output of goods. In order to ensure this, we are stopping levying taxes on enterprises on the money that they are investing in the development of production. Fairly tough, very large taxes are being levied today on these so-called production development funds.

[Correspondent] Up to 70 percent.

[Silayev] We are incorporating that in our budget. We understand what we are doing. We understand that this impression may be created: You exempt one person, you give another person a reduction, and before you know where you are there is nothing left at all. What is to be used for compensation? There is a simple effect just here. If an enterprise sees an advantage, if it is not crushed with taxes, it begins expanding its output. This is what we are stimulating. This is collective enterprise.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, you remember, probably you know, that one of the questions which has been popular is the question connected with social protection, with the problems of compensation. I see that in the draft program a fairly large space has been devoted to the problem of the social protection of the population. What will this look like and will this chapter—it has been designated as the sixth—remain only on paper?

[Silayev] It will not of course remain on paper, although, naturally, to say that we shall reliably protect everyone from the fluctuations of the market, or certain adverse consequences...[changes thought] it is impossible to protect people from everything. It would no doubt be the wrong thing to do anyway. It hardly makes any sense to protect poorly functioning enterprises, not to mention idlers or layabouts. It was no coincidence that we put the encouragement of entrepreneurial activity at the top of our priorities. To have social protection you need to have the sources, you need to have the funds, you need to have the resources, and these come from production activity, the services sector, the trade sphere. So it is not in sixth place in terms of its significance....

[Correspondent, interrupting] I didn't have that in mind at all. It's just that....

[Silayev, interrupting] Well, as far as technology itself is concerned, one must above all create incentives and produce more output. All kinds, and above all, of course, for the consumer market. We are putting that at the basis of both collective and individual entrepreneurial activity. Naturally, the market is just that. It is particularly harsh toward those who shirk work, who do not want to work, but it is also harsh toward those who are poorly protected. Those are the people we propose to protect. One knows what these categories are. On the one hand, they are children. On the other hand, elderly people, who have retired from their jobs; simply pensioners, the disabled, and young families.

On analysis, it was found that in our country young families are offered very little welfare protection, one might say none at all. They have a very difficult start in life; we all started out at one time, but at present, in this market situation, it is particularly difficult. Here, in general, we think we have specific and interesting measures to provide welfare protection for this very section. Also for the section of the population that is unable to earn, that cannot undertake entrepreneurial activity—and we have no small number of such people—we are protecting these people, too, by means of appropriate laws, reserve funds, and means envisaged in our plans.

[Correspondent] The question of small-scale privatization, of small enterprises in general, will probably come up alongside the question of business activity. How will the program encourage the establishment of small enterprises and the process of privatization in general?

[Silayev] Well, perhaps some people will remember that last year I visited a potato field near Moscow—a dramatic situation, when piles of potatoes were not being harvested, there was no one to harvest them, and the weather was awful, and so on. I said then that if this had been someone's property, such a thing would not happen, consequently we—I am not talking now about small privatization in the countryside, enough has been said about that, and not only said, but we are acting energetically—there are very interesting materials—people are obtaining parcels of land with some swiftness I would say for market gardens, for orchards: it is a multiple quantity [kratnoye kolichestvo] for this quarter. We have the task for spring now, for this...[changes thought] the sowing season [words indistinct] to give those who want it a market garden, so that they can plant potatoes and vegetables. I do not want to say that this is all fine and easy, but in any case the rates are very high. We have issued all the necessary decisions. We shall give up to 1,500 square meters—this is not 300 square

meters—and the farmers' movement is advancing quite confidently. Today, in comparison with the end of last year, there are four times more individual farms. That is also a problem. That is small privatization in the countryside. I'm not going to say anything more about it.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, I want to press the figure of 1,500 and this is why: Where did this figure come from? Not three, not 10, not 20, but 15, and is it only calculated for the production of agricultural output, or is it also for dacha plots? After all, these are different lots of 1,500 square meters. Then who is going to allocate them? The collective farm? if it is collective farms in the Moscow area, there will be a fight: There aren't very many such plots in the Moscow area. Why am I coming back to this question? I was speaking recentlty to the director of the Losinyy Ostrov reserve, and he said that there is now a disaster there. Losinyy Opstrov is simply being torn apart into plots of 1,500 square meters. No one thinks that this is a reserve, reserve land. So what is the principle of the allocation of these 1,500 square meters, and for what and how?

[Silayev] Well, of course, if they have had the idea of giving Losinyy Ostrov away for market gardens and orchards, this is not being done by the local body. Actually....

[Correspondent, interrupting] No one...[changes thought] there is no right, it is a national state park.

[Silayev] Excuse me, there is a decision by the Russian Federation which protects historical monuments, national parks, reserve areas: this is simply a violation.

Fortunately, I must say this is obviously an exception. Even for Moscow. We met together with Muscovites, with Moscow Oblast, and invited several neighboring oblasts a few days ago, because of course it is impossible to divide up all the land around Moscow: There are a lot people who want some, for the Moscow area, with its industrial technology for the production of vegetables and potatoes must be preserved, and you won't feed Moscow from private market gardens. This is simply a supplement, as they say, in order to remove the load from the basic producers of potatoes and vegetables.

Therefore, 20,000 hectares have been allocated in Moscow Oblast, and this work is going quite well. In addition, we have asked the adjoining oblasts—Smolensk, Tula, Kaluga, and all those oblasts contiguous to Moscow Oblast—to allocate appropriate plots. These are linked by good roads to the capital; that is no problem today, there is quite a lot of private vehicle transport. We got Muscovites interested in it and signed contracts with the executive committees of these oblasts for supply of specific industrial goods. A contract might be signed for a five-year period, say, and then it will be continued. This task is thus being resolved, and on a good basis, it must be said.

In general, many bodies, executive bodies in particular, have understood how difficult it is for us to leave everything as it used to be. Nonetheless, this is not privatization. A market garden is not privatization: it is allocation of a plot in order to meet people's own individual needs. Whereas the aim of privatization is to ensure production of goods, to ensure supplies of output to the market, to the consumer, to all other citizens, and so forth. In this sphere, the term privatization is starting to operate properly. Well, first and foremost, I once again address myself to what will still happen. When fall comes, regiments of the army, students, and pupils drive out to help gather in the harvest. We regard is as essential, we shall take all possible measures to ensure that this infrastructure, as it is called, between the field and the shop, should be privatized; to ensure that we shall create advantageous conditions for the sale of shops selling vegetables and potatoes, for the sale of vegetable storage and processing depots—to ensure, that is, that this whole process—one in which many economic technological transfers will be involved—is privatized. We shall take measures to ensure that people, entrepreneurial people who have their own shops, their own lorries, and their own small warehouses, and also their own premises for processing meat, vegetables, and so on, for instance—this need not necessarily be one person, it can be a group of people—are involved in each element—whether it be harvesting, storage, transportation, or, above all sale. If this entire chain is put into the hands of....

[Correspondent, interrupting] ...of the private trader....

[Silayev, interrupting] ...private traders, indeed, there will be no losses, no waste, and certainly meat, potatoes, and other perishable food products will not wait for long periods in freight wagons at stations to be unloaded.

[Correspondent] But so far, after all, this production and vegetable stores, and vegetable shops have been lossmaking for the state, and it is also lossmaking to bring in the potatoe harvest using scientific workers, students, and so on. What will private people do?

[Silayev] Well, first, there are a lot of lossmaking things today, because we....

[Correspondent, interrupting] But will private persons want to take on this responsibility?

[Silayev] Well, don't think that private people are so indecisive and unenergetic. They only need to have the conviction that no one will take it away, and, (?even more important), that they will not be arrested under some new article from the past. Such articles do exist. They should also be abrogated.

Well, first of course, the private individual cannot manage huge warehouses with a capacity of tens of thousands of tonnes. He couldn't manage to buy one, and is not likely to need to do so. So these centers will remain, that's a different matter. There will also be joint-stock companies, which the collective can buy up for its residual value, and will own the shares. We consider that these individual farms—and they are now

really developing in this way—must take of lot of strain off the situation precisely in this field—that is, vegetables, potatoes, milk and meat production. Then they will be in a position to store their harvests in small warehouses and we will help to see that such warehouses are built, to exempt the builders from tax—that is another mechanism. So there are tried and tested methods here. The world has gotten itself into such a situation with this, one could say, that it doesn't know where to put the vegetables and fruit and meat and milk, and the Western countries are now paying subsidies not so that people will produce more, but so that they will cut their production and produce the strict norm that has been allocated to them.

[Correspondent] Let's hope that with time we'll also get there.

[Silayev] At first we shall support them and help them to do more, and at a certain stage—I think perhaps in three or four year's time—we, too, will have to deal with such problems.

[Correspondent] [word indistinct] said that you are a great optimist.

[Silayev] Well, I'll finish anyway. Small privatization is not of course, only a matter of selling everything connected with this area between the farm and the buyer. It is also shops on another level as well: shops for manufactured goods, studios, workshops, and so on, other service points. All of this has to be privatized. All of this must be in owners' hands, definitely.

In addition small enterprises, either newly set up by specific entrepreneurs, or bought up by the workforce, all this must also belong to... (changes thought) must be someone's baby, then it will get the maximum from its parent. This will of course put an end to all sorts of unnecessary auxiliary services and so on, and that is actually how it is being done.

So that is the first part.

We consider—and I appeal to local soviets and executive committees on this, after all the main burden falls on them—we consider that everything connected with the privatization of this sphere, connected with food, that a significant part of it should be sold off in time for the fall harvesting period. If that happens, then these private entrepreneurs will not allow potatoes to rot, even if it rains.

A very important question is the privatization of housing. I would like to say straight away that we do not support the sale, let alone the sale at inflated prices, of flats to our citizens who are currently living in them. They should not be forced to pay prices that have increased many times over. Unfortunately, things of this sort are already happening. This is illegal. Our law on the privatization of housing has been slightly held up. However, it will be examined by the Supreme Soviet in the very near future. We do expect that, provided the quotas applicable in each region are observed, a substantial amount of housing will be handed over, free of charge, to the citizens living there at the moment.

What happens to housing in excess of these quotas is a different question. Local soviets will have to study this question, bearing in mind the degree of comfort or wear in any particular block. Bearing these and other criteria in mind, they will have to decide what prices should be charged. Later—and this is what we are looking at now—later we plan to move toward a market in housing. Lest it be thought, however, that the less well-off, those who cannot pay a market price for housing, will be left without homes, we are planning next year to launch a special program for the construction of housing, of flats, for people who cannot pay a high price for housing. This may be about 20 or 30 percent of the total. We'll have to decide this with the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, of course, the market will regulate the second part of the housing sector, where well-to-do citizens, so to speak, will live. They must have an opportunity to purchase housing.

Certainly we will have to—I say certainly because there's no getting away from this—we will have to ensure that the housing built under this special state program for the less well-off is allocated to those same categories who are not protected at the moment. Credit at preferential rates or interest-free loans will be available—or, maybe, part of the loans could be paid off by the state. Here, too, there are very serious and interesting approaches which have been approved, generally speaking, and which make it possible both to protect the needy and provide an opportunity for someone who is earning a good salary to purchase housing.

[Correspondent] I want to make use of a phrase, a question posed in the economic stabilization program: responsibility and trust. From theoretical constructions we have moved to specific measures to create a market economy. What is the minimum we need to work confidently and calmly? What the Government of Russia needs for confident and calm work is, as I understand it, responsibility and trust. So wherein lies the responsibility, and upon those trust are you counting?

[Silayev] First and foremost, we are counting upon the support of the Supreme Soviet—to say nothing, of course, of the fact that the necessary laws must be adopted, or those laws that hamper us must be repealed. There are even some laws, some articles in the criminal code of the Russian Federation....

[Correspondent, interrupting] ....those relating to foreign currency exchange....

[Silayev, interrupting] Quite right. There's an article there providing for a penalty even of execution....

[Correspondent, interrupting] But people won't be executed....

[Silayev, interrupting] No. What's more, foreign currency exchange will be permitted, it will be protected by law, as long as it proceeds properly, through the market, through the stock exchange, through auctions; that right is granted, is permitted. But we need laws to implement what is included in the program. Some of these laws already exist, and we are counting on—the Supreme Soviet is disposed to work hard here—adopting the main laws, at least 10 or 12 of the most important laws, within a short period of time. At the same time, however, we must feel the trust of our Supreme Soviet: unfortunately, we have not felt this on the part of some deputies. Not only have we not been aware of their trust, but on the contrary, our activity has been called into question, especially our foreign economic activity. The third Congress of People's Deputies has dispersed back to the localities, and we are in need of support first and foremost from the legislative bodies. The most important thing, however, is of course the trust of the people: they can be won over only by definite measures and by results within a specific and short time-scale.

Therefore we do take on that responsibility, and say that we shall be able to cope with it. There is also, of course, a group of questions that we will not solve by ourselves. Here of course we need interaction with the central organs of power, with the Cabinet of Ministers, with the USSR Supreme Soviet; because, after all, we do not live in a vacuum. I have already said that there are currency questions, financial questions. We intend to strengthen the ruble and not devalue our currency. There are voices—among certain people, yes, but not in Russia—I have not heard any voices in Russia.

[Correspondent] Such voices can be heard in the Baltic.

[Silayev] Yes. We do not intend to do that. We intend to strengthen our own currency, but that has got to be solved as a whole, in our economic union space. However many republics disappear, Russia of course will remain. So of course cooperation with the cabinet is very important to us. We act on the assumption which actually the third congress arrived at. Despite all the drama of events—and it even seemed at times that in place of consolidation there would be implacable confrontation, there were such moments—it ended with some consolidation of the main forces, which was a great achievement of that congress. In his concluding speech Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin said that, in spite of the contradictions, we shall cooperate with the center. Naturally we need reciprocal steps and we consider that if Russia is economically strong, then the center will have an easier time, too. It will even be easier for the president, and it will even be easier for our Union republics when such a power, you might say, as Russia arises and stand confidently on its own feet. Consequently, everyone must help us, including the party and the independent public organizations, regardless of their aims and conviction—I mean those which the law allows. In that, too, we hope for support and trust and a constructive spirit of cooperation, so that our Russian people understand that it's not just talk. We also want to table a proposal to the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers to set up a small new structure to cooperate with public movements and parties, including the strikers; we must concern oursleves with them too—these are also actions of a public kind, we may say.

This is why we shall not be able to cope alone, of course, and we are counting in particular upon the broad support of the population, of our citizens. We ask them to have trust in us, to believe in us, and we are of course doing everything possible to ensure that we cope with this task. I should....

[Correspondent starts to speak]

[Silayev] Excuse me, please. I should nevertheless like to talk about another stage here, another section, namely the interaction between the current unrest and Western capital. Well, there's no longer any talk that managers are prepared virtually to sell off Russia. That is not the case. We are, after all, not such eccentrics as to seek happiness in some regions overseas. We are of course counting a great deal upon our own strengths, upon the strengths of our society. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary, in particular—and this we have taken on board, and we are currently drawing up a law on it—we consider it necessary for Western partners to be able to bring in their goods to us here, consumer goods in particular, and especially those goods that enable construction materials to be made, and that process agricultural produce and consumer goods. We do not think that we have anything to fear here. Let them bring in these goods: we have such a huge shortage that it will be no threat to our Soviet machine-building. There is room in the market for both. This will be some sort of competition, the market will be filled with goods.

Furthermore, Western partners are intending to sell for our rubles, and not to export those rubles but to leave them here—and we shall take care to see this is done—and to invest those rubles in what is of interest both to them and to us. I have no doubt that in two or three years' time it will come about that, unless it is restricted, the mass of Western output could stifle our Soviet-manufactured output. In that event, we shall without fail use the appropriate protective economic methods. Presently, however, we intend to harness sanctioning economic methods, removing taxes on imports, giving incentives to Western firms to bring in to us what our citizens, our consumers need today. For our industry is incapable of doing this today, within a short period of time.

[Correspondent] Ivan Stepanovich, when you were speaking about responsibility and trust, you rightly pointed out that what citizens are interested in now are results. The 500 days program was calculated for 500 days, and for the moment, people said, we citizens seemed to know what was in store for us. In the case at issue—I do understand that this is quite a difficult question—when can we expect results? How can one understand and feel that something has finally started to

move, that we are no longer in a state of crisis, but that the first half-step, the first step has been taken?

[Silayev] Well, here I would like to say that there are various programs with different authors. We have studied them very attentively. A number of programs were also proposed at the congress. There is, in particular, Comrade Fedorov's program. That surname is much in fashion at the moment. He is chairman of the executive committee of Sakhalin Obkom [oblast party committee]. He also has a program. Its approximate name is, not 500, but 5,000 days. He considers that the transition should be very slow but sure and gradual. This is the way it should be done, he believes. In fact, 5,000 days is 10 years.

We, however, are basing our program on a time-scale of months rather than years. Our people cannot remain in this terrible economic situation. Therefore, we understand this—but we are not talking about 500 days. We do not want people to think that the government has some tricks up its sleeve which will make it possible to have everything sorted out in 1,000 days' time. No, we, I have tried to explain to citizens that we want to create conducive conditions—and we will create them. They will be comprehensible, understandable, and advantageous ones which will give our citizens an incentive to take their destiny into their own hands. Our task is to support them and to create economic advantage, to create incentives, and to protect those citizens who cannot earn enough, and who, maybe, do not even have the right to earn—civil servants, officials, and employees of the Ministry of Health, and teachers, for instance. They cannot earn extra money. They are servants of the state. We must protect them. But those who can earn must work. It is for them that we are creating the realistic and specific conditions that are needed. We are inviting them to get involved in this.

Therefore, we can only forecast. I have already said, and I say again now, that we can expect that by the end of this year we will have 30,000 peasant farms instead of 2,000 peasant farms. This is already something substantial. I think that next year the figure could triple. Definitely that will happen, we can say so with confidence. I can say that small-scale privatization has much to offer us. It is not right to say that we have gotten terribly unaccustomed, that the state dominates everything, and that nothing else is left. Man, as it turns out, is the repository of the human genius which he was endowed with by God, as they say. The well-known saying "charity begins at home" sometimes seems to have negative overtones. But the sense of ownership is important for man. Depending directly on how he uses it, he can live well and maybe even get rich, maybe go bankrupt, too, if he maintains his assets in a chaotic state, neglects them, if he takes no trouble at all over them. But that is inconceivable.

Therefore, we are greatly hoping that our population will take an active part in this. We are relying very much on them. That section of our population which cannot protect itself, however, can and must rely on us. That is the way things should be arranged, we believe. Then we will jointly count the days and decide when things have begun to change for the better.

Transfer to Market Relations Cited

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[From the "Russian Parliamentary Herald" program; report by Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, People's Deputy Igor Zbronzhko]

[Excerpts] The transfer to RSFSR jurisdiction is the subject of a conference in the RSFSR House of the Soviets between representatives of the main coal regions of Russia and Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the republican Council of Ministers. [passage omitted] [video shows Zbronzhko interviewing Silayev at the conference hall]

[Begin recording] [Zbronzhko] Ivan Stepanovich, you said that the transfer to the jurisdiction of Russia is not a tug-of-war, it should not be approached administratively, it is merely a step on the way to the transfer to a market economy. You yourself asked the question: How can this be done in a constructive, not a destructive way? Regarding this, is there any program for doing this constructively and not destructively?

[Silayev] Well, in the first place, I should inform you that today we submitted to the Supreme Soviet a government program for overcoming the crisis and for the transfer to market relations. We are fulfilling the decisions of the third congress: we were given a month, until 4 May, but we are doing it, we have done it, earlier, and today we submitted the document. In the next day or two it will be published in the mass information media. In this document we do indeed enshrine the principles of economic methods tried and tested all over the world, and everywhere irrefutably yielding positive results. We are not inventing anything; we are following world practice. This involves, in the main, economic methods of setting regulations and giving incentives and stimuli. The main thrust here, so to speak, is, I would say, backing for business activity. I would like to reiterate a phrase that seems to me a good one: Russia will be saved by entrepreneurs. This phrase was uttered here. It encompasses the peasant, the peasant-farmer, the labor collective owning property collectively on joint-stock principles. It is on this principle that we envision helping to organize work in this difficult industry now that we have taken it under our jurisdiction.

The question of ownership and authority was indeed raised here, and ownership comes first: What is it? An administrative structure that suppresses and fetters and does not allow the results of labor to be disposed of? Or is it ownership by the collective, in particular joint-stock ownership, a very effective form of ownership, which enables the collective, in general, to resolve many issues

itself, being able to dispose of the results of its labor. It is this principle that we intend to harness.

[Zbronzhko] Another opinion was expressed here today, namely that the issue is in effect already settled. The majority of enterprises, coal enterprises at any rate, are ready right away to transfer to Russian jurisdiction. The point does not lie here, however: The point is how the government can guarantee these enterprises their living and working conditions, and, above all, what is the time-scale?

[Silayev] Well now, you see, there is an element here, a juridical element. We do indeed have very many statements made in the press and other media, many verbal comments. But there is the following feature: We do not intend to exert compulsion against any individual collective to impose on it the principle of this transfer. What is needed, therefore, it not a purely emotional evaluation and approach, shall we say? It must be resolved officially. The Raspadskaya mine made an official application to us, they have protocols, and the issues were resolved.

Today's sitting, though, deforms our approach, I think. I sense that we shall have to think over and come to agreement, excluding the element of coercion, to adopt a decision on the transfer of the entire coal industry to Russia's jurisdiction. After lunch we shall continue our exchange of opinions, and we shall probably adopt such a decision.

[Zbronzhko] But what about the time-scale? Coal enterprises are at a standstill at the moment, after all, in many mining regions; and the fate of the strike and the fate of the striking enterprises most probably depend to a great degree on how this issue is decided.

[Silayev] Undoubtedly so! I think we shall...[changes thought] I suggest putting forward today the idea that having exchanged opinions—many interesting things have been said—we should over the next seven or ten days put everything finally down on paper regarding the program for preparation and transfer of all the mines situated on Russian territory to Russia's jurisdiction. And perhaps we should talk not with the present representatives, but with main representatives brought together from the strike movement and from our major regions, and will be able to sit down and sign a program document for the transfer. As for how long this would take, I would not presently like to say categorically, but probably it would be around two months. That is the transfer itself. But we must sign a certain document on the principles of the transfer, and the actions by both sides, both on the part of the government and on the part of the labor collective, should be between seven and ten days. It will also undoubtedly be essential here, of course, to sign—and we shall strive toward this end—specific agreements with the Cabinet of Ministers....

[Zbronzhko, interrupting]...of the USSR....

[Silayev]...with the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR. I reckon that as soon as Comrade Pavlov returns there absolutely must be a meeting, and regardless of whose initiative it is, I shall go to him myself and I shall propose to him, and I shall insist on negotiating, that the Cabinet of Ministers should enable us to carry out this transfer in an organized and effective manner. [end recording]

Russian Union Head Meets Press on Planned Strike

LD1904203291 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—"Russian trade unions have no intention to watch from aside how the republic and the entire country are inexorably sliding to economic disintegration," said Igor Klochkov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. Addressing Soviet and foreign reporters here today, he commented on the decision of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions to hold on April 26 an all-Russian token action of protest. The trade union federation urged the working people of Russia to halt for one hour work of enterprises, institutions and transport and to organise rallies of whole plants and city demonstrations wherever law permits.

The head of the Russian trade union centre emphasised that the token action will be held even if all-union and republican leaders hastily promise to fulfil trade unions' demands.

"People are sick and tired of promises, which high officials are in no hurry to fulfil. The action on April 26 is an alarm to urge legislative and executive bodies to speed up work to create a mechanism for social protection of the working people in conditions of a market," he said.

Klochkov noted the Federation demands the lifting of restrictions on wage increases, immediate adoption of an anti-crisis programme, laws on indexing incomes and on the population's employment and the lifting of the five per cent "presidential" tax on sales and services. Some demands of the trade unions are beyond the limits of socio-economic sphere.

The Federation favours a coalition government of people's confidence at the union level, clear separation of powers of the centre and republic and the introduction of the presidency in the Russian Federation. The Russian trade union centre supports the miners strike and is in solidarityy with their demands.

"We favour the solution of burning problems by civilised methods, through negotiation with the goverment and the quest for mutual compromise. But if the supreme authority refuses to grant our demands, we reserve the right to continue collective actions, possibly in tougher forms than a one-hour strike," Klochkov said.

Urges 'Token' Strike 26 Apr

LD2104085691 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 21 Apr 91

[Text] The leader of the independent trade unions of the Russian Federation has said the Russian unions will not be bystanders at a time when the republic and the country are going downhill into an abyss of economic ruin. Igor Klochkov told reporters in Moscow that the decision to hold a one-hour token strike throughout Russia on Friday [26 April] was an alarm signal to the legislature and the government to speed up the elaboration of a social security mechanism for the workers under market conditions.

Vorkuta Workers Strike in Support of Miners

LD1904135491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2330 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] A meeting has been held in the Arctic town of Vorkuta in support of the demands made by the striking miners. A 24-hour solidarity strike was staged by workers at the mechanical works and the reinforced concrete works. A number of enterprises in the consumer services sector also stopped work. Representatives of the town's strike committee, and the leadership of the Vorkutaugol association, have left for talks with Silayev. On behalf of workers' collectives, they will hold talks on ways to transfer Vorkuta mines to RSFSR jurisdiction.

Workers Present Demands to Gorbachev, Pavlov

LD2004080191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] According to the report of the SIBINFORM agency, Tyumen Oblast committee of oil workers' trade unions has sent a letter containing oil workers' demands to the USSR president and to the chairman of the country's Cabinet of Ministers. These demands include: to raise the prices for oil and gas to the world level, to exempt oil-and gas-extracting enterprises from rental payments, and to set the minimum wage at the amount of 1,400 rubles. It is proposed to set up a conciliation commission in order to achieve these goals.

Party Leader Envisages Gorbachev Retirement

LD1904192691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Vladimir Zherenovskiy, chairman of the Soviet Union's Liberal Democratic Party, has stated in an interview with a correspondent from the RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY that he does not rule out Mikhail Gorbachev leaving the political arena as early as this year. Zherenovskiy said that if Gorbachev continues to show indecisiveness he will not last for more than two or three months. Zherenovskiy predicts that the crisis in the Soviet Union will come to a head in May or June.

RSFSR Government Prepares Stabilization Program

LD2004080691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1100 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] In compliance with the instruction of the third congress of republican people's deputies, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Government has prepared a program for stabilizing the economy and transfering to market relations. It is being submitted to the Russian Supreme Soviet for approval. As the Russian news agency correspondent was told at the Russian Council of Ministers, the authors of the document came to the conclusion that a gradual transition from a planned economy to a market economy is impossible. A new market mode of administration should be found quickly. World experience has confirmed its efficiency. The program mainly emphasizes creating optimum conditions for those who wish to work and know how to work. The authors of the Russian program believe that there are no insurmountable barriers between their program and the anti-crisis program of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and that, finally, real hope for fruitful cooperation with the Union Government has emerged.

Russian Communists Open 'Initiative' Congress

LD2004131491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 20 Apr 81

[Text] The second initiative congress of Russia's Communists opens in Leningrad today. According to the POSTFAKTUM Agency, the main attention in the congress's organizational committee will be devoted to the issue of the current situation and to a discussion of drafts of the CPSU program. It is thought that the congress will meet tomorrow as well. It will be attended by representatives of a number of primary CPSU organizations and also by representatives of public organizations and movements, including the United Front of the Working People [obedinennyy front trudyashchikhsya], the All-Union Society of Unity for Leninism and Communist Ideals [vsesoyuznoye obshchestvo yedinstva za leninizm i kommunisticheskiye idealy], the Communist Initiative Movement [dvizheniye kommunisticheskaya initsiativa], and the Moscow Club of Leninist Communists.

If one is to believe the POSTFAKTUM Agency correspondent, the so-called fighters for Leninism [bortsy za leninizm] intend to raise the question of changing the party's leaderhip, to dissociate themselves from Gorbachev's political course, and to pose the question of the election of new party leaders.

Discuss Draft Programs

LD2104200391 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 21 Apr 91

[Text] Leningrad April 21 TASS—The first stage of the second initiative congress of Communists of Russia ended in Leningrad today.

According to organizers, delegates represented three million communists in the Russian Federation. Guests from party organizations in eight union republics attended the congress. Participants favoured transforming the initiative movement of Communists of Russia into an all-union movement.

Delegates discussed two draft programmes of the Soviet Communist party. Both of them noted the need to "restore and strengthen socialism in the Soviet Union". Authors believe that the "strengthening of the social character of production" will help move the country out of the current crisis.

After the drafts are discussed in the country's work collectives, the second stage of the initiative congress in Moscow in June is expected to adopt one of them.

Participants approved an appeal to communists, calling them to "take part in creative activities and in the struggle for reviving the Communist party on Leninist principles and clearing it of opportunism". They believe that it is necessary to fight "for Sovietization of the economy, rather than its privatization, for improving the lives of working people and for slashing prices".

Participants supported the nomination of economist Aleksey Sergeyev to the post of president of the Russian Federation. Earlier, Sergeyev had been nominated by the United Workers Front. He is an author of a programme for moving the country out of the economic crisis "without price hikes and reducing living conditions of the people".

RSFSR-Lithuania Resettlement Agreement Assessed

LD1904204791 Moscow TASS in English 1116 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Nataliya Kupriy and Vyacheslav Bondarenko]

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—A draft agreement, drawn up by the Lithuanian side and now discussed by ministries of the Russian government, may cost Russia hundreds or even billions of roubles. It stipulates that the entire cost of evicting the Russian-speaking population from Lithuania will be borne by Russia.

The very idea of such a document, which we saw with our own eyes in the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation, was but recently bluntly denied by Russia's top leadership. Addressing a session of the Russian parliament this January, member of the Russian Supreme Soviet Sergey Baburin inquired whether talks on the Russian-speaking population's resettlement from the Baltic republics were under way or not. The reply was conclusive: There is no such document in existence.

And now we were able to see the draft of this Lithuanian-Russian migration agreement.

"Fortunately, it is only a draft," Baburin said. "But it is a horrible draft. Its goals and purposes will by no means help resolve pressing problems linked with natural migration. Despite its high-sounding formulations, the draft is discriminatory in respect to Russian-speaking people. It does not envisage the protection of their rights and interests."

"It ought to be noted primarily," Baburin noted, "that this Lithuanian-Russian inter-governmental agreement was very thoroughly prepared. Every detail has been considered from seemingly objective, but actually anti-Russian positions, humiliating the Russian people. For instance, Article 5 of the draft says that the entire cost of resettling migrants will be borne by the accepting side. Hence, the Russian government is now discussing with Lithuanians the possibility of resettling its compatriots from regions where many of them were born and are now compelled to leave against their will. And why on Earth must the Russian people incur the expenses. Moreover, the Russian government thereby usurps the functions of the union by violating the USSR law "On the Procedure of Settling Problems Linked With a Constituent Republic's Secession From the USSR".

To furnish a clearer idea of this draft, it is worth quoting the following figures. According to expert estimates, the cost of providing everything necessary for one resettler at his new place of residence amounts today to 60 or even more thousand roubles. According to the latest information, about 150,000 families of Russian-speaking people out of a total of 350,000, now residing in Lithuania, are ready to return to Russia. Plans are also afoot to start resettling Russian-speaking people from Latvia and Estonia.

The agreement places Soviet citizens, resettling from Lithuania to the Russian Federation and vice versa, in an unequal position. Thus, any citizen of the USSR has the right to migrate to the Russian Federation, while only citizens of Lithuania and members of their families will be allowed to go to Lithuania.

According to Article 6 (of course, this is only a draft agreement yet) the sides undertake to provide living conditions for resettlers which cannot be inferior to those he enjoyed at his previous place of residence. Isn't this an utopia in present-day conditions when every region of Russia is suffering from an acute housing shortage? How can the Russian Federation assume such a commitment? How can crisis-hit Russia ensure such living conditions to migrants from a republic whose standard of living have always been somewhat higher than its own?

But this is not all. Isn't it sheer disrespect for the Russian and Lithuanian peoples when the agreement grants migrants social guarantees only for a period of up to December 31, 1995, i.e. for five years? Or take the proposed mutual commitment "to accept for permanent residence only citizens and members of their families who leave their apartments or houses in the other state and are able to produce documents confirming their readiness to give them up".

Can you imagine the consequences that Russia will have to bear as a result of this agreement, discussed behind the backs of the Russian people? A few more words about the cost of this project. The migration of Russians and Russian-speaking families able to "confirm their readiness to give up their housing facilities" may snowball out of all proportion. And, looking at it from the point of view of morality, it ought to be said that nobody has any right to even discuss the possibility of humiliating and evicting a part of a nation from any territory for national or political reasons.

"But this is yet only a draft", we interrupted People's Deputy Sergey Baburin.

"Yes, people may claim that this is only a proposal by the Lithuanian side," Baburin replied. "But it is indicative that the Russian leadership is ready to negotiate it. The document is extra proof of the fact that the process of turning the Soviet Union as a federative state into a community of alien or, to put it more mildly, neighbouring states, leads to a national disaster fraught with the tragedy of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of people and maybe even whole nations."

Moscow Kurds Demonstrate Against Saddam

LD2004085291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0559 GMT 20 Apr 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A demonstration attended by many people against Saddam Husayn's inhuman policy regarding the Kurdish population took place in Moscow today.

Taking part in the demonstration, which started on the capital's Crimean Square and ended near the Iraqi Embassy, were Kurds living in Moscow, representing over 150,000 Soviet Kurds. They were supported by Kurdish students from other countries studying in our city.

The demonstrators demanded that the genocide be stopped and that Saddam Husayn be brought to trial for crimes against humanity. [video shows angry demonstrators carrying slogans in Russian—one slogan is in Armenian]

'Communists for Democracy' Members Listed

91UN1287A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[List of members of "Communists for Democracy," introduction, and commentary by Al. Lilov: "Opposition With a Blessing"]

[Text] **"Communists For Democracy": Who's Who?**

When, at the congress, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin put forth the idea of holding a roundtable discussion, many did not expect the proposal to allow "progressively thinking communists" in this discussion. Only one thing disturbed them: Who would determine how one communist or another thinks—"progressively" or "conservatively." But everything fell into place when the congress floor was festively turned over to Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskiy, RSFSR people's deputy, vice president of the "Rebirth" fund (until recently, the president was B.N. Yeltsin), and chairman of one of the committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The audience stood up and applauded when he announced the creation of the "Communists for Democracy" faction. Looking at us from the screens of our television sets, "standing and applauding," were the painfully familiar radical democrats and republicans, "Democratic Russians" and social democrats, in general, representatives of forces who call themselves "leftists" because they do not understand what they are saying.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich proudly threw out from the congress podium the figure of "170 deputies" who had supposedly joined the faction and separated themselves from the destructive and inflexible deputy group "Communists of Russia." Once it got started, the sensational news about the "split" in the ranks of "Communists of Russia" and the gigantic numbers of the "Democratic Communists" faction spread easily from item to item through the pages of the independent and "democratic" press.

Careful readers, comparing the arithmetic calculations of the number of "democratic communists," first in one independent newspaper and then in another, even more "independent" one, immediately noticed the discrepancies. The difference reached as many as 60-70 deputies. After all, according to the regulations, 50 deputies are enough to constitute a new faction.

Naturally, even while the congress was still in progress I, like many of my colleagues, tried to find out who the members of the new deputy group were. At a news conference on 3 April (immediately after the announcement) A.V. Rutskiy assured the journalists that the faction's membership list had been turned in to the secretariat for registration and the group included 170 individuals. But we did not manage to find out the membership of "Communists for Democracy" that day. They said that some member of the secretariat had taken the list home with him. The next day the congress information reference service "gave out" the number of members of the faction as 80. Then two deputies "changed their minds" and did not confirm their agreement to join this new political formation. By the end of the congress, the situation had changed again—the reference computer put out a list with 95 people. But where are the missing 75 "communist-democrats?" Judging from the propaganda support and Boris Nikolayevich's repeated blessing of the faction, these arithmetic trivia are of no importance whatsoever.

And so here is the list of members of the faction "Communists for Democracy."

The Computer Printed Out the Faction's Membership List

1. Avdonin, Ivan Yakovlevich, Territorial District 326, Department chief of Vologda City Hospital No. 1, Vologda, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

2. Adrov, Valeriy Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 275, Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science and Public Education, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, member of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group.

3. Akhmedzyanov, Galim Ibragimovich, Territorial District 200, Director of the Pervomaysk complex timber floating enterprise of the Yenisyelesoeksport Association, Motyginskiy Rayon, Pervomaysk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group, member of the "Sever" group.

4. Akhtyamov, Dzhaudat Sunagatovich, Territorial District 662, Division chief of the Central City Hospital, Asbest, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

5. Babenko, Vladimir Dmitriyevich, Territorial District 688, Head physician of the Tambov Oblast Hospital, Tambov, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

6. Balovnev, Vladislav Petrovich, Territorial District 442, Chairman of the State-Law Committee of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Kemerovo, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

7. Barmin, Nikolay Yuryevich, Territorial District 363, Director of the Ilinskiy Secondary School, Gordetskiy Rayon, Ilinskiy, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Smena" group.

8. Belashov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Territorial District 598, Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Disabled Persons, Veterans of War and labor, and Social Protection of Military Servicemen and Their Families, member of the "Smena" group.

9. Bignov, Ramil Imamagzamovich, Territorial District 783, Head construction worker of the Ufa construction association for large- panel housing construction of the Bashstroy territorial construction organization, Ufa, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of People's Deputies From Republics and National State Formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Rossiya" group, member of the "Smena" group.

10. Bogatyrev, Bambulat Bersovich, Territorial District 884, Head state inspector for the use and protection of the land supply of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] (Checheno-Ingush Republic), Groznyy, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group, member of the group of People's Deputies From the Republics and National-State Formations of the RSFSR.

11. Boyko, Vera Aleksandrovna, Territorial District 182, Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Freedom of Conscience, Religions, Charity, and Philanthropy, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "For Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group.

12. Brechalov, Albion Vasilyevich, Territorial District 215, Editor of the okrug newspaper SOVETSKIY TAYMYR, Dudinka, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Glasnost" group of people's deputies, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, member of the "United Parliamentary Faction of Social Democratic and Republican Parties of the Russian Federation" group, member of the "Sever" group.

13. Bugrimov, Anatoliy Lvovich, Territorial District 2, Lieutenant colonel, instructor of the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Radical Democrats" group, member of the "Russian Union" group, member of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science and Culture" group.

14. Vershinin, Eduard Nikitich, Territorial District 221, Deputy head physician of the Maritime Kray Clinical Hospital, Vladivostok, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group.

15. Vilchek, Mikhail Ivanovich, Territorial District 461, Deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science and Public Education, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group.

16. Vinogradova, Irina Viktorovna, Territorial District 519, Secretary of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science and Public Education, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group, member of the "Rossiya" group.

17. Vitebskiy, Vitaliy Yakovlevich, Territorial District 481, Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and Energy, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy"

group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group, member of the "Rossiya" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group.

18. Volkov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, Territorial District 888. Director of the Cheboksary Aggregate Plant imeni XXIV Syezd KPSS, Cheboksary, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

19. Galushko, Ivan Vasilyevich, Territorial District 258. Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Interrepublic Relations, Regional Policy, and Cooperation, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group, member of the "Rossiya" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

20. Golishnikov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 872. Deputy chief of the Administration of Internal Affairs of the ispolkom of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Volgograd, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Food and Health" group.

21. Gorbachevskiy, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 111. Deputy chief of the criminal investigation administration of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs of ispolkoms of Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad City Soviets of People's Deputies, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

22. Grachev, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Territorial District 568. Faculty head of the Penza Polytechnical Institute, Penza, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Rossiya" group.

23. Gun, Rudolf Semenovich, Territorial District 757. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Health Protection, Social Security, and Physical Culture, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Chernobyl" group of people's deputies, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Rossiya" group.

24. Dzhamaldinov, Sultan Shavkhalovich, Territorial District 811. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Moscow, member of "Communists for Democracy" group.

25. Didichenko, Georgiy Ivanovich, Territorial District 565. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legality, Law and Order, and Fighting Crime, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group.

26. Dimitrenko, Aleksey Fedorovich, Territorial District 168. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and Engergy, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" Group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

27. Dmitriyev, Yuriy Yakovlevich, Territorial District 836. Faculty head of the Mary Polytechnical Institute imeni A.M. Gorkiy, Yoshkar-Ola, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group.

28. Dunayev, Andrey Fedorovich, Territorial District 401. RSFSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group.

29. Yegorov, Anatoliy Nikolayevich, Territorial District 57. Chief of the criminal investigation administration of the Main Internal Affairs Administration of the ispolkom of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the Moscow deputy group.

30. Yegorshin, Viktor Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 114. Chief of the criminal investigation administration of the Main Internal Affairs Administration of the Leningrad Oblast Ispolkom and Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies, Leningrad, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

31. Yelshin, Yuriy Vladimirovich, Territorial District 667. Division chief of the Pyshminskiy Central Rayon Hospital, workers settlement of Pyshma, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

32. Yermolayev, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 807. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and Efficient Use of Natural Resources, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia.

33. Zhilin, Igor Fedorovich, Territorial District 347. General director of the Rossosh Minudobreniya Production Association, Rossosh, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

34. Zhukov, Grigoriy Semenovich, Territorial District 700, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and the Development of Self-Management, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

35. Zhukov, Mikhail Mikhailovich, Territorial District 838, General director of the Mary Agroindustrial Combine, Yoshkar-Ola, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Food and Health" group.

36. Zaytsev, Yuriy Vladimirovich, Territorial District 30, Rector of the All-Union Correspondence Polytechnical Institute, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Russian Union" group, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, chairman of the coordination council of the "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture" group.

37. Ivanov, Sergey Nikolayevich, Territorial District 656, Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies and Development of Self-Management, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Soviets and Local Self-Management" group, member of the "United Parliamentary Faction of Social Democratic and Republican Parties of the Russian Federation" group.

38. Ivanov, Stefan Petrovich, Territorial District 787, Machine operator on the Kosh-Yelginskiy Sovkhoz [state farm], Bizhbulyanskiy Rayon, Kosh-Yelga, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the "Food and Health" group.

39. Ivanov, Fedor Fedorovich, Territorial District 877, Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and Efficient Utilization of Natural Resources, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

40. Kadyshev, Vladimir Dmitriyevich, Territorial District 732, Colonel, faculty head of the Ulyanovsk Higher Military Command Communications School imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze, Ulyanovsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the group of deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers.

41. Kamanin, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, Territorial District 682, Head physician of the Smolensk Oblast Clinical Hospital, Smolensk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Chernobyl" group of people's deputies, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

42. Kashnikov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich, Territorial District 830, Leader of brigade of mine tunnelers of the Kapitalnaya Concern of Intaugol, Inta, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, deputy chairman of the "Sever" group.

43. Klyuyev, Nikolay Vasilyevich, Territorial District 760, Director of the Satka trucking enterprise, Satka, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Chernobyl" group of people's deputies, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group, member of the "Smena" group.

44. Kondobayev, Gennadiy Sergeyevich, Territorial District 388, Deputy head engineer of the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine, Angarsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Sever" group.

45. Kondrashov, Boris Petrovich, Territorial District 3, Deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legality, Law and Order and Fighting Crime, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the Moscow deputy group, member of the "Rossiya" group.

46. Kotenkov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, Territorial District 257, Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Russian Union" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the group of people's deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers.

47. Kudinova, Lyudmila Sergeyevna, Territorial District 692, Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Mass Media, Communications with Social Organizations and Mass Movements of Citizens, and Study of Public Opinion, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "United Parliamentary Faction of Social Democratic and Republican Parties of the Russian Federation" group, member of the "Glasnost" group of people's deputies.

48. Kuzin, Aleksandr Viktorovich, Territorial District 737, Head of the department of public education of the ispolkom of the Dimitrovgrad City Soviet of People's Deputies, Dmitrovgrad, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

49. Kulakovskiy, Aleksey Viktorovich. Territorial District 239. Head engineer of the construction administration of the Lermontovskiy Almaz Production Association, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

50. Kyshtymov, Sergey Leonodovich. Territorial District 663. Chairman of the Bogdanovich City Soviet of People's Deputies, Bogdanovich, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Food and Health" group, member of the "Soviets and Local Self-Management" group, member of the "Smena" group.

51. Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna. Territorial District 654. Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Women, Protection of the Family, Maternity, and Childhood, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the group of people's deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers.

52. Litvinov, Yuriy Alekseyevich. Territorial District 457. Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Disabled Persons, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Military Servicemen and Their Families, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the group of people's deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers.

53. Makarkin, Nikolay Petrovich. Territorial District 839. Dean of the economics department of the Mordovian State University imeni N.P. Ogarev, Saransk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of deputies who are specialists in economics and management, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

54. Martynov, Dmitriy Dmitriyevich. National Territorial District 120. Director of the Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum Kemlyanskiy imeni V.I. Lenin, Ichalkovskiy Rayon, Kremlya worker settlement, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Food and Health" group.

55. Matchak, Yaroslav Andreyevich. Territorial District 175. Director of the Kropotkin plant for installation and special construction adaptors, Kropotkin, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group.

56. Medvedev, Nikolay Pavlovich. Territorial District 117. Chairman of the Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for the National-State Structure and Interethnic Relations, Moscow, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

57. Miktyukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich. Territorial District 212. Deputy chairman of the Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for Legislation, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Rossiya" group.

58. Nazdratenko, Yevgeniy Ivanovich. Territorial District 225. President of the Maritime Mining Company, Dalnegorsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group.

59. Natapov, Semen Aronovich. National Territorial District 153. Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legality, Law and Order, and Fighting Crime, Moscow, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

60. Ovchinnikov, Vladimir Alekseyevich. Territorial District 301. General director of the Aleksandrovskiy Radiozavod Production Association, Aleksandrov, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

61. Ozhegov, Anatoliy Ivanovich. Territorial District 582. General director of the Gubakha Metanol Production Association, Gubakha, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

62. Oynvid, Grigoriy Mikhaylovich. Territorial District 427. Chairman of the Olyutorskiy Raykom [rayon committee] of the trade union of workers of the agroindustrial complex of Kamchatka Oblast, Tilichiki, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Food and Health" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, member of the "Smena" group.

63. Ostapenko, Eduard Ivanovich. Territorial District 615. Leader of brigade of mine tunnelers of the "Western-Kapitalnaya" Mine, Novoshakhtinsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

64. Plotnikov, Oleg Vitalyevich. Territorial District 459. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science and Public Education, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Food and Health" group, member of the "Smena" group.

65. Pogorelov, Sergey Viktorovicyh, Territorial District 619. Operator of mill for hot rolling pipes of the Taganrog Metallurgical Plant, Taganrog, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

66. Podoprigora, Vladimir Nikolayevich, National Territorial District 135. Deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Interrepublic Relations, Regional Policy, and Cooperation, Moscow, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Soviets and Local Self-Management" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

67. Popkov, Nelson Nikolayevich, Territorial District 56. Secretary of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and Energy, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Radical Democrats" group, member of the "United Parliamentary Faction of Social Democratic and Republican Parties of the Russian Federation" group, member of the "Left Center" group.

68. Pudovkin, Yevgeniy Konstantinovich, Territorial District 118. Captain second rank, manager of the technical organization of the Navy, Leningrad, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Soviets and Local Self-Management" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the group of deputies who are specialists in economics and management.

69. Putilov, Eduard Petrovich, Territorial District 614. General director of the Novocherkasskiy elektrovozostroitelnyy zavod Scientific Production Association, Novocherkassk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group.

70. Pushkina, Tamara Aleksandrovna, Territorial District 65. Member of the Comission of the Soviet of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for Social Policy, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, member of the "Russian Union" group.

71. Rakov, Petr Pavlovich, Territorial District 733. Head physician of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Hospital, Ulyanovsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Medical Workers" group.

72. Rassokhin, Gennadiy Vasilyevich, Territorial District 832. Rector of the Ukhta Industrial Institute, Ukhta, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Sever" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

73. Rogacheva, Irina Aleksandrovna, Territorial District 507. Deputy chairman of the Commission of the Soviet of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for the Budget, Plans, Taxes, and Prices, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of deputies who are specialists in economics and administration, chairman of the "Sever" group.

74. Rutskoy, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, National Territorial District 52. Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Disabled Persons, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Military Servicemen and their Families, Moscow, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, deputy chairman of the group of people's deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers.

75. Ryabov, Nikolay Timofeyevich, Territorial District 617. Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Food and Health" group.

76. Semukov, Yuriy Ivanovich, National Territorial District 112. First deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi ASSR (Komi SSR), Syktyvkar, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the "Sever" group.

77. Skudnov, Vladimir Arkadyevich, Territorial District 349. Deputy head engineer of the Krasnaya Etna state plant (Metiz Production Association), Nizhniy Novgorod, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Organizers of the National Economy" group.

78. Smirnov, Valeriy Valentinovich, Territorial District 752. Chief of the internal affairs administration of the ispolkom of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Chelyabinsk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group, member of the "Chernobyl" group of people's deputies.

79. Sokolov, Sergey Nikolayevich, Territorial District 306. Director of Secondary School No. 2, Murom, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group "On Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture."

80. Sorokina, Mariya Ivanovna, Territorial District 497. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on

Human Rights, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Glasnost" group of people's deputies.

81. Stepashin, Sergey Vadimovich, Territorial District 112. Chairman of the subcommittee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Affairs of Disabled Persons, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Military Servicemen and Their Families, Moscow, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Left Center" group.

82. Sukharev, Veniamin Platonovich, Territorial District 576. General director of the Permnefteorgsintez Production Association imeni XXIII Syezda KPSS, Perm, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Communists of Russia" group.

83. Teterin, Vasliy Nikolayevich, Territorial District 173. Lieutenant Colonel, instructor at the Yeysk Higher Military Aviation School for Fliers imeni V.M. Komarov, Yeysk, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the group of people's deputies created according to profession from the USSR Armed Forces, KGB, and reserve officers, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the group "For Questions of Rearing, Education, Science and Culture."

84. Timofeyev, Valerian Aleksandrovich, Territorial District 649. Chairman of the Korsakov City Soviet of People's Deputies, Korsakov, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

85. Titkin, Aleksandr Alekseyevich, Territorial District 710. General director of the Tula Tyazhprodmash production association, Bolokhovo, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Chernobyl" group of people's deputies.

86. Travnikov, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, Territorial District 115. Chief of the internal affairs administration of the ispolkom of the Frunzenskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of the City of Leningrad, Leningrad, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Left Center" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group.

87. Tyleyev, Aman-geldy Moldagazyyevich, National Territorial District 46. Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Kemerovo, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group.

88. Udachin, Vladimir Yakovlevich, Territorial District 166. Chief of the correspondents' office of the combined editorial staff of the newspaper DELOVOY MIR for Krasnodar Kray, Krasnodar, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Glasnost" group of people's deputies.

89. Ustinov, Igor Gavrilovich, Territorial District 226. Chairman of the Nakhodka City Soviet of People's Deputies, Nakhodka, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Independent Deputies" group, member of the deputy bloc of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR.

90. Fomin, German Maksimovich, Territorial District 671. Member of the Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for Science and Public Education, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Workers Union of Russia" group, member of the group "For Questions of Rearing, Education, Science, and Culture."

91. Kharayev, Feliks Akhmedovich, Territorial District 819. General director of the Kabbalkavtotrans territorial production association, Nalchik, member of the Soviet of the Republic, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Rossiya" group, member of the group of people's deputies from republics and national-state formations of the RSFSR.

92. Khoroshilov, Gennadiy Ivanovich, Territorial District 395. Chief of the Osetrovskiy River Port, Ust-Kut, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Rossiya" group, member of the "Sever" group.

93. Tsann-Kay-Si, Fedor Vasilyevich, Territorial District 299. Department head of the Vladimir State Pedagogical Institute imeni P.I. Lebedev-Polyanskiy, Vladimir, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group.

94. Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich, National Territorial District 10. Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Moscow, member of the Soviet of Nationalities, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Smena" group, member of the "Levyy Center" group.

95. Shevoldayev, Sergy Borisovich, Territorial District 38. Member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Mass Media, Communications with Social Organizations, Mass Movements of Citizens, and Study of Public Opinion, Moscow, member of the "Communists for Democracy" group, member of the "Democratic Russia" group, member of the "Radical Democrats" group, coordinator of the "Sotrudnichestvo" group.

So in Whose Camp Is the Split?

Now, completing our arithmetic research, we will give only a couple of statistics about the composition of the "Communists for Democracy" group, which were provided by the Congress reference information service.

Well, in the first place we see that new, "democratic" apparatchiks have "rushed" to the new faction. It includes 22 chairmen and deputy chairmen of committees and subcommittees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet,

The rest—with the exception of a machine operator and a brigade leader—are chiefs, chairmen, leaders, and directors.

Only 11 of the members of the faction are from the "Communists of Russia" group (the lowest percentage of all the factions). And 15 members of the "Democratic Russia" bloc and also three "radical democrats" considered it an honor to stand under the banner of "Democratic Communists." From the "Left Center" grouping 13 members decided to combine that membership with membership in Colonel A.V. Rutskiy's faction. But the most surprising thing is that the three members of the "Russian Union" group who supported the Russian Christian Democratic Movement and also four members of the United Parliamentary Faction of Social-Democratic and Republican Parties of the Russian Federation "were not averse" to becoming "Democratic Communists."

So that is the "communist division" from the "Democratic Russia" bloc. But how they want to call all this a "split" in the "Communists of Russia" group! But perhaps this really is a split, only not among the communists.

Western Republics

Belorussian Presidium Meets Strike Committee

LD1904221191 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Glod and Vyacheslev Sivakov]

[Text] Minsk April 20 TASS—Members of the Minsk strike committee demand that an extraordinary session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet (parliament) be convened. Then the strike will not be resumed. This demand was advanced at a meeting of members of the parliament's presidium and of the Minsk city strike committee. The meeting began at 6 P.M. on Friday and lasted for three hours. All members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the strike committee, over 100 people, participated.

The problems posed include departisation, Belorussia's sovereignty, programme of overcoming the crisis, private property on land.

Stanislav Shushkevich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian parliament, who presided over the meeting said that "no one in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet objects to the discussion of these matters. Our stance coincides with that of the strike committee. There is only a different attitude to the schedules. All these problems should be analysed by parliamentary commissions, and then real laws can be adopted".

It was noted that in order to clarify the problems discussed it is necessary to conduct a referendum with the participation of the republic's entire population and not just a parliamentary session.

Members of the strike committee who took the floor said that the convocation of the session should not be delayed. What is logical in normal conditions becomes pointless in extreme conditions. And precisely extreme conditions are shaping now. Participants in the meeting said that if an extraordinary session is not convened, several enterprises are going to resume the strike.

Members of the Presidium listened to all speeches by members of the strike committee. The latter walked out when members of the Presidium spoke. Shushkevich said that the meeting has actually been disrupted.

After a brief closed-door meeting, it was announced that the Supreme Soviet Presidium will resume work on Saturday morning.

Presidium Rejects Strike Demands

LD2004212891 Moscow TASS in English 1959 GMT 20 Apr 91

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk April 20 TASS—The presidium of the Belorussian Parliament has not yielded to the unprecedented pressure of the Minsk strike committee and has decided unanimously not to hold an emergency session of the parliament. A regular session will be held on May 21. The leaders of the strike committee are threatening another strike, beginning on April 23, if their demands are not met.

"We have no right to rush headlong, when deciding matters of state importance, and to turn a session into another rally," First Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich said. "Besides, practically all demands of the strike committee will be taken into consideration in the agenda of the May session."

The presidium of the republican parliament and the Council of Ministers adopted today an appeal to the Belorussian people. It said, among other things, that it is clear to every reasonable person that all the key problems, including the transfer of state property to the ownership of other legal or physical persons, privatisation, private property on land and departisation, [as received] should be settled in a constitutional way. Another way leads to the deepening of the crisis, the worsening of living conditions, and puts the republican economy in a hopeless situation. The appeal urged all citizens of the republic to display restraint and commonsense, and not to yield to the calls for strikes.

No Political Agreement Reached

LD1804223991 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 1725 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] The negotiations between representatives of the Presidium of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, the government of the Republic, and the Minsk City Strike Committee have already been going on for one week. Both political and economic demands have been put forward. As for the political demands, agreement has not been reached. Let us remind you: The members of the strike committee put at the head of the list the question of an extraordinary session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. With regard to economic issues, agreement has been reached.

Committee Vows 'More Powerful' Strikes

LD1904211191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1900 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] According to a NOVOSTI agency report, the Minsk strike committee, with which over 150 strike committees at enterprises in the capital and other industrial centers of Belorussia coordinate their activities, has appealed on television for the work collectives to resume their political strike on 23 April. The reason for this was the refusal of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium to urgently convene an extraordinary session of parliament to consider the political demands of the workers. The leaders of the strike committee consider that the wave of strikes will be more powerful this time than at the beginning of April.

Situation 'Extremely Tense'

PM1804141391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

["Direct Line" report by Mikhail Shimanskiy: "No One Wants To Give Up"]

[Text] Minsk—The emergency session of the Belorussian parliament, whose convocation the leaders of Minsk's strike movement are insistently demanding, will not take place.

The date of the scheduled session has been brought forward—it will take place 21 May. This decision was adopted 16 April at a joint sitting of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Belorussian Council of Ministers Presidium.

The situation in Belorussia remains extremely tense, however.

A Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee statement on the current moment has been made public. Every sentence of the document contains profound alarm over the crisis within the republic and the country.

The Union Government's price hike does not demonstrate common sense—that was how the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee plenum just held spoke of this measure. Another of the plenum's conclusions is that perestroyka, on which great hopes were pinned, has reached a deadlock.

The republic's industrial enterprises and organizations are working intensively to set up strike committees. Now there are already more than 100 of these committees in Minsk. The strike committee at the Belorussian automobile plant in Zhodino has proposed that the enterprise administration no longer lease out premises to the party committee and that it settle the question of removing the party committee from the plant by 19 April. The party committee has been forced to appeal to the rayon prosecutor's office. What will its answer be?

Another force—the students—is entering the Belorussian political arena. An organizational committee is operating in Minsk to set up a student strike committee.

Belorussian Trade Union Plenum Adopts Resolution

LD1804230691 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 1725 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Summary] The second plenum of the Federation Council of Belorussian Trade Unions adopted a resolution that supports the economic demands of the work collective voiced during the strike. In its address to primary trade union organizations, the plenum calls for uniting the efforts of all public formations and strike committees in the struggle for improving the working people's life. It condemned the attempt to split the trade union and working people's movements. Vyacheslav Kebich, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers chairman, and Vasiliy Shalodonov, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, spoke at the plenum. Representatives of the strike committee did not attend the plenum. The members of the Federation Council of Belorussian Trade Unions confirmed their confidence in the Federal Council Presidium.

Ukrainian Official on Need To End Strikes

LD2004095391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1444 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Yesterday as our Kiev correspondent, Vladimir Sokolov, reported, a joint agreement was signed between representatives of parliament and the republic's government on the one hand, and representatives of miners' strike committees on the other, on all Ukrainian coal enterprises starting work in the next two days. Kiev, you are on the air. The details, please.

[Sokolov] Indeed, yesterday at the evening session of the republic's Supreme Soviet this protocol was announced, which had just been signed after long and difficult negotiations. From this it is clear that on the whole all nine points of the demands of the striking miners have been satisified, or a compromise has been found. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately when all this was being discussed and was already signed, representatives of the Republic party and even some opposition people's deputies were speaking on the city's main square, and—hardly in the interests of the miners—not only called for the strike to continue, but to broaden it. For this reason Viktor Dmitriyevich Gladush, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, had reason to say during a television round table:

[Begin Gladush recording] Yes, they are playing the miners' card. Regardless of who wants to hold on to power with the help of the miners, or come to power, or wants to satisfy his ambitions, they should remember that the price—the destruction of the national economy—is so high that no one can ever get rid of these debts. Everyday we are destroying the national economy. I as a man, a specialist, with all my soul feel how cold batteries of coking ovens are now coming to collapse, how coking by-products are suffering, how blast furnaces are standing idle, how builders stand idle, how restrictions are being introduced on electricity, now the people, the population of the Ukraine, will suffer.

For this reason I once more appeal to the miners with the words that are written in the protocol: It is necessary to get to work. Everything written here is guaranteed. The super impossible has been done. I repeat that whoever comes to power we have to resurrect everything with our own hands and heads. There is no other way. [end recording]

[Sokolov] For the moment the miners are still on strike. Today their representatives once again met with members of the government and parliamentary deputies. They received all the signed documents and left for their collectives. So on the whole there can be changes only in a day or two. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Deputies Hear Plan To Settle Strikes

LD1904202291 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Today the [Supreme Soviet] deputies heard information by their colleague, Ivan Balyna. He is a member of the parliamentary commission which since yesterday [17 April], along with representatives of the government, held talks in Kiev with the delegates of the striking miners. Ivan Balyna said that these talks ended with the adoption of a joint protocol. Concrete agreements were reached on all the articles of this document. They are as follows: One of the variants of a new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] will be examined in May. The Constitution must be adopted prior to the signing of the Union treaty. The striking miners agreed to a gradual increase of their wages, taking into account the complicated economic situation in the republic. At the same time, their collectives will be given the centralized credit on favorable terms, mainly from the national budget, to ensure normal functioning of coal-mining enterprises. Not one of them is going to be closed this year. This is guaranteed by the government. It has been envisaged that the miners will receive certain compensation for their losses sustained as a result of the strike. The miners' partners from other industrial branches will refrain from raising the losses brought about by the strike. The strikers themselves will not be subjected to administrative or any other kind of persecutions. Also settled was an issue on privileged pensions to certain categories of miners. The sides also agreed that other demands of the striking miners will be in the focus of attention of a work group, which will mediate in permanent talks. The demand of the miners to provide their representatives with an opportunity to speak over the republican TV was also met. On their part, the miners have to resume work within two days' time after the agreement was reached. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Students Announce Protest for 23 Apr

LD1904220891 Moscow TASS in English 2137 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS Correspondent Marina Tarnavskaya]

[Text] Kiev April 20 TASS—"Our patience is wearing thin. Half a year has passed since the student hunger strike in Kiev, but the government is in no hurry to fulfil its promises, recorded in the resolution, which was adopted in connection with those developments on October 17, 1990," said Yuriy Zubko, coordinator of the Kiev branch of the Ukrainian Student Union. He spoke on Friday at a meeting of leaders of Ukrainian youth organisations with chairman of the republican parliament Leonid Kravchuk and heads of a number of parliamentary commissions and committees.

Leaders of the Ukrainian Student Union, the Independent Ukrainian Youth Union, the youth branch of RUKH [Ukrainian Peoples Movement] and a number of other organisations believe that it is impossible to resolve economic problems and create proper living conditions for the young and for people in general without settling political problems and creating a truly independent Ukrainian state.

The meeting was intended as an attempt to consolidate the Ukrainian youth movement, which is lacking unity, to find common goals recorded in programmes of various organisations, and to establish contacts with government structures. Kravchuk assured the meeting that he was not going to deviate one bit from provisions of the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Ukraine. He said that negotiations between a commission of the Ukrainian parliament and students would be held on April 22. Youth leaders, with the exception of Komsomol leaders said, however, that their organisations did not trust the republican parliament and the Council of Ministers because of their failure to fulfil previous promises, and announced their intention to begin an all-Ukrainian protest action on April 23.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Discusses Restructuring

LD1904200991 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Today [18 April] the session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet continued its work in Kiev. The main attention of the parliament members was focussed on the question pertaining to the restructuring of the state management structure in the republic. It has been proposed to replace the current Council of Ministers by the Cabinet of Ministers.

Head of government Vitold Fokin pointed to several reasons. These are the deepening economic crisis, the decline in the living standards of the population, and ever-growing social tensions. As a result of this, numerous strikes take place in Ukraine. The discipline of enterprises is declining. The restructuring processes are hampered by the resistance offered by the administration, by the injunction system. The Council of Ministers, as its link, seems to be unprepared to remedy the situation and develop market economy in the republic. We must finally get rid of the dictate of the center and give priority to national interests. The executive power should, at the same time, be as flexible as possible and comply with the requirement of market economy, said Vitold Fokin. The world experience shows that the transformation of the Council of Ministers into the Cabinet of Ministers will help solve problems. Unlike the Council of Ministers, the Cabinet of Ministers will exclude the possibility of preserving the bureaucratic administration machine. The Cabinet of Ministers will promote in every way possible market relations in the economy, and will be able to carry out a consistent social and economic policy, which is so much awaited for by the entire society.

Vitold Fokin said the following about the new structure of the republic's government: It is envisaged to have two vice premiers. Unlike present-day deputies of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the new vice premiers will be responsible not only for this or that group of issues or branches, but for all the affairs of the cabinet. I am convinced that such an institution as state ministers should be also introduced. Unlike ministers, they will be responsible not for a separate branch of the economy, but for problems which are to be solved comprehensively, with the participation of various ministries and departments. Of course, the state ministers will have the right to give instructions to any ministry or department, said Vitold Fokin.

A principally new factor will be concentration of the new government on economic policy. For this purpose, a State Council is proposed to be set up, to be headed by the prime minister. It will be the brain or the intellectual potential of the republic in the field of economy. The State Council will coordinate the activities of the republic's Ministry of Economy. The speaker outlined the list of ministries which will be set up in compliance with the new structure of the government. In his opinion, one of the most important will be the ministry in charge of denationalization and demonopolization of the new production sphere. The number of ministries will notably decrease. Mostly those will remain which ensure the republic's development along the main trends of economy. The ministries, especially some of the new ones, will have significant independence, first and foremost in realizing socially important programs. At the same time, priority financial support will be rendered, as Vitold Fokin stated, to the ministry dealing with the protection of the population from the after-effects of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the ministries of culture and information, and on youth affairs.

In particular, the speaker dwelt on the expediency of setting up a national defense ministry: I believe that there should not be such a subdivision in this lay-out, [sentence as heard] The majority of the people of Ukraine spoke out for the establishment of a new Union which would be delegated a limited number of functions, including defense, possibly strategy. But we are not side-stepping this sphere. State management on the part of the republic's government will be carried out by the state minister for national defense and emergency situations, and the State Committee on Communication with the USSR Defense Ministry.

Vitold Fokin stated that the new structure of government was worked out in perspective. The majority of the people's deputies in general approved the new concept of economic management put forth by the prime minister. [passage omitted]

The discussion of the report made by Vitold Fokin ended with a general parliament voting. The suggested new structure of the government, the Cabinet of Ministers, was approved as a whole. [passage omitted]

Ukraine Premier Urges New Cabinet of Ministers

LD2104132491 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 21 Apr 91

[Text] The Ukrainian prime minister, Vitold Fokin, has appealed to Parliament for a government reshuffle as part of efforts to overhaul the existing command administrative system.

He said the Government must be converted to a cabinet of ministers with the number of ministries curtailed, but new ones formed to coordinate the operation of plants under market conditions.

Ukrainian Leader's Son 'Brutally Murdered'

PM1604145391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 91 Second Edition p 6

[UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Murder in Kiev"]

[Text] Valeriy Plyushch, 30-year-old son of I.S. Plyushch, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, has been brutally murdered in Kiev.

The corpse, bearing the marks of a brutal beating and countless knife wounds, was found in his apartment. Valeriy Plyushch worked in a cooperative translating foreign literature.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted.

Caucasus

Further Reportage on South Ossetian Situation

Three Killed in Machine Gun Attack

LD2104123391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 21 Apr 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] More shooting in Tskhinvali. An Ossetian village near the city was machine-gunned. Three people were killed and there are some wounded.

In North Ossetia a state of emergency has been imposed in the city of Vladikavkaz and its suburbs. This is in response to continuing armed clashes between members of the Ingush and Ossetian peoples. Some people have been wounded, among them members of the republic Interior Ministry personnel.

More Clashes, Deaths Reported

LD2004153191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1408 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 20 Apr (TASS)—The situation in the South Ossetia oblast center—Tskhinvali—remains complicated, a TASS correspondent was told at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Shots were fired in two Georgian rayons. In the town a 23-year-old Ossetian was killed. Fires continue to burn in the oblast center. On the night of 18-19 April servicemen of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were forced to open fire on a Moskvich car whose driver failed to stop when required to do so by a troop unit and tried to run down a soldier. As a result, a female passenger in the car was fatally wounded. It was discovered that the car was driven by a drunken driver. An investigation is being conducted into the incident.

A TASS correspondent has reported from Vladikavkaz, citing the press center of the emergency committee under the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic, that on 19 April the village of Tsisevi in Tskhinvalskiy Rayon was fired on by heavy machine guns. As a result three Ossetians were killed and others wounded. Only the intervention by servicemen of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs prevented further bloodshed.

'Mercy Shipments' Sent

PM1904144791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 91 First Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Mercy Shipments for South Ossetia"]

[Text] South Ossetia today is a land of great human sorrow. Although the gunfire has subsided in recent days, the suffering goes on for the people who have been forced to leave their native homes and become refugees. Children, women, the elderly and the sick are all victims of the conflict. The lives of these people are in danger because of the disruption of normal lifelines and the lack of produce. They all need emergency aid, and especially medicines and foodstuffs.

Since the beginning of the conflict the needs and concerns of South Ossetia have been the focus of attention for the Central Commission on Organizing the Utilization of Foreign Humanitarian Aid, set up by order of the USSR president and operating under his control. In anticipation of the present situation, over 500 tonnes of foodstuffs from shipments of humanitarian aid from the FRG were sent to help refugees, children, and sick people in South Ossetia back in February.

Since then, the Central Commission has systematically organized the delivery of various shipments to South Ossetia—canned meats and vegetables, powdered milk, salami, fish, macaroni, tea, sugar. In all, 3,500 tonnes of goods have been dispatched.

The next consignment of mercy shipments will be sent this week, after three barges carrying 825 tonnes of food make their way from FRG river ports along the Danube and into the Soviet port of Reni near Ismail 18-19 April. There they will be transferred to rail cars and delivered as instructed.

The Central Commission on Organizing the Utilization of Foreign Humanitarian Aid is monitoring the situation in South Ossetia closely and will henceforth be exploiting every opportunity to improve the lot of refugees and other victims of the conflict.

Interior Ministry Spokesman Comments

LD1904155491 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—The situation in South Ossetia has not changed much, a spokesman for the Soviet Interior Ministry press centre told TASS today. Illegal armed groups continue to make sorties on the territory of the autonomous region.

Maneuvering groups of the Interior Ministry troops detained in Tskhinvali nine cars without number plates and 18 people for the violation of the curfew. 126 trucks were brought to the region, escorted by army details.

The economic blockade of Tskhinvali is continuing. Electricity supply to the city has not been resumed.

Armenian Communist Property Nationalization Noted

Council of Ministers To Manage Property

NC2004081391 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 19 Apr 91

["The Decision of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet on the Nationalization of the Property of the Armenian Communist Party and the Former Leninist Communist Youth League of Armenia"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Considering that the integration of the state power structures with the Communist Party and the recognition of the leading role of the Communist Party have been used by the party to amass huge material resources; and considering that the property of the Communist Party has been accrued at the expense of many generations of citizens of the republic and at the expense of state property, the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet decides:

To nationalize all of the property of the Armenian Communist Party and of its effective component the Leninist Communist Youth League, presently known as the Armenian Youth Union, and to consider this property as the property of the state and hand over the right of its management to the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers.

[Signed] L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet; and A. Saakyan, secretary of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet

[Dated] 17 April 1991, Yerevan

Communist Party Protests Seizures

LD1904184491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1727 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan, 19 Apr (TASS)—The Communist Party of Armenia Central Committee has resolutely protested the decision by the legislature of this Transcaucasian republic to nationalize the property of the Communist Party.

A statement adopted at a plenum of the Communist Party of Armenia Central Committee in Yerevan today notes that the decision by the republic's Supreme Soviet is a "serious departure from proclaimed democratic principles." "The Supreme Soviet has in effect violated Armenia's Constitution and the republic's laws on ownership and sociopolitical organizations," the document says.

The legislature's decision cannot promote the stabilization of the situation in the republic and is the latest attempt to divert the working people's attention from the grave socioeconomic position and from the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Communist Party of Armenia reserves the right to struggle by all lawful means for the restoration of its violated rights, the plenum noted.

The Communist Party of Armenia Central Committee has made a proposal to the republic's Supreme Soviet that the decision on the nationalization of the property of the Communist Party be reviewed and that it be rescinded as unlawful.

Party Criticized Over Reaction

NC2004105891 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 20 Apr 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee issued a statement saying: The property of the Armenian Communist Party has been acquired basically from property belonging to the CPSU Central Committee. The Armenian Communist Party manages this property legally, but the decision to nationalize it and declare it as state property is devoid of any legal foundation.

Marxism's classical propagandists, the expropriators of the expropriators, suddenly consider themselves expropriated, forgetting that the property about which the CPSU Central Committee and the Armenian Communist Party talk was our property. The land on which their buildings were raised is ours; it is the property of the republic.

And a host of other arguments! That decision does not contribute in any way to stabilizing the situation in the republic and aims at diverting the workers' attention from the grave socioeconomic situation and the basic problem of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh]. What an impassioned concern!

This statement is followed by a threat: Whereas the Armenian Communist Party has done and is doing everything it can to eliminate confrontation and reduce the tension in the republic, the decision of the Supreme Soviet leads towards the exacerbation of the tension and could result in such consequences for which the Armenian Communist Party cannot bear responsibility.

After this commentary, HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN has also published the appeal made by Kapanets, deputy administrator of administrative affairs of the CPSU Central Committee, to Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers. In it Kapanets tries to show that the decision to nationalize the property of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee is wrong.

Cabinet Acts on Decision

NC2004103691 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 19 Apr 91

["The Decision of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers on the Nationalization of the Property of the Armenian Communist Party and the Former Leninist Communist Youth League of Armenia"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] In keeping with the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet decision of 17 April 1991 "on the Nationalization of the Property of the Armenian Communist Party and the Former Leninist Communist Youth League of Armenia," the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers decides:

1. To instruct the executive committees of the city and rayon soviet of people's deputies:

A. To create commissions, under the chairmen of the executive committees, that would take custody of the property of the Armenian Communist Party and of the Armenian Youth Union [former Leninist Communist Youth League of Armenia].

B. To instruct the said commissions to finish taking custody of all of property of the Armenian Communist Party and the Armenian Youth Union within a week from 22 April 1991.

To instruct the Armenian Republic Internal Affairs Ministry to ensure the protection of the property during the receivership and afterwards.

2. To instruct the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and the Presidium of the Armenian Youth Union to hand over custody of all of their property to the commissions of the city and rayon soviet executive committees of people's deputies within a week starting on 22 April 1991.

3. To instruct the executive committees of Yerevan, Leninakan, and Kirovakan city soviets of people's deputies to create the necessary conditions to enable the Armenian Communist Party to continue functioning.

To instruct the Yerevan City Soviet Executive Committee to create similar conditions in Yerevan for the Armenian Youth Union.

4. To instruct the commission that was set up on 18 January 1991 by Decision No. 23 of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to summarize the material obtained from the executive committees of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies concerning the reception of the property of the Armenian Communist Party and Armenian Youth Organization, and to submit the results to the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers.

5. To instruct the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Armenian Youth Union, and the Armenian Republic's banks not to make any transactions on the accounts of the Armenian Communist Party and the Armenian Youth Union, except for expenses of the publications department and the printing house of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, until further instructions from the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers.

[Signed] V. Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers; and H. Akobyan, acting director of the administrative affairs of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers

[Dated] 18 April 1991, Yerevan

Nationalization Now Effective

LD2204084591 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] As of today, all the property of the Communist Party of Armenia and of the former Young Communist League of that republic has to be turned over for the upkeep to a commission of the local councils. One week has been set as the deadline for the turnover. The Armenian Government has frozen the bank accounts of these two organizations. The decision to nationalize the property was taken by the Armenian Parliament a few days ago. It was motivated by a claim that the fusion of the Communist Party and state power was used for the accumulation of vast material resources in the hands of the party. In the meantime the Central Committee Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party as a whole has protested the decision of the Armenian Parliament.

Armenia To Take Part in Interrepublican Group

NC2004143191 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1830 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpt] The Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium has held a meeting under Supreme Soviet Chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan at which a cable sent to Ter-Petrosyan by Ruslan Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet Presidium, was read out. The cable proposed that Armenia participate in the creation of an interrepublican parliamentary group that would formulate a plan to satisfy the demands of the striking workers, including the coal miners, in the various regions of the country.

The meeting decided Armenia would participate in the upcoming meeting of the interrepublican parliamentary group by sending Armenian Republic People's Deputies Eduard Yegoryan, Avetik Grigoryan, and Anait Bayandur.

The meeting then discussed a proposal by a group of Armenian Republic people's deputies, including Rafayel Gazaryan and Norayr Manaseryan, to bring forward the date for the referendum on the status of Armenia. The Supreme Soviet Presidium deemed it unnecessary to change the date for the republican referendum, as an analysis of the situation indicates that such a move is not warranted. [passage omitted]

Armenian Supreme Soviet Decides To Reopen Nairit

NC2004113191 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 18 Apr 91

["The Decision of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet on the Commissioning of Production Lines at the Nairit Scientific-Production Association"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Text] Having studied the proposal of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers for commissioning the production of chloroprene rubber and latexes at the Nairit Scientific-Production Association, the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet decides:

1. To allow the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to commission the production of chloroprene rubber and latexes at the Nairit Scientific-Production Association until 31 December 1995 within the existing capacity, and maintaining the existing ecological standards.

2. To instruct the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to resolve the issue of bringing Nairit Scientific-Production Association under full control of the republic during 1991.

3. To instruct the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to find a respecialization plan for the factory within a year, and introduce relevant measures in the republic's socioeconomic plan as of 1992.

4. To create an environmental protection organ under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources should present the structure and functions of the aforesaid organ to the Supreme Soviet within a month.

5. To instruct the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to divert all income from the operations of the Nairit Scientific-Production Association to a solution to the social problems of the population in Yerevan's southern industrial zone and adjacent areas. To present the package of measures in this direction to the Supreme Soviet within three months.

6. To consider invalid the 25 June 1989 decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on Nairit Scientific-Production Association.

[Signed] Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet; and Saakyan, secretary of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet

[Dated] 17 April 1991, Yerevan

NKAO Troops Send Appeal to Country's Leaders

LD1904144591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] NOVOSTI news agency reports that a general meeting of personnel of the internal troops of the commandant's office maintaining the state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has adopted an appeal to the presidents of the USSR and Azerbaijan, the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the USSR KGB, and the country's minister of internal affairs. The appeal notes that the situation in the oblast remains tense, and that only a political solution to the Nagorno Karabakh problem can restore peace. The servicemen appeal to the leaderships of the country and both republics, calling upon them to cast aside political ambitions for this purpose.

Mutalibov Orders Curfew Lifted in Baku

NC1904180191 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Azerbaijan Republic President Ayaz Mutalibov, considering the proposal made by the Baku City People's Deputies Soviet Presidium, issued a decree on 19 April 1991 instructing Valeriy Buniyatov, military commandant of Baku City, to lift the curfew in Baku City at 0000 on 20 April 1991.

Azerbaijani Government Compensates for Price Hikes

LD1904103691 Moscow TASS in English 0848 GMT 19 Apr 91

[By AZERINFORM-TASS correspondent Natan Barskiy]

[Text] Baku April 19 TASS—The Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers passed a resolution on additional social protection measures for the population of the Transcaucasian republic in connection with the recent price increases.

Funds have been allocated to the Azerbaijani Public Education Ministry, as well as to the regional and municipal public education departments, to compensate for up to 50 per cent of the price increase on school meals.

The Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov had earlier decreed the abolition of all sales taxes on basic foodstuffs. This will allow the people of the republic to save more than 130 million roubles annually.

Three Azerbaijanis Killed in Armenian Attacks

NC2204103691 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] On 18 April three more people were killed in armed attacks in the republic. The Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs has informed an AZERINFORM correspondent that armed men shot at a vehicle taking a group of local militiamen and internal

troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs somewhere close to Fizulinskiy Rayon's Ashagy Divanallar town on 18 April. The shots came from the direction of the town of Kyrmyzhy Bazar in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast's Martuninskiy Rayon. Lieutenant Khimmetov, field inspector affiliated with the Fizulinskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department; Inayev, military serviceman; and Aghayev, the driver, were killed in this treacherous attack. Two others in the vehicle were wounded.

According to the rayon departments of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs, armed Armenians fired on Shusha City and the town of (?Zhizhimly) in Lachinskiy Rayon and the town of Karavelliler in Kedabekskiy Rayon on 18 April. No one was hurt in the attacks.

Two Azerbaijanis Killed; Security Forces Fired On

NC1904102791 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 19 Apr 91

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The newspaper KOMMUNIST reports that the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast continues to be tense. The press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs told a TASS correspondent that a patrol unit of the internal troops was shot at with automatic weapons while driving out of the Meshely residential area in Askeranskiy Rayon on 15 April. The soldiers were forced to return fire.

A militia worker was wounded in the head during an exchange of fire with unidentified people in Martuninskiy Rayon on the same day. In addition, an intensive exchange of fire took place between the [word indistinct] residential areas on the night of 15 April. The internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the members of the investigation and operations group are checking passports in several residential areas in the oblast.

The Republic of Azerbaijan Committee for State Security informed An AZERINFORM correspondent that a large number of armed men were seen gathering in the Armenian town of Karachinar in Gorenboyskiy Rayon. The bullet-riddled bodies of Asadov and Bashrakhimov were discovered five km from Sorik on 16 April. They were residents of that town. The employees of the Gorenboyskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department and the Operations Group of the Republic of Azerbaijan Committee for State Security were shot at with automatic weapons, including machine guns, while traveling to the site of the incident. The fire was returned. No one was killed or wounded.

Central Asia

Tatarstan Declaration of Sovereignty Becomes Law

LD2004103791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1012 GMT 20 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Sorokin]

[Text] Kazan, 20 Apr (TASS)—The declaration of the sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan, which was declared eight months ago, has been made law. It was incorporated into the constitution of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic [TSSR] at the republic's supreme soviet session today. Its first article now states: "The Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic is a sovereign democratic state, expressing the will and interests of all the multiethnic peoples of the republic."

The main body of the law also contains an article on the presidency: "The head of state of the TSSR is the president of the TSSR, who is to be elected by popular vote." The constitutional commission has been entrusted with working out a draft law on elections to the post of president, which will be examined at the next session. They believe that in this fashion, Tatariya will have its own president in the coming months.

Kyrgyzstan President, Renewed CP Leadership Meet

PM1704155991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent Yu. Razgulyayev report: "Pooling Efforts"]

[Text] Bishkek, 16 Apr—D. Amanbayev, first secretary of the Kyrgyzstan Communist Party Central Committee, has addressed the republic Supreme Soviet session which has opened here. He was elected to this post just a few days ago. On behalf of the renewed Central Committee Bureau D. Amanbayev proposed pooling the efforts of state power and all progressive forces in the struggle to surmount the economic crisis situation. Party organizations at all levels, he said, must become a center of consolidation and the soviets' chief bulwark in implementing the policy of civic peace and accord.

Kyrgyzstan Republic President A. Akayev had a businesslike meeting the previous day with the Communist Party's new leadership. They discussed close cooperation in accelerating democratic transformations and economic reforms and the fuller utilization of the potential of party committees for resolving acute problems of life.

Akayev promulgated a decree appointing the first secretary of the Kyrgyzstan Communist Party Central Committee a member of the republic's Presidential Council.

Tajikistan Exempts Some Goods From 5-Percent Tax

PM1804124391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 91 Second Edition p 6

[Correspondent L. Makhkamov report: "Tax Abolished"]

[Text] Dushanbe—You only have to glance at the list of goods whose sale the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Cabinet of Ministers has decided to exempt from the 5-percent tax on the republic's territory to see clearly that the reasons were very substantial. A large number of large families, the lowest average wage in the country, and the indigenous population's traditionally restricted diet force the republic government to constantly seek ways to raise the prosperity of the disadvantaged sector of the population to the level of that of the rest. This time it has done so by abolishing the sales tax on bread, bakery products, flour, groats, pasta, sugar, tea, vegetable oil, milk, dairy products, eggs, salt, baby food, linen for newborn babies, sewn and knitted goods and hosiery for children, school uniforms, toys, and school textbooks.

The republic Finance Ministry has been instructed to compensate state and cooperative trade enterprises for losses through budget revenue derived from the sales tax on other goods. The resolution goes into effect this year.

Turkmenistan CP Plenum Holds Ashkabad Meeting

LD1604202591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Apr 91

[Text] A plenum of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan's Communist Party took place in Ashkhabad today. Tasks of party organizations in improving the political situation in the republic; the budget of the Turkmen party organization for this year; and organizational and other questions, were considered at the plenum. Under present political conditions, the plenum stressed, resolute practical actions are required of the republican party organization to stabilize and deepen positive tendencies in the republic and to mobilize all protective forces of the social organism. Niyazov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of Turkmenistan's Communist Party, spoke at the plenum.

Progress of 'Radical Reforms' Viewed

PM1804145791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Toward Decisive Actions"]

[Text] Ashkhabad, 16 Apr—Having refused to copy other people's experience and made a conscious choice, with due regard for local conditions, in favor of gradual development and stability, the Turkmen Communist Party has, to a certain extent, secured favorable conditions for the development of perestroyka processes and the creation of political and legal preconditions for radical reforms. The participants in a Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee plenum spoke of this today. The tasks of party organizations in improving the political situation in the republic, the Turkmen Party Organization's budget for this year, and organizational and other questions were examined at the plenum.

Under conditions of the present political situation, it was emphasized at the plenum, decisive practical actions are required of the republic party organization to stabilize and deepen positive trends in the republic and to mobilize all protective forces of the social organism.

The plenum was addressed by S.A. Niyazov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee.